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Introduction 
 
“ Compliance is everything”1. 
 
Thomas Friedman 
 
* * * 
 
0. As corporate compliance has become an integral part of both the legal 
and the policy discourse, this research sets out to examine some of the key 
questions posed by compliance to contemporary corporate governance.The 
dominant question surrounding compliance in cross-border corporate groups 
concerns the concentration of duties within a group holding company against 
the backdrop of regulatory diversity, increased private-to-private compliance 
obligations and growing attention to risk management.  
 
1. The research draws on a wide body of literature (books, policy elements, 
peer-reviewed articles, grey literature, press reports, internet based materials) 
dealing with a variety of compliance-related topics such as the nature of the 
duties associated to compliance, its implications for corporate governance in the 
context of corporate groups active in different jurisdictions and the interplay 
with risk management regulations. This thesis provides multiple and 
                     
1Friedman, T. L. (2005). The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
7 
 
 
converging evidence that the challenges of compliance within a cross-border 
group cannot be solved by relying exclusively on a “one-size-fits-all” process as 
a means for staying compliant with their foreign obligations throughout the 
world. While an accurate assessment of compliance organizations’ recognition 
in alien jurisdictions will only be possible once a robust bulk of case law and 
policy developments become available, this thesis acknowledges that the job of 
group compliance offer may indeed prove a Sisyphean task but there are 
several limitations imposed on his role which should be duly taken into 
account. More specifically, this thesis specifically aims to advance research in 
the area of corporate compliance by addressing the complexity associated with 
recognition of compliance organizations, corporate programs and processes 
adopted in foreign jurisdictions, and the uncertainties which surround the role 
and liability of board members and compliance officers.  
 
2. Afundamental and controversial preliminary question examined in Part I 
of this research is whether “corporate compliance” is a novel concept an sichto 
which actual legal and policy consequences can be connected, and, if so, which 
ones and to what extent. Over the last 10 years, compliance has become a 
fashionable topic across Europe. Yet, for all its fashion, the very expression 
“compliance” is not entirely clear in its contours, contents and implications. 
Several factors arguably concurred to determine this lack of clarity and 
indefiniteness. Firstly, the term “compliance” was often left untranslated, so 
that it is called “corporate compliance” (or simply “compliance”) in languages 
other than English. Moreover,the terms “corporate compliance” and 
“compliance” are often used interchangeably,though this research provides 
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evidence that  “corporate compliance” seems to put more emphasis on the 
aspects of thelegal configuration of the organisational structure and represents 
reciprocation tothe obligations of “corporate governance”2. Secondly, 
compliance is mentioned in the media frequentlybut it is rarely analysed as a 
comprehensive legal and policy issue. As a scholar put it: “In der Oeffentichkeit 
kam die schnelle Verurteilung!”3(Translation: “The quick judgement was made in 
the media spotlight!”).Little attention is paid to legal criteria and categories at 
all, and no distinction is for instance made between good practice(soft law) on 
one hand, and law prescriptions(hard law) on the other hand. In addition, it is 
usually not asked whether cross-border compliance on a large scale represents a 
new international policy pattern.  
 
3. At the outset of this research, it is also necessary to clarify that 
compliance is different from “corporatesocial responsibility”, which has an 
even wider scope and effect4. In fact, the latter termcovers the moral, social and 
ethical behaviour standards maintained by the companyby means of the 
establishment of in-house guidelines and codes of conduct. Corporate social 
responsibility is routinely not considered a legal duty – unless it is explicitly 
embedded in a legal obligation - but merely a combination of in-house 
                     
2 Casper, M. (2012). Corporate Governance and Corporate Compliance. In Du Plessis, J.J., 
Großfeld, B., Luttermann, C., Saenger, I., Sandrock, O., & Casper, M. (Eds.),German 
Corporate Governance. International and European Context.Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, 358-
397. 
3Schneider, U.H. (December 8, 2009). Compliance im Konzern, NZG - Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht, 34, 1321. 
4Lampert, T. (2010). Corporate Compliance – Handbuch der Haftungsvermeidung im 
Unternehmen.München:CH Beck Verlag, S9,20. 
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requirements with which the company aims tocomply, often to benefit from a 
marketing point of view. Yet, according to several scholars5, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to separate compliance from corporate social 
responsibility. Moreover, some legal definitions, such as the one provided 
under Article 4.1.3 of the German Corporate Governance Codex (GCGC)6 also 
seems to include the concept of corporate social responsibility under 
compliance7 insofar as it not only stipulates obedience to the law but also 
includes aspirational goals. The Basel Committee seems to semantically include 
elements of corporate social responsibility within compliance policy: “[…] a 
bank’s compliance policy will not be effective unless the board of directors promotes the 
values of honesty and integrity throughout the organisation. Compliance with 
applicable laws, rules and standards should be viewed as an essential means to this 
end”8. Also the newly released ISO 19600 standard9 on compliance management 
systems states that: “an organization’s approach to compliance is ideally shaped by the 
leadership applying core values and generally accepted corporate governance, ethical 
                     
5 Wolfframm, S. (2008). Die ethische Dimension der Compliance. München-Ravensburg: GRIN 
Verlag, 6. 
6“The Management Board ensures that all provisions of law and the company’s internal policies are 
abided by and works to achieve their compliance by group companies (compliance)”. 
7Casper, M. (2012). Corporate Governance and Corporate Compliance. In Du Plessis, J.J., 
Großfeld, B., Luttermann, C., Saenger, I., Sandrock, O., & Casper, M. (Eds.),German 
Corporate Governance. International and European Context.Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer,358-
397. 
8http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf. 
9 ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of 
national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International 
Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body 
interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to 
be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-
governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. 
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and community standards. Embedding compliance in the behaviour of the people 
working for an organization depends above all on leadership at all levels and clear 
values of an organization, as well as an acknowledgement and implementation of 
measures to promote compliant behaviour. If this is not the case at all levels of an 
organization, there is a risk of noncompliance”. ISO’s position is also that: 
“organizations are increasingly convinced that by applying binding values and 
appropriate compliance management, they can safeguard their integrity and avoid or 
minimize noncompliance with the law. Integrity and effective compliance are therefore 
key elements of good, diligent management. Compliance also contributes to the socially 
responsible behaviour of organizations”.It is thus fair to say that it is often difficult 
to draw the line that separates compliance from corporate social responsibility, 
and this is largely due to the fact that compliance duties exists (both general 
ones and substantive ones) but they come in open-ended form and provide 
significant flexibility as to how compliance should be organized by a company 
or a corporate group.   
 
4. Another key aspect in the global discourse about compliance concerns its 
relation with the increasingly dominant risk culture, and with the spreading of 
risk management as a key component of contemporary managerial best practice 
and legal culture. Quite tellingly, the ISO 19600 guideline about compliance 
management systems also follows a risk-based approach: after establishing the 
context in which it operates, the organization must perform a “compliance risk 
assessment”. The identified risks (compliance obligations) are the basis for 
establishing and implementing controls. The performance of those risk 
treatment measures must then be evaluated and improved upon, as well as 
11 
 
 
communicated both internally and externally. One can even go so far as to say 
that compliance requires risk management10 but is in turn part of it11. What 
seems to be contradictory is actually quite logical: in order to conduct successful 
compliance management key compliance risks12 have to be selected and dealt 
with.  
 
5. Lastly, it is important to preliminarily point out that within the vast body 
of literature about compliance, many different perceptions of the ultimate 
purpose of compliance and about the role of boardrooms and compliance 
officers can be found. More specifically,  corporations and their leaders embody 
a role that is seen as shifting between the role of a sheriff or draconian enforcer, 
and the role of a teacher/educator13. As a scholar put it: “nach der einen Ansicht 
entspricht Compliance der Taetigkeit einer Polizeibehoerde. Sie hat repressive 
Funktionen. […] Nach einer zweiten Ansicht nimmt Compliance die Aufgaben einer 
Schulbehoerde wahr. Ihre Aufgabe lautet: informieren und kontrollieren“14 
(translation:“from one angle, compliance corresponds to the activity of a police 
institution, with repressive functions […] from another angle, the tasks of 
                     
10 Hauschka, C. E. (2007). Corporate Compliance – Handbuch der Haftungsvermeidung im 
Unternehmen, München: CH Beck Verlag, 3. 
11 Hauschka, C. E. (2007). Corporate Compliance – Handbuch der Haftungsvermeidung im 
Unternehmen, München: CH Beck Verlag, 11. 
12According to ISO 19600 par. 3.1.2 definition, compliance risk is “the effect of uncertainty on 
compliance objectives“, and it “can be characterized by the likelihood of occurrence and the 
consequences of noncompliance  with an organization’s compliance obligations“. 
13Weber, J., & Fortun, D. (2005).  Ethics and compliance officer profile: Survey, comparison, 
and recommendations. Business and Society Review, 110(2), 97-115. 
14Schneider, U.H. (December 8, 2009). Compliance im Konzern. NZG - Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht, 34, 1325. 
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compliance bear resemblance to those of a school/educational institution, 
whose role is to inform and control”). According to the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, for instance, one of the functions of the compliance 
function is “to assist senior management in educating staff on compliance issues”15, 
“acting as a contact point within the bank for compliance queries from staff members”, 
“establishing written guidance to staff on the appropriate implementation of compliance 
laws, rules and standards through policies and procedures and other documents such as 
compliance manuals, internal codes of conduct and practice guidelines”16. In our 
research, we will among other things show how important civil society, 
combined with “enforced self-regulation”, can be in modelling the contours of 
compliance’s contents.  
 
6. With this background in mind, this research is organized in three main 
parts:  
 
                     
15Par. 7.2.2 of the ISO 19600 standard (“Training”) clarifies that “the governing body, 
management and all employees have compliance obligations should be competent to discharge these 
effectively. The attainment of competence can be achieved in many ways, including skills and 
knowledge required through education, training or work experience. The objective of a training 
program is to ensure that all employees are competent to fulfil their job role in a manner that is 
consistent with the organization’s compliance culture and its commitment to compliance. Properly 
designed and executed training can provide an effective way for employees to communicate 
previously unidentified compliance risks. Education and training of employees should be: a) tailored 
to the obligations and compliance risks related to the roles and responsibilities of the employee; b) 
where appropriate, based on an assessment of gaps in employee knowledge and competence; c) 
undertaken at commencement with the organization and be on-going ; d) aligned to the corporate 
training program and be incorporated into annual training plans; e) practical and readily 
understood by employees; f) relevant to the day-to-day work of employees and illustrative of the 
industry, organization or sector concerned; g) sufficiently flexible to account for a range of 
techniques to accommodate the differing needs of organizations and employees”. 
16Available online at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf. 
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i. in part I, “compliance” duties are examined in the context of a single, 
stand-alone company. The primary research goal of this part is to  
investigate the very existence and the contours of the “duty of 
compliance”. In particular, the duty of compliance is examined both 
within the context of a wider management duty in general law, and with 
a view to specific legal obligations such as those set forth under Mifid. 
Furthermore, the contents of the compliance duty and its implications for 
corporate governance are explored. In particular, the organizational 
obligation (e.g. the duty to establish a compliance department within a 
company) embedded in the compliance duty is discussed and analysed 
against the backdrop of existing civil and criminal law developments  as 
well as key case law. The organizational aspects stemming from 
compliance are also taken into account, and processes to foster internal 
communication of potential violations within a company such as whistle-
blowing are described also with a view to potential conflicts with data 
protection laws. Finally, the allocation of compliance-related roles across 
management board, supervisory board and compliance department is 
pointed out, and reference is made to the role and specific liability of the 
compliance officer;  
 
ii. in part II,compliance duties are considered within the wider context of a 
corporate group, and in particular the trade-off between the compliance 
obligation of group subsidiaries, and the duty of the parent company is 
examined. Attention is devoted to one-enterprise schemes and 
judgements where the existence of a “group interest” that extends 
14 
 
beyond the interest of individual companies is detected. From the point 
of view of organization, the key distinction between centralized group-
wide compliance and decentralized compliance is examined. In the 
former model, a single compliance organization of the parent company 
oversees compliance for the whole group. In the latter model, the 
parent’s compliance organization usually sets general guidelines, but 
specific compliance management is dealt with by the subsidiaries’ 
compliance organizations. It is noted that within a centralized model the 
compliance officers of the parent company can be characterized as 
“external consultants” rendering their services to group subsidiaries, and 
that in many jurisdictions attorney-client privileges may be entailed, too. 
Specific limitations to compliance duties are pointed out in the context of 
a corporate group, and the case is made that the role of compliance 
officer of a cross-border corporate group is indeed a Sisyphean task, but 
also that substantial restraints are imposed on him/her by other legal 
obligations, regulatory diversity, complexity of organizations, the legal 
status of compliance officer;  
 
iii. in part III, the argument is upheld that compliance duties represent not 
just a legal novelty per se, but also a trend and an international policy 
noveltythat entails “enforced self-regulation” by corporate actors and 
increased collaboration with state authorities as well as the inclusion of 
compliance obligations which are not just statements of principles, but 
prescriptions about processes in private-to-private contractual 
arrangements. Among the factors contributing to the rise of compliance 
15 
 
 
as a global phenomenon, the tendency to blend risk management and 
legal obligations is examined – and so are the downsides of this 
tendency.    
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I 
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Compliance in the single company 
 
“ [the board has]a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a 
corporation’s information and reporting system, which the board 
concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some 
circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses 
caused by noncompliance with applicable legal standards.”. 
 
 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation17 
 
* * * 
 
Chapter 1: Compliance as a Management Task 
 
0. One of the first elements to address for the purposes of this research is 
whether “compliance” is (only) about good practice18 or whether it (also) entails 
binding legal duties. In this respect, as a scholar put it19, it is a Binseweisheit 
(truism) that corporate boards have to adhere to the law (in German: “an Recht 
und Gesetz”) when managing the company.  In fact, it goes without saying that a 
                     
17698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
18Goncharov, I., Werner, J. R., & Zimmermann, J. (2006). Does compliance with the German 
corporate governance code have an impact on stock valuation? An empirical analysis. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(5), 432-445. 
19Schneider, U.H. (December 8, 2009). Compliance im Konzern. NZG - Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht, 34, 1322. 
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board has to adhere to the law and to good management principles20. In 
Germany, for instance, there is agreement that the management board of an AG 
has a duty of legality(“Legalitaetspflicht”), and the same duty applies to an 
Italian Società per Azioni’s board insofar as it must comply with the applicable 
law when managingand directing the business of the corporation21. It is 
therefore clear from the very beginning that compliance is not (only) a good 
practice. This duty does notonly cover compliance with the law and the articles 
of incorporation by themanagement board itself, hence in the following 
paragraphs it will be examined what is entailed by this duty.  
1. Having acknowledged that the duty of legality is a basic requirement of 
the boardroom, it is also necessary to recall that the duty of legality typically  
includes an organisational duty22 to manage the company in such a way that 
compliance with the statutoryprovisions as well as the articles of incorporation 
is secured at all subsidiary levels,i.e. all operative departments of the whole 
company. This is particularly evident for  legal obligations which are binding 
for the company and/or for the directors. In particular, reference should be 
made to a variety of legal areas, starting from antitrust/competition law, 
                     
20Falk, M. (2012). Governance und Compliance–Begriff und Bezugsrahmen. IT-Compliance 
in der Corporate Governance.Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag, 27-45. 
21Frischemeier, A. (2014). Die Haftung geschäftsführender Organe für Compliance-Verstöße in 
Tochtergesellschaften. Pieterlen-Bern: Peter Lang Verlag. 
22Verse, D. A. (2011). Compliance im Konzern, Zur Legalitätskontrollpflicht der 
Geschäftsleiter einer Konzernobergesellschaft. ZHR - Zeitschrift für das gesamte handelsrecht 
und wirtschaftsrecht, 175(2), 401-424. 
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corporate law, etc..23Therefore, in Germany some speak of aduty to monitor 
legality (“Legalitaetskontrollpflicht”)24 or monitoring duty. According to 
Fleischer25, the monitoring duty can present itself with a gradient of intensity, as 
the monitoring duty can be more or less intensive depending on a number of 
elements, including the following ones: 
 Clues/suspect elements (“Verdachtsmomenten”): directors must act 
without immediately if they detect signs of potential breaches or 
unlawful behaviour by company employees. The duty, thus, arises 
when actual elements for suspicion (“greifbare Anhaltspunkte”) arise, and 
board directors must take action immediately.  
 Ongoing control (“Laufende Kontrolle”). As part of the duty to monitor, 
the board must engage in ongoing controls, and not just step in “ex 
post”, when a suspicion arises and the benefit of hindsight is available. 
 Precedents: if the company’s track record includes precedents of 
breaches or mis-compliance, this should result into heightened 
monitoring by the board, and in its organization. 
 Commensurate organization: the size and scope of monitoring duties 
should be commensurate with the size, type, complexity of the business 
                     
23Schneider, U.H., & Schneider, S.H. (2007). Konzern-Compliance als Aufgabe der 
Konzernleitung. ZIP – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 44, 2061-2065. 
24Verse, D. A. (2011). Compliance im Konzern, Zur Legalitätskontrollpflicht der 
Geschäftsleiter einer Konzernobergesellschaft. ZHR - Zeitschrift für das gesamte handelsrecht 
und wirtschaftsrecht, 175(2), 401-403. 
25Fleischer, H. (2008). Corporate Compliance im aktienrechtlichen Unternehmensverbund. 
CCZ - Corporate Compliance Zeitschrift, 1(1), 1-6. 
20 
 
conducted26. The principle of proportionality is very important, and it 
means that there is no such thing as a default compliance organization, 
but a variety of different solutions which have to match the actual 
business of the company and its group. This is for instance reflected in 
the words of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on bank 
compliance: “Regardless of how the compliance function is organised within a 
bank, it should be independent and sufficiently resourced, its responsibilities 
should be clearly specified, and its activities should be subject to periodic and 
independent review by the internal audit function. […] The principles should 
be applicable to all banks, although it is for individual banks to determine how 
best they should be implemented. A bank may be able to follow practices other 
than those set out in this paper which are also sound and which, taken together, 
demonstrate that its compliance function is effective. The way in which the 
principles are implemented will depend on factors such as the bank’s size, the 
nature, complexity and geographical extent of its business, and the legal and 
regulatory framework within which it operates. In smaller banks, for example, 
it may not be practicable to implement in full some of the specific measures 
recommended in this paper, yet the bank may be able to take other measures 
that achieve the same result”27.  
 
                     
26Schweikert, C., & Jantz, M. (2012). Corporate Governance in Abhängigkeit von 
Unternehmensstruktur und Unternehmensgröße-eine betriebswirtschaftlich-juristische 
Analyse.Leitlinien für das Management von Organisations-und Aufsichtspflichten.KICG-
Forschungspapiere, No. 3. 
27Available online at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf. 
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Compliancecounts as an indispensable part of the management board’s 
management tasks: Compliance ist Chefsache28! Further along these lines, 
according to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision April 2005 paper 
Compliance and the Compliance function in banks:  “a bank’s compliance policy will 
not be effective unless the board of directors promotes the values of honesty and 
integrity throughout the organisation. Compliance with applicable laws, rules and 
standards should be viewed as an essential means to this end. As is the case with other 
categories of risk, the board is responsible for ensuring that an appropriate policy is in 
place to manage the bank’s compliance risk. The board should oversee the 
implementation of the policy, including ensuring that compliance issues are resolved 
effectively and expeditiously by senior management with the assistance of the 
compliance function”29.  
 
2. Even if the law often grants discretion to corporate boards as to how and 
to what extent actually implement the organisational duty, this discretion 
should not be interpreted too broadly: complying or not complying with the 
laws is in any case not subject to the discretion of the board, and cannot 
represent an opportunity for cost-opportunity analysis30. In fact, maintaining 
that the method of compliance is subject to corporate discretion could lead to 
                     
28Schneider, U.H. (2003).Compliance als Aufgabe der Unternehmensleitung. ZIP - 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht,24, 645- 648; Neidthardt, N. (2013). Compliance Als Chefsache. 
München-Ravensburg: GRIN Verlag. 
29Available online at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf. 
30Fleischer, H. (2005). Aktienrechtliche Legalitaetspflicht und “nuetzliche” 
Pflichtverletzungen von Vorstandsmitgliedern.ZIP - Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 26,141-
147; Fleischer, H. (2010), Comment of §93. In Spindler, G., & Stilz, E. (Eds.),Aktiengesetz. 
München:CH Beck Verlag. 
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the assumption that breaches of less serious violations of compliance rules, 
which can increase profits for the company, are somehow exempt from the the 
duty of legality. For example, in Germany for a long time there were so-called 
“useful breaches of duty” (“nuetzliche Pflichtverletzungen”)31, e.g. thepayments of 
bribes or secret commissions abroad in order to secure lucrativebusiness deals. 
Frequently, a distinction is made between an internal and anexternal 
commitment to duties32. The internal commitment to duties covers allstatutory 
duties as well as those established by the articles of incorporation, withwhich 
the management board has to comply vis-a`-vis the company. In 
particular,these include duties deriving from the Aktiengesetz (German Stock 
CorporationAct), the articles of incorporation and the employment contracts of 
managementboard members. An external commitment to duties exists by 
means of all other statutory provisions which concern the company as a legal 
subject (“Rechtssubjekt”),which covers foreign rules of law and contractual 
duties. Compliance withprovisions regarding environmental protection serves 
as a typical example.With regard to the internal commitment to duties, there is 
agreement that theduty of legality applies without constraints. The external 
commitment to duties ismore difficult to adjudge. In 1985, the German Federal 
Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) decided33 that the payment ofa 
secret commission abroad may be immoral, but would not entail a breachof 
                     
31Grieger, A. (2010). Corporate Crime und Compliance: die straf-und zivilrechtliche 
Verantwortlichkeit eines boersennotierten Industriekonzerns und dessen Organe fuer 
Wirtschaftsdelikte seiner Mitarbeiter. Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag, Vol. 16. 
32 Casper, M. (2012). Corporate Governance and Corporate Compliance.In Du Plessis, J.J., 
Großfeld, B., Luttermann, C., Saenger, I., Sandrock, O., & Casper, M. (Eds.), German 
Corporate Governance. International and European Context.Berlin - Heidelberg: Springer, 365. 
33BGH, May 8, 1985. 
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duty of the acting management board in relation to the company (aslegal 
person), insofar as the payment of the secret commission was in accordancewith 
the local custom in the respective third country. This approach is no longer 
acceptable because German law has long aligned to intensified OECD-
Standards, nor would the case be reflecting nowadays law. 
 
3. When discussing the factors driving the debate on the establishment of 
compliance systems or “departments”, it is important to stress the importance 
of corporate liability. In several jurisdictions, no specific discipline existed that 
ascribes criminal responsibility not just to individuals but to legal entities in 
whose interest a crime was committed34. The development of corporate liability 
regulations arguably represents a key factor behind the development of 
compliance departments. This is because corporate liability regulations usually 
foresee sanctions’ mitigations if compliance programmes exist and are 
effectively implemented by the company. Italy was one of the last countries35 
that introduced a discipline about criminal enterprise liability in 2001. Other 
countries already foresaw36 forms of enterprise liability for crimes committed 
                     
34Geis, G., & DiMento, J. (1995). Should we prosecute Corporations and/or Individuals? In 
Pearce F., & Snider, L. (Eds.), Corporate Crime: Contemporary Debates.Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 72-90. 
35Armone, G. (2007). La responsabilità penale delle persone giuridiche nella prospettiva 
dell’Unione Europea.La responsabilità amministrativa delle società e degli enti, 1, 7. 
36 The United Kingdom eventually institutionalized enterprise liability with the 1978 
“Interpretation Act”, the Netherlands introduced enterprise liability under art. 51 of the 
Dutch criminal law back in 1979, and France 1994 under art. 121-2 of the criminal law code.  
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by individuals37. The US, which condensed this approach into the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act, were already at a very advanced stage of reflection, as the milestone 
case New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. U.S38 of 1909 shows. In 
this case, the Defendant corporation, New York Central & Hudson River 
Railroad Co. (Defendant), together with a managing agent within the 
corporation, were convicted of violating a federal law prohibiting the payment 
of rebates39. Specifically, the corporation was prosecuted for the payment of 
rebates to the American Sugar Refining Company arising out of shipments of 
sugar from New York to Detroit. The Defendant was prosecuted under the 
“Elkins Act”, 32 Stat. 847, which held a corporation criminally liable for 
unlawful acts of its agents.This important case took away the immunity from 
criminal prosecution that corporations previously enjoyed40. The court’s 
reasoning was that insomuch as the corporation could be imputed with the 
knowledge of the actions its employees were taking in the course of their 
employment, any criminal culpability for those actions – should they be in 
violation of law – could also be imputed to the corporation.Prosecutors need 
not show that the board, or even senior officers, encouraged or were complicit 
                     
37 Khanna, V.S. (2000). Corporate Liability Standards: When Should Corporations Be Held 
Criminally Liable?. AM. CRIM. L. REV -American Criminal Law Review, 37,1239, 1271-1272.  
38New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. U.S, 22 Ill.212 U.S. 481, 29 S. Ct. 304, 53 
L. Ed. 613 (1909). 
39DiMento, J.F.C.,& Geis, G.  (2005). Corporate criminal liability in the United States. In 
Tully, S. (Ed.), Research Handbook on Corporate Legal Responsibility. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, 159; Brickey, K. F. (1982). Corporate criminal accountability: A 
brief history and an observation.Washington ULQ - University Law Quarterly, 60, 
393.Available at: 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2261&context=law_lawrev
iew. 
40Wormser, M. (1912). Piercing the veil of corporate entity.Columbia Law Review, 12, 496. 
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in the crime. Thus, in order to deter criminal charges, managers must ensure 
that adequate information systems are in place and implement “policing 
measures” that increase the likelihood that the government detects and 
sanctions wrongdoers41. These measures include adopting effective compliance 
programs truly designed to detect wrongdoing and identify violators, promptly 
reporting wrongdoing to the government, and cooperating with any 
government investigation. Although effective enforcement of the criminal law 
depends on encouraging corporations to detect and report wrongdoing, until 
recently most laws did not encourage companies to do so42.  
 
4. As will be described more in-depth infra (Chapter 2, par. 9), on the one 
hand it is evident that there is such as thing as a duty of legality, and that the 
duty of legality includes an organizational duty as well. On the other hand, it is 
far less evident that this organizational duty entails the establishment of a 
corporate compliance department, i.e. an institution within the company. Some 
authors such as Schneider, based on a general analogy with substantive duties, 
believe that the duty of organization contains such as an obligation – a general 
obligation - as well. Since the existence of a general obligation to set up a 
corporate compliance department is not explicit, some guidance can be found in 
risk management provisions. After all, as we have pointed out in our research’ 
introduction, one can go so far as to say that compliance requires risk 
                     
41Gray, G. C. (2006). The Regulation of Corporate Violations, Punishment, Compliance, and 
the Blurring of Responsibility. British Journal of Criminology, 46.5, 875-892. 
42Ribstein, L. E. (2002).Market vs. regulatory responses to corporate fraud: A critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. J. Corp. L. - Journal of Corporation Law,28, 1. 
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management43 but is in turn part of it44. What seems to be contradictory is 
actually quite logical: in order to conduct successful compliance management 
key compliance risks have to be selected and dealt with. Substantive provisions 
on risk management and internal control are few. In 1998, for instance, the 
German Parliament enacted the Control and Transparency in Business Act 
(KonTraG) under which it was provided that the management board must 
establish an early risk recognition system. The system must provide assurance 
that material risks that can endanger the going concern of the company or, 
according to the German literature, can impair the net worth, financial position 
and results of the company in a sustainable manner, are identified. The German 
lawrequires a system to be set up, but only to the extent that risks that can cause 
material damage can be identified at an early stage. The management report 
must also report on the risks of the future development of the company45. 
Moreover, auditors must control the risk early recognition system.  
 
5. Also other European countries have foreseen “early risk detection” 
systems without going into specifics as to how the systems should be designed. 
For instance in 2010 the Danish Companies act was modernized, and it is 
provided that the board of directors, or in case the company has opted for a 
two-tier board structure, the supervisory board, must ensure that “adequate 
                     
43 Hauschka, C. E. (2007). Corporate Compliance – Handbuch der Haftungsvermeidung im 
Unternehmen, München: CH Beck Verlag, 3. 
44 Hauschka, C. E. (2007). Corporate Compliance. Handbuch der Haftungsvermeidung im 
Unternehmen, 11. 
45By analogy, also art. 2428 of the Italian civil code foresees extensive risk disclosure in the 
management report. 
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risk management and internal control procedures have been established”46. The 
Danish law does not provide any additional guidance to companies as to what 
is considered an “adequate” system. The Danish corporate governance code 
which was amended in 2011 to integrate the new Companies Act only 
recommends an annual identification of the most important business risks as 
well as communication between the executive and the supervisory boards of 
the most important areas of risk and compliance including the adopted policies, 
frameworks etc. in order to enable the supervisory board to assess the 
development and make the necessary decisions. The Danish act also provides 
indirectly for a similar early risk recognition system as the German act47. 
 
6. The UK Companies Act 2006 requires the director to consider inter alia 
the likely consequences of any decision in the long term and the impact of the 
company’s operations on the community and the environment. However, 
boards of listed companies must comply with more stringent internal control 
provisions. The UK Listing Rules compel companies to apply the Main 
Principles of the UK Corporate Governance Code and report to shareholders on 
how they have done so. Main principle C 2 makes the board responsible “for 
determining the nature and extent of the significant risks it is willing to take in 
achieving its strategic objectives. The board should maintain sound risk 
management and internal control systems”. The Financial Reporting Council’s 
                     
46Aven, T., & Renn, O. (2010). Risk management and governance: concepts, guidelines and 
applications. New York: Springer. 
47Van der Elst, C. (2013). The Risk Management Duties of the Board of Directors. Financial 
Law Institute, Working Paper, S2013-02. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2267502. 
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Internal Control Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code provides in 
details what it considers a “sound” system: 
 
“An internal control system encompasses the policies, processes, tasks, 
behaviours and other aspects of a company that, taken together:  
- facilitate its effective and efficient operation by enabling it to respond 
appropriately to significant business, operational, financial, compliance and 
other risks to achieving the company's objectives. This includes the safeguarding 
of assets from inappropriate use or from loss and fraud and ensuring that 
liabilities are identified and managed;  
- help ensure the quality of internal and external reporting. […];  
- help ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and also with 
internal policies with respect to the conduct of business.  
A company's system of internal control will reflect its control environment 
which encompasses its organizational structure. The system will include:  
- control activities;  
- information and communication processes; and  
- processes for monitoring the continuing effectiveness of the system of internal 
control.  
The system of internal control should:  
- be embedded in the operations of the company and form part of its culture; 
[…]”.  
 
Other countries only indirectly force the establishment of an internal control or 
risk management system. France is an example of this approach. The French 
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Commercial Code requires the board of directors to perform all controls and 
verifications that it considers expedient48. In Italy there is no general duty 
foreseen by the Civil Code to establish an internal control department – there is 
however, a duty to ensure an “adequate organization”. Specific requirements 
are foreseen by industry-specific or business-specific regulation. Perhaps more 
importantly, many corporate players are deliberately opting for establishing an 
ad hoc compliance department and effectively implement its programme and 
guidelines in order to benefit from corporate liability as foreseen under D. Lgs. 
no. 231/200149.  
 
Chapter 2: Compliance as a Duty to Establish a Compliance Department? 
 
7. So far, it has already been clarified that many Western corporate 
governance laws entail a general duty for corporate boards to ensure 
organizational adequateness within the company. We have also pointed out 
that in many cases the creation of burdensome compliance departments, 
programs and guidelines is the consequence of legal incentives, such as in Italy 
the exemption from corporate liability regime pursuant to D. Lgs. no. 231/2001. 
Paragraphs 7 and 8 examine the incentives deriving from corporate liability 
insulation, while paragraph 9 deals with the question of whether, in the absence 
                     
48Van der Elst, C. (2013). The Risk Management Duties of the Board of Directors.Financial 
Law Institute, Working Paper, S2013-02. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2267502. 
49Paludi, A., & Zecca, M. (2014). Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in 
Italian Case Law. In Manacorda, S., Centonze, F.,& Forti, G. (Eds.), Preventing Corporate 
Corruption.Springer International Publishing A.G., 397-416.  
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of this type of incentives, the general organizational adequateness duty actually 
includes the creation of totally comprehensive systems of compliance and 
control50. The recognition of an extensive duty of legality does not 
automatically mean thatthe management board has to establish a totally 
comprehensive system of compliance-control in the company. In this respect, 
one must also make a key distinction between the duty of legality and what is a 
choice dictated by opportunity. More specifically, on one hand for most 
jurisdictions the management board is not an assistantpublic prosecutor 
(“Hilfsbeamter der Staatsanwaltschaft”)51. On the other hand, in order to induce 
companies to monitor, report, and cooperate, it is fair to assume that boards 
expect to be better off if they engage in policing measures than if they do not52. 
This implies that they must be confident of facing lower expected liability if 
they monitor, investigate, and report. This promise of insulation from criminal 
sanctions grants a substantial benefit to corporations that53 adopt compliance 
organizations and programs to deter crime, respond proactively to reports of 
suspected wrongdoing, and cooperate fully with any government investigation. 
To benefit from this legal attitude, boards faced with evidence of potential of 
wrongdoing must avoid the temptation to circle the wagons in an effort to 
thwart unwanted government intrusion— particularly when evidence suggests 
managers may indeed have committed a crime. Instead they must focus on 
                     
50In other words: is there a general duty to establish a compliance department? 
51Siebler, B. (2014). Criminal-Compliance im interdisziplinären Kontext: Die Legitimierung von 
Compliance-Tätigkeiten und Maßnahmen sowie deren Verwertbarkeit im deutschen Strafverfahren. 
Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag. 
52Goldsmith, M., and King, C. (1997). Policing Corporate Crime: The Dilemma of Internal 
Compliance Programs. Vanderbilt Law Review, 50.1. 
53 Malloy, T. (2003). Regulation, Compliance and the Finn.Temple Law Review, 76, 451-459. 
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their primary duty: to the firm. This often will place directors in the 
uncomfortable position of cooperating with investigations that threaten long-
term colleagues and friends54. Managers who implement effective measures to 
detect crime and who report wrongdoing can benefit their companies even if 
prosecutors do decide to indict. For instance, under the US federal sentencing 
guidelines and the Italian D. Lgs. no. 231/2001, a convicted corporation faces a 
significantly lower criminal fine if it had an effective compliance program, 
reported wrongdoing promptly, and cooperated than if it did not55. For 
example, if a company can prove that, before the crime was committed, it 
adopted and effectively implemented a model of organisation, management 
and control it is exempt from liability under Italian law56. Moreover, a 
corporation whose managers follow good corporate practices in deterring crime 
may avoid intrusive corporate probation. According to the November 2012 
SEC’s Enforcement Division’s “Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act”57, the following elements represent essential keystones of a 
compliance model: 
- Commitment from Senior Management and a clearly articulated policy against 
corruption: compliance and ethical rules must start at the top58. Prosecutors 
                     
54Scholz, J.T. (1984). Voluntary compliance and regulatory enforcement. Law & Policy, 6.4, 
385-404. 
55de Maglie, C. (2011). Societas delinquere potest? The Italian solution. In  Mark Pieth,M.,& 
Ivory, R. (Eds.), Corporate Criminal Liability: Emergence, Convergence, and Risk. New York: 
Springer, 9, 255-270. 
56Articles 6 and 7 of Legislative Decree no. 231/2001. 
57 Available online at: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. 
58 According to the ISO 19600 standard (par. 5.3.3): “the governing body and top management 
should d) appoint or nominate a compliance function with: 1) authority and responsibility for the 
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thus evaluate whether senior management has clearly articulated company 
standards, communicated them in unambiguous terms, adhered to them 
scrupulously, and disseminated them throughout the organisation. 
-Code of Conduct, Compliance Policies and Procedures: whether a company 
has policies and procedures that outline responsibilities for compliance within 
the company, detail proper internal controls, uditing practices, and 
documentation policies, and set forth disciplinary procedures will also be 
considered by prosecutors. Effective policies and procedures require an in-
depth understanding of the company’s business model, including its products 
and services, third-party agents, customers, government interactions, and 
industry and geographical risks. 
-Oversight, Autonomy, and Resources: a legal person needs an assigned 
responsibility for the oversight and implementation of a company’s compliance 
programme to one or more specific senior executives. Those individuals must 
have appropriate authority within the organisation, adequate autonomy59 from 
management, and sufficient resources60 to ensure that the company’s 
                                                            
design, consistency and integrity of the compliance management system; 2) clear and unambiguous 
support from and direct access to the governing body and top management; 3) access to: — senior 
decision-makers and the opportunity to contribute early in the decision-making processes; — all 
levels of the organization: — all documented information and data needed to perform the compliance 
tasks; — expert advice on relevant laws, regulations, codes and organizational standards; 4) the 
authority and capacity to execute countervailing power, by showing any consequences for 
compliance in relevant decision-making processes”. 
59According to the ISO 19600 standard (par. 5.3.3), ”the governing body and top management 
should […]ensure that the compliance function has authority to act independently and is not 
compromised by conflicting priorities, particularly where compliance is embedded in the business”.  
60According to the ISO 19600 standard (par. 7), “the organization should determine and provide 
the resources needed for the establishment, development, implementation, evaluation, maintenance 
and continual improvement of the compliance management system appropriate to its size, 
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compliance programme is implemented effectively. Adequate autonomy 
generally includes direct access to an organisation’s governing authority, such 
as the board of directors and committees of the board of directors (e.g., the 
audit committee). 
- Risk Assessment: one-size-fits-all compliance programmes are generally ill-
conceived and ineffective because resources inevitably are spread too thin, with 
too much focus on low-risk markets and transactions to the detriment of high-
risk areas. Factors to consider, for instance, include risks presented by: the 
country and industry sector, the business opportunity, potential business 
partners, level of involvement with governments, amount of government 
regulation and oversight, and exposure to customs and immigration in 
conducting business affairs. It is decisive whether and to what degree a 
company analyses and addresses the particular risks it faces61. 
                                                            
complexity, structure and operations.Top management and all other levels of management should 
ensure that the necessary resources are deployed effectively to ensure that the compliance 
management system meets its objectives, and that compliance is achieved. Resources include 
financial and human resources, as well as access to external advice and specialized skills, 
organizational infrastructure, contemporary reference material on compliance management and 
legal obligations, professional development and technology”. 
61According to the ISO 19600 standard (par. 9.1.1),“the organization should determine: a) what 
needs to be monitored and measured and why; b) the methods for monitoring, measurement, analysis 
and evaluation, as applicable, to ensure valid results; c) when the monitoring and measuring should 
be performed; d) when the results from monitoring and measurement should be analysed, evaluated 
and reported. The organization should retain appropriate documented information as evidence of the 
results. The organization should evaluate the compliance management system performance and the 
effectiveness of the compliance management system”.  
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- Training and Continuing Advice: such measures will help ensure that the 
compliance programme is understood and followed appropriately at all levels 
of the company62. 
- Incentives and Disciplinary Measures: many companies have found that 
publicising disciplinary actions internally63, where appropriate under local law, 
can have an important deterrent effect, demonstrating that unethical and 
unlawful actions have swift and sure consequences. Incentives can take many 
forms such as personnel evaluations and promotions, rewards for improving 
and developing a company’s compliance programme, and rewards for ethics 
and compliance leadership.  
- Third-Party Due Diligence and Payments: third parties, including agents, 
consultants, and distributors, are commonly used to conceal the payment of 
                     
62 According to par. 7.2.2 of the ISO 19600 standard, “the governing body, management and all 
employees have compliance obligations should be competent to discharge these effectively. The 
attainment of competence can be achieved in many ways, including skills and knowledge required 
through education, training or work experience. The objective of a training program is to ensure that 
all employees are competent to fulfil their job role in a manner that is consistent with the 
organization’s compliance culture and its commitment to compliance. Properly designed and 
executed training can provide an effective way for employees to communicate previously 
unidentified compliance risks. Education and training of employees should be: a) tailored to the 
obligations and compliance risks related to the roles and responsibilities of the employee; b) where 
appropriate, based on an assessment of gaps in employee knowledge and competence; c) undertaken 
at commencement with the organization and be on-going ; d) aligned to the corporate training 
program and be incorporated into annual training plans; e) practical and readily understood by 
employees; f) relevant to the day-to-day work of employees and illustrative of the industry, 
organization or sector concerned; g) sufficiently flexible to account for a range of techniques to 
accommodate the differing needs of organizations and employees”.  
63Par. 7.4.4 of the ISO 19600 standard (“Internal communication”) reads as follows: “the 
organization should adopt appropriate methods of communication to ensure that the compliance 
message is heard and understood by all employees on an on-going basis. The communication should 
clearly set out the organization’s expectation of employees and those noncompliances that are 
expected to be escalated and under what circumstances and to whom”. 
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bribes to public officials. As part of risk-based due diligence, companies should 
understand the qualifications and associations of its third-party partners, 
including its business reputation, and relationship, if any, with foreign officials. 
Companies should also have an understanding of the role of, and need for, the 
third party and ensure that the contract terms specifically describe the services 
to be performed. Additional considerations include payment terms and how 
those payment terms compare to typical terms in that industry and country. 
Furthermore, companies should undertake some form of on-going monitoring 
of third-party relationships. 
- Confidential Reporting and Internal Investigation: an effective compliance 
programme should include a mechanism for an organisation’s employees and 
others to report64 suspected or actual misconduct or violations of the company’s 
policies on a confidential basis and without fear of retaliation. Companies may 
employ, for example, anonymous hotlines or ombudsmen. Reporting needs to 
be followed-up by effective investigations. 
- Continuous Improvement (Periodic Testing and Review): a company’s 
business changes over time, as do the environments in which it operates, the 
nature of its customers, the laws that govern its actions, and the standards of its 
industry. In addition, compliance programmes that do not just exist on paper 
                     
64 In the words of par. 9.1.3 of the ISO 19600 standard, “the organization should establish, 
implement, evaluate and maintain procedures for seeking and receiving feedback on its compliance 
performance from a range of sources, including: employees, e.g. through whistle blowing facilities, 
helplines, feedback, suggestion boxes; customers, e.g. through a complaints handling 
system;suppliers; regulators; process control logs and activity records (including both computer and 
paper based)”. 
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but are followed in practice will inevitably uncover compliance weaknesses and 
require enhancements. 
- Mergers and Acquisitions (Pre-Acquisition Due Diligence and Post-
Acquisition Integration): for example, an acquiring company should uncover 
any possible corruption at the company which is being acquired as part of due 
diligence, ensure that the corruption was voluntarily disclosed to the 
government, cooperate with the investigation, and promptly incorporate the 
acquired company into its compliance programme and internal controls. 
Adopting a compliance organization may sometimes even be an “ex post” 
remedy when a breach has already been detected. In Italy, for instance pursuant 
to Art. 12, comma 2, lett. b) of Legislative Decree no. 231/2001 sanctions are 
reduced to one third if, before the first judiciary session, a compliance model 
adequate to pre-emt breaches such as those detected. Moreover, pursuant to art. 
17, lett. b) of Legislative Decree no. 231/2001 no indictment sanctions (e.g. a ban 
on liaising with public offices) if the company has filled the organizational gaps 
which caused the tort by adoption and effectively implementing a compliance 
model adequate to pre-emt breaches such as those detected. 
8. By contrast, a convicted corporation that did not have an effective 
compliance program is likely to have one imposed (and designed) by the 
authorities65. Managers cannot obtain the full benefit of these mitigation 
provisions if they wait to act until they suspect wrongdoing. The US sentencing 
                     
65Alfiero, S., & Secinaro, S. (2009). The Implication of Adopting the Compliance Program in 
Italian Holding Companies. International Review of Business Research Papers, 5.4, 448-456. 
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guidelines only provide full mitigation for reporting and cooperating to firms 
that had an effective  compliance program at the time the crime occurred. 
(Prosecutors also are more likely to indict companies that did not have a 
compliance program). Thus, managers who fail to institute a program designed 
to detect wrongdoing put their firms at much greater risk of criminal sanction 
even if they report any wrongdoing they detect. 
 
9. With a view to the previous paragraph,the question should asked 
whether the management board has an actual duty, in the best interests of and 
for the benefitof the company, to establish an institution within the company 
which revealsviolations of law and helps to prevent them. As stated earlier, it 
is important to distinguish between an actual duty embedded in a non-
substantive obligation, and a choice (although one not free from a variety of 
positive or negative incentives). Moreover, the answer to this question varies 
depending on the country. In Germany, for example, it is controversial whether 
such a duty underorganisational law exists for all AGs, aside from the special 
scheme for investmentservices companies in Section 33(1) cl. 2 No. 1 of the 
WpHG66. Commentators seem in any case to agree that the managementboard 
has to implement its duty of legality, but it is disputed whether this 
entailsestablishing a compliance department as well. In any case, it is 
indispensable that compliance function is entrusted to competent, skilled and 
                     
66 In favour of this Schneider, U.H. (2003). Compliance als Aufgabe der 
Unternehmensleitung, ZIP - Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 24, 645 - 648; Buerkle, J. (2005). 
Corporate Compliance – Pflicht oder Kuer fuer den Vorstand der AG?, BB- Betriebs-Berater, 
60, 565- 568. 
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knowledgeable professionals, whereas it fairly marginal whether these 
professionals have a “compliance department” or work in another department 
(e.g. legal department) but cover compliance67. In Germany, some supporters of 
a general duty to establish a compliance department refer to Section 130 OWiG 
according to which the owner of a company acts contrary topublic policy if he 
or she omits to implement the necessary control measures required to prevent 
breaches of duty by the company, which are punishable by means of a fine or 
a sentence. There is, however, a limitation insofar that the ruleonly refers to 
necessary control measures, depending on the particular circumstancesof the 
company. In a certain case,like a very complex corporate structure, the 
requirements may only be achievedwith the establishment of a compliance 
department, yet, this is not compulsory, inparticular not for smaller companies. 
 
10. With a view to the above, the debate is shifting from the duty of 
legality to the (possible) duty to establish a compliance department. 
Interestingly, this seems to echo the famous 1996 In re Caremark International Inc. 
Derivative Litigation68Delawarecase. Arguably, Chancellor William Allen’s 
opinion in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation remains one of 
the most complete and detailed explorations of the duty to monitor by a 
Delaware court69. Caremark originated from a federal investigation of illegal 
                     
67Schneider, U.H., & Schneider, S. (2005).Die zwölf goldenen Regeln des Geschäftsführers 
zur Haftungsvermeidung. GmbHR - GmbH-Rundschau, 1229.  
68Inre Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
69Funk, S. F. (1997). In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation: Director 
Behavior, Shareholder Protection, and Corporate Legal Compliance. Del. J. Corp. L. – 
Delaware Journal of Corporation Law,22, 311. 
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payments made by Caremark International employees to physicians in 
exchange for patient referrals. Eventually, Caremark paid out approximately 
$250 million to settle the charges. Chancellor Allen had to decide whether the 
company’s directors breached its duty to monitor by allowing these violations 
to occur. Chancellor Allen concluded that the board of directors cannot assume 
that the corporation is operating in compliance with the law; instead, it has an 
actual obligation to invest in monitoring systems that are suitable to identify 
legal violations. More specifically, in the words of Chancellor Allen, a board has 
“a duty to attempt in good faith70 to assure that a corporation’s information and 
reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so 
under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses 
caused by noncompliance with applicable legal standards.” However, under the 
standard formulated in Allen’s decision, finding a violation of this duty is far 
from easy71 as directors must have failed to provide reasonable oversight in a 
“sustained or systematic” fashion72, and the information reporting system on 
which the board relied73 must have been an “utter failure”74.Actual failure to 
prevent wrongdoing does not in itself mean that the system is an utter failure: 
                     
70Sale, H.A. (2007). Monitoring Caremark's Good Faith. Del. J. Corp. L. – Delaware Journal of 
Corporation Law, 32, 719. 
71Elson, C.M., and Gyves, C.J. (2004). In Re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended 
Consequences. Wake Forest L. Rev.- Wake Forest Law Review, 339, 691. 
72Burch, R.F. (2006). Director Oversight and Monitoring: The Standard of Care and the 
Standard of Liability Post-Enron.Wyo. L. Rev. - Wyoming Law Review, 6, 481. 
73Grossman, N. (2007). Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate of 
Corporate Governance Reform. Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L.-Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law,12, 393. 
74Bainbridge, S. (2009). Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management. UCLA School of Law, 
Law-Econ Research Paper, paper no. 09-08.  
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in fact, a court must also consider the design of the system and make a case-by-
case assessment of its effectiveness. And in fact, in Caremark, the company, 
Caremark International had a structured organization in place to ensure 
compliance with the law. More specifically, Caremark International had 
regularly run training programs and distributed ethics instructions and check-
lists to its employees. The board also had reviewed the company’s legal 
compliance systems even after outside auditors found no material weaknesses 
in the systems. Therefore, based on these elements, Chancellor Allen concluded 
that the board had made a good faith attempt to ensure compliance with the 
law. Therefore, it fair to say that the Caremark case is important because of the 
principles stated by Chancellor Allen, which epitomized a change in legal 
thought occurred over the course of thirty years. In fact, in Caremark, the burden 
on boards to put into place information reporting systems75 went beyond what 
originally contemplated in 1963’s Graham, raising the question whether the 
Chancery Court was deliberately ignoring the earlier Delaware Supreme Court 
decision. Not only did Chancellor Allen not ignore Graham’s verdict, but he 
openly questioned whether in 1996 the Delaware Supreme Court still would 
believe that boards could justify an outdated laissez-passer approach76, i.e. not 
making any effort to ensure they collected information “respecting material acts, 
                     
75Frankel, T. (2008). Corporate Boards of Directors: Advisors or Supervisors. U. Cin. L. Rev.- 
University of Cincinnati Law Review,77, 501. 
76Reese, C. L., & Herring, K.A. (2004). Recent Developments in Delaware Case Law: Recent 
Developments in Delaware Corporate Law.Del. L. Rev. - Delaware Law Review, 7, 177-213. 
41 
 
 
events or conditions within the corporation, including compliance with applicable 
statutes and regulation[.]”77.  
 
Chapter 3: Compliance and foreign criminal laws 
 
11. Another useful element that can be taken into account when assessing 
the general obligation to set up a compliance department is the 2007 UK 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act. Art. 1, par. 3 of the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act reads as follows: 
“An organisation is guilty of an offence under this section 
only if the way in which its activities are managed or organised by 
its senior management is a substantial element in the breach 
referred to […]” 
The wording of the text clearly signals the willingness not to use the role of 
corporate officers as attribution criterion78. It also signals that a different 
criterion is adopted, namely the fact that the corporate activities can 
substantially contribute to a crime. Following this approach, an objective factor 
is used in lieu of arguments based on the alleged role of individuals within their 
                     
77Allen, Chancellor W. T. (1997). Tribute to Chancellor William T. Allen: Ambiguity in 
Corporation Law. Del. J. Corp. L.- Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 22 (1997), 894-1337. 
78Parsons, S. (2003). Doctrine of Identification, Causation and Corporate Liability for 
Manslaughter. J. Crim. L.- Journal of Criminal Law, 67 – 69. 
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organization79.One should not underestimate the relevance of the criterion 
entailed by Manslaughter, because it may be used to prosecute corporate actors 
who do not even have a branch office or personnel in the United Kingdom80. 
Because Manslaughter uses an approach that requires an evaluation of an 
organization’s management and organization81, this is likely to increase 
compliance within corporate groups which do business with the United 
Kingdom82. Moreover, since no specific degree of compliance is put forward, 
corporate actors are incentivized to adopt the highest level of compliance to 
pass the scrutiny of British prosecutors83. This is very important, as the 
architecture of the British Manslaughter act marks an important in the long-
standing Anglo-Saxon debate on corporate criminal liability84. In fact, under 
English law, the essential problem is that a corporation is granted an 
independent status by a pragmatic legal fiction which affords an identity to 
entity which has no physical existence85. This is done in order to allow the 
corporation to assume responsibility and rights in its economic activities and 
                     
79Bittle, S., & Snider, L. (2006). From manslaughter to preventable accident: Shaping 
corporate criminal liability, Law & Policy, 28.4,  470-496. 
80Schneider, A. (2014).  Corporate Criminal Liability and Conflicts of Jurisdiction.In 
Brodowski, D., Espinoza de los Monteros de la Parr, M., Tiedemann, K., Vogel, J. (Eds.), 
Regulating Corporate Criminal Liability. New York: Springer International Publishing,249-
260. 
81Gobert, J. (2008). The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007–
Thirteen years in the making but was it worth the wait?. The Modern Law Review, 71.3, 413-
433. 
82 Schneider, U.H. (2008). Auslaendisches Unternehmensstrafrecht und Compliance. CCZ - 
Corporate Compliance Zeitschrift, 18. 
83Manslaughter, Corporate, and Corporate Homicide Act (2007) . 
84Bergman, D. (2000). Manslaughter and corporate immunity. New Law Journal, 316-317. 
85Radin, M. (1932). The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality. Colum. L. Rev.- Columbia 
Law Review, 32, 643. 
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this device has proved extremely useful in encouraging commercial risk taking 
and entrepreneurial activity86. However, problems arise when it is necessary to 
consider the question of the criminal liability of the corporation, because one of 
the fundamental precepts of criminal law is that of personal criminal 
responsibility. The way in which criminal law attributes liability is by 
ascertaining a guilty mind and a guilty act on the part of the accused87. It is 
difficult to accuse a company of possessing a guilty mind, because it has no 
personal mind or conscience88, and it is guilty of accusing a company of a guilty 
act, because it is a legal construct without any means of acting on its own 
behalf. Companies can only act vicariously89 through the actions of their human 
employees and representatives, and such individuals possess their own 
personal criminal responsibility which can be dealt with by the ordinary 
application of criminal law.Given that the company has no conscience or mind 
of its own, it has been suggested that the law should look to a senior 
representative of the company and attribute his or her state of mind to the 
company itself (s.c. “directing mind” theory). This is a tenuous approach, 
because it undermines the fundamental rule of personal criminal responsibility, 
but it has received considerable academic support and comment. The 
                     
86 Thompson, R.B. (1994). Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of 
Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise. Vanderbilt Law Review,47,1. 
87 Arlen, J.,& Kraakman R. (1997). Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of 
corporate Liability Regimes. N.Y.U. L. Rev. - New York University Law Review, 72. 
88In this respect, one can recall Coffee, J.C., Jr., 1980, “No Soul To Damn: No Body to Kick”: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386 with the 
famous quote of Edward, First Baron Thurlow: “Did you ever expect a corporation to have a 
conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?”. 
89 Thompson, R.B. (1994). Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of 
Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise. Vanderbilt Law Review, 47,1. 
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traditional starting point in an analysis of the evolution of directing mind 
theory is the dictum of Viscount Haldane in the civil case, Lennard's Carrying Co 
Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd90. He stated: 
“A corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its 
own any more than it has a body of its own; its active and 
directing will must consequently be sought in the person 
of somebody who for some purposes may be called an 
agent, but who is really the directing mind and will of the 
corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of 
the corporation.” 
In the case of H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T.J.Graham & Sons Ltd91, Lord 
Denning attempted to entrench directing mind theory at the heart of the law for 
the imposition of civil or criminal liability on companies. Lord Denning stated 
that companies:  
“may in many ways be likened to a human body. 
They have a brain and a nerve centre which controls what 
they do. They also have hands which hold the tools and 
act in accordance with directions from the centre”. 
Therefore Lord Denning advocated that the means of determining the mind of 
the company was to identify its actual human controllers. He argued that a 
                     
90Lennard's Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705. 
91HL Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd -v- TJ Graham & Sons Ltd, CA 1957. 
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company's directors and managers represent the directing mind and will of the 
company, and that they control what the company does92. He concluded that 
the state of mind of senior corporate officers is the state of mind of the company 
and that it should be treated by the law as such. Unfortunately, Denning's 
policy rendered it virtually impossible for corporations of anything93 other than 
a very small size to be successfully prosecuted because in most corporations of 
a significant size the personal responsibility for corporate affairs is divided 
between a number of directors and senior managers and as a consequence, no 
single human component of the company is responsible for sufficient of the 
mens rea and actus reus in order to found a criminal prosecution. The 
“directing mind” theory was further refined by Lord Ried94 in the case Tesco 
Supermarkets vs. Nattra in 1972. Lord Ried observed that: 
Normally the board of directors, the managing director and 
perhaps other superior officers of a company carry out the 
functions of management and speak and act as the company. 
Their subordinates do not. They carry out orders from above 
and it can make no difference that they are given some measure 
of discretion. But the board of directors may delegate some part 
of their functions of management giving to their delegate full 
discretion to act independently of instructions from them. I see 
                     
92Clarkson, C. (1996). Kicking corporate bodies and damning their souls. The Modern Law 
Review 59.4, 557-572. 
93Sahni, B. (2005). Interpretation of the Corporate Personality of Transnational Corporation. 
Widener LJ - Widener Law Journal, 15, 1. 
94Stern, Y. Z. (1987). Corporate Criminal Personal Liability-Who Is the Corporation.J. Corp. 
L. - Journal of Corporation Law 13, 125. 
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no difficulty in holding that they have thereby put such a 
delegate in their place so that within the scope of the delegation 
he can act as the company.  
The “directing mind” theory, however, was not flawless, as it required complex 
investigations to identify the “directing mind” within a company, making 
careful distinctions based on “seniority”, “control” and “autonomy”95. While 
this might be easy in the case of a small company, a large modern corporation 
active in different jurisdictions would typically make the identification process 
a very burdensome one96. Ultimately, this would result into an asymmetry of 
treatment between large companies and small ones. With this in mind, it is 
evident that the approach embedded in the Manslaughter act is radically 
different, as it does not even attempt to use the role of corporate officers as 
attribution criterion. Instead, a different criterion is adopted, namely the fact 
that the corporate activities can substantially contribute to a crime. Because 
Manslaughter uses an approach that requires an evaluation of an organization’s 
management and organization97, this is likely to increase the pivotal role of 
compliance within corporate groups which do business with– not necessarily in 
- the United Kingdom 
                     
95Ferran, E. (2011). Corporate Attribution and the Directing Mind and Will. Law Quarterly 
Review 127, 239-259. 
96Field, S., & Jorg, N. (1991). Corporate-liability and Manslaughter- Should we be going 
Dutch. Criminal Law Review, 156-171. 
97Gobert, J. (2008). The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007–
Thirteen years in the making but was it worth the wait?. The Modern Law Review 71.3,  413-
433. 
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Chapter 4: Compliance and foreign courtrooms 
 
12. In this respect, one should also recall a 2004 Italian case-law landmark 
case. In this verdict, an Italian court held a German corporate group, Siemens, 
not resident in Italy and operating in Italy only through a temporary company 
grouping (s.c. “associazione temporanea d’impresa”) accountable for criminal 
offences (namely: bribery) committed in Italy98. Back in 2004, the Italian 
Supreme Criminal Court stated that Italian criminal laws are applicable to a 
criminal offence committed abroad if there is any connection with Italy99, even if 
the connection is not per se a criminal breach, the rationale being that the 
connection “has to be regarded as a fragment of larger criminal sequence that should 
not be taken singularly”100. Moreover, the Italian court held the Siemens holding 
company liable101 even if, not being incorporated in Italy, it had no Italian 
compliance organization nor programs – these programs are explicitly foreseen 
                     
98In the Siemens Case, the Court of Milan, in its verdict of 28 October 2004, stated that it is 
almost self-evident that foreigners (both individuals and legal entities), when acting in 
Italy, shall comply with Italian legislation, regardless of the fact that similar rules exist in 
their country of origin. 
99One should also recall that, by symmetry, section 4 or Law No. 231/2001 foresees the 
application of Italian criminal laws – and sanctions - to entities which have their main seat 
in Italy and commit violations abroad. 
100 Italian Criminal Court, Siemens case, Sentence no. 4284/2000. 
101Rizzi, R., & Rahman, N. (2005). Why Limiting Liability in Italy Just Got Harder. Int'l Fin. 
L. Rev. - International Financial Law Review, 24 - 25; Wrage, A., &Richardson, A. (2009). 
Siemens AG-Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. ILM – International Legal 
Materials, 48, 232. 
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under the Italian domestic discipline102. One could also wonder what their 
judgment would have looked like, if the holding company had had in place 
such risk management programs. More specifically, one might ask whether the 
existence of these organizations103 would have avoided the application of Italian 
law onto a non-resident company.Another important judgment by an Italian 
court is the June 13 2007 verdict by the Tribunal of Milano (judge Tacconi), 
where it was stated that the corporate liability regime foreseen under 
Legislative Decree no. 231/01 as well as general Italian criminal law is 
applicable to foreign banks which have no subsidiary in Italy but are active in 
Italy.Regretfully, also this judgement does not provide any additional element 
as to the value and comparability of compliance and/or risk management 
programs adopted by a foreign bank. 
 
Chapter 5: Contents of the Compliance Duty 
 
13. As far as a general duty to establish a compliance department exists, its 
contents must be examined. As a preliminary remark, one can argue that there 
are few specifications of this duty, and existing ones only apply to specific 
topics/industries/businesses, so analogy is the only way to draw a parallel 
among the the contents of the general duty and those of specific rules. In 
Germany, for example, specifications are contained in Section 33 of 
                     
102Castaldo, A.,& Nizi, G. (2007). Entity Liability and Deterrence: Recent Reforms in Italy. 
Erasmus L.& Econ. Rev. - Erasmus Law& Economics Review, 1, 1-8. 
103Bevilacqua, F.C. (2006). Corporate compliance programmes under Italian law. Ethikos, 
November/December. Available at: 
http://www.singerpubs.com/ethikos/html/italy.html. 
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theSecurities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG)) or in the 
MinimumRequirements for the Compliance Function and Additional 
RequirementsGoverning Rules of Conduct, Organisation and Transparency 
(MaComp). Yet,as far as other companies are concerned, there are no 
specifications for thecompliance department. Thus, general principles and 
elements can be pointed out when assessing the main features of the 
compliance department. According to Schneider104 compliance is in its essence a 
three-pronged duty that covers: 
 the personal behavioural duties of the board members and company 
employees; 
 the organizational duties of the management bodies, i.e. the duty to set up 
and manage an organization, a system with the aim to ensure that the 
company and its employees behave in accordance with the law and other 
principles, and that breaches and violations are discovered in  a timely 
and efficient manner; 
 a breach pre-emption and damage avoidance duty in the hands of the 
members of corporate bodies, i.e. a duty to avoid legal breaches - and 
damage deriving therefrom to the company’s value.  
With this in mind, it is also worth recalling that the scope and size of directors’ 
duties are inextricably connected and commensurate to the type and size of the 
company, as well as on the complexity of the regulatory environment in which 
it operates. In Germany, this can for instance be deducted from Section 33 of the 
                     
104Schneider, U.H., & Schneider, S.H. (2007). Konzern-Compliance als Aufgabe der 
Konzernleitung, ZIP - Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 44,2061. 
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WpHG, whose basic rule is that the larger the company and the morelikely it is 
that pursuing its business aims can cause harm to the general public, themore 
one has to take into consideration the underlying aim and purpose of 
theWpHG. It should specifically be noted that it is a guiding principle that 
compliancemust be organised in such a way that violations of law can be 
efficiently prevented. 
 
Chapter 6: The Duty of Compliance and the Business Judgement Rule 
 
14. As we have pointed out earlier in this research, it not always clear 
whether a corporate board has a duty, in the best interests of and for the 
benefitof the company, to establish an institution within the company which 
revealsviolations of law and helps to prevent them, as this would be a duty 
other from those cases in which there is such a specific legal requirement105. 
According to Casper, the duty to establish a compliance department does not 
involve or require a “business decision” as the establishment of such a 
department is a non-discretionary and binding legal requirement for certain 
companies. The discretion only applies at a later stage, as to “how” structure 
the compliance organization. According to Schneider, even the substantive and 
specific laws requiring the establishment of a compliance department can be 
                     
105In favour of this Schneider, U.H. (2003). Compliance als Aufgabe der 
Unternehmensleitung. ZIP - Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 24,645 and foll.; Buerkle, J. 
(2005). Corporate Compliance – Pflicht oder Kuer fuer den Vorstand der AG?. BB – Betriebs 
- Berater,60, 565 and foll.. 
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seen as the expressions of a general duty to actually set up a compliance 
department106. In those cases in which the establishment of a compliance 
department is a requirement explicitly foreseen by the law, if the board – in 
Germany it is the management board - breaches the duty to establish a 
compliance department or to provide it with sufficient personnel, non-cash 
resources or competences, it may become liable towards the company. This 
requires, however, that it should be proved that the company has suffered 
damage as a result of this breach. Moreover, in Germany it is also 
controversial107 whether the members of the management board may be able to 
invoke the so-called “business judgment rule” under Section 93(1) cl. 2 of the 
AktG to avoid such a liability. According to  such rule, managerial conduct 
cannot be judicially reviewed, when four prerequisites are fulfilled: 
i. A business decision was taken (“unternehmerische Entscheidung”); 
ii. The decision was taken in the best interests of the corporation (“zum 
Wohle der Gesellschaft”); 
iii. The decision was taken in good faith, or, closer to the wording of the 
provision, the person could reasonably believe (“vernuenftigerweise 
annehmen durfte”) that it was a business decision taken in the best 
                     
106Schneider, U.H. (2003). Compliance als Aufgabe der Unternehmensleitung.24 ZIP - 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 645 and foll.. 
107See for example Reichert, J., & Ott, N. (2009). Non Compliance in der AG – 
Vorstandspflichten im Zusammenhang mit der Aufklaerung und Sanktionierung von 
Rechtsverstoßen.ZIP - Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 30,2173 – 2176; Meier-Greve, D. (2009). 
Vorstandshaftung wegen mangelhafter Corporate Compliance. BB – Betriebs - Berater,64, 
2555 – 2557(both with further bibliography); for a monograph see Geiser, M., (2012). 
Grenzziehung zwischen der Business Judgment Rule und den notwendigen Anforderungen an eine 
Compliance-Organisation. Hamburg: Dr. Kovacˇ Verlag,  42 and foll.. 
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interests of the corporation, which implies that the person must be 
unbiased and has no conflicts of interests; and 
iv. The decision was reached based on appropriate information 
(angemessener Information) or, put more generally, an informed 
decision was taken. 
According to Casper, the “business judgement rule” cannot be invoked in those 
cases in which the establishment of a compliance department is a non-
discretionary act that stems from a precise legal requirement. This is different 
from the decision as to how shape and organize the compliance department – a 
decision for which there is no strict and specific legal requirement. In this 
regard, therefore, the business judgment rule is applicable and may protect the 
management board if all the other prerequisites for the protection are present.  
 
Chapter 7: Requirements of the Compliance Department 
 
15. Arguably, a key requirement for the compliance organisation, is its 
independence. For the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, considering 
compliance in a bank, this means that: ”the compliance function should have a 
formal status within the bank. Second, there should be a group compliance 
officer or head of compliance with overall responsibility for co-ordinating the 
management of the bank’s compliance risk. Third, compliance function staff, 
and in particular, the head of compliance, should not be placed in a position 
where there is a possible conflict of interest between their compliance 
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responsibilities and any other responsibilities they may have. Fourth, 
compliance function staff should have access to the information and personnel 
necessary to carry out their responsibilities”108. Because the compliance 
organisation has to be independent, it should be organised as a separate 
department. In this respect, it is important to distinguish between the 
separation from operative departments and separation from the board. Some 
countries have a dual board structure, common in Germany but also used in 
other European and Asian countries, foreseeing a structure of corporate 
governance in which shareholders (and often workers) elect members of a 
supervisory board, which then appoints and supervises a management board.  
16. As far as independence from operative units/departments is concerned, 
the compliance department should be separated from the operational partof the 
company’s business activities. Moreover, this does not preclude the fact that the 
compliance department can be combined with other, already existing 
departments also matching the same separation principle. It is also important to 
recall that compliance may not always be concentrated in the compliance 
department, but can be allocated in a variety of corporate functions. As the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision noted back in 2005: “Not all 
compliance responsibilities are necessarily carried out by a “compliance 
department” or “compliance unit”. Compliance responsibilities may be 
exercised by staff in different departments. In some banks, for example, legal 
and compliance may be separate departments; the legal department may be 
                     
108http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf. 
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responsible for advising management on the compliance laws, rules and 
standards and for preparing guidance to staff, while the compliance 
department may be responsible for monitoring compliance with the policies 
and procedures and reporting to management. In other banks, parts of the 
compliance function may be located within the operational risk group or within 
a more general risk management group. If there is a division of responsibilities 
between departments, the allocation of responsibilities to each department 
should be clear. There should also be appropriate mechanisms for co-operation 
among each department and with the head of compliance (e.g. with respect to 
the provision and exchange of relevant advice and information). These 
mechanisms should be sufficient to ensure that the head of compliance can 
perform his or her responsibilities effectively”109. The compliance organization 
can be combined with the legal department, provided it is separate from the 
company’s operations as well. The controlling department is also frequently 
quoted as an alternative match110. Compliance officers may end up holding 
dual roles in their company. Where the compliance officer holds a role such as 
Legal Counsel or Head of Internal Audit or is a qualified or chartered 
                     
109http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf. 
110For details on the differences between compliance, controlling and auditing see in 
particular Dreher, M., (2010). Die Vorstandsverantwortung im Geflecht von 
Risikomanagement, Compliance und interner Revision. In Kindler, P., Koch, J., Ulmer, P., 
& Winter, M. (Eds.),Festschrift für Uwe Hüffer zum 70. Geburtstag. München:CH Beck Verlag, 
161 and foll.; AKEIU - Arbeitskreis Externe und Interne Ueberwachung der Unternehmung 
der Schmalenbachen-Gesellschaft fuer Betriebswirtschaft, (2010). Compliance: 10 Thesen 
fuer die Unternehmenspraxis. DB - Der Betrieb, 63,  1509-1518. For the advantages of a 
Compliance-Management-Systems with a Compliance Council (instead of a CCO) – see 
Goeßwein, G., & Hohmann, O. (2011). Modelle der Compliance-Organisation im 
Unternehmen. BB – Betriebs - Berater, 66, 963 and foll.. 
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professional such as an attorney or accountant, there is the possibility that a 
clash will occur between her/his professional obligations and duties to the 
company as a compliance officer. For example, such employees will have a 
heightened fiduciary responsibility to raise concerns and uphold a public 
interest requirement. 
 
17. As far as independence from the management board is concerned, 
because of the fact that the compliance department must be subordinated to the 
management board, it can be said that the compliance department should not 
be subordinated to any other employees of the company. By contrast, it is not 
necessary that there is an independent position, free from instructions received 
from the management board. This follows from the fact that it is a specific 
management duty of the management board to ensure compliance with the law 
within the company, which can then be delegated to the compliance 
department111 (but without the management board losing its duty nor its 
responsibility as a collegiate body: “Compliance ist eine Fuehrungsaufgabe, von der 
sich der Vorstand nicht befreien kann”112). In this respect, the recent Neubuerger 
judgement by the Regional Court of Munich113 clarified that according to the 
Regional Court of Munich, the board may not delegate the implementation of 
                     
111 Casper, M. (2012). Corporate Governance and Corporate Compliance. In du Plessis, J.J., 
Großfeld, B., Luttermann, C., Saenger, I., Sandrock, O., & Casper, M. (Eds.),  German 
Corporate Governance in International and European Context.Berlin - Heidelberg: Springer, 359-
397. 
112Schneider, U.H.,& Schneider, S.H. (2007). Konzern-Compliance als Aufgabe der 
Konzernleitung. ZIP - Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht,44,2065. 
113Regional Court of Munich, decision of December 10, 2013, file no. 5 HK O 1387/10, 
“Siemens” – case / decision published end of March 2014. 
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the compliance system114 in detail to a lower level (“division managers”)115. 
More specifically: the board must check out for itself whether and how the 
compliance system is implemented and whether it is appropriate and 
functional.   
18. A controversy on the independence of the compliance department, in 
particular of the company compliance officer (CCO), could arise. In fact, if the 
criterion of independence is stretched to its limit, the CCO’s independence 
could be meant not only in regard to the subsidiary levels within the company, 
i.e. all operative departments or divisions of the company, but also vis-à-vis the 
management board. If this line of reasoning is applied, either protection from 
                     
114In the case in question, Siemens, a globally active company brought an action for 
compensation against a former member of the board due to a breach of duty. Employees of 
the plaintiff had created and managed so called “black accounts”. The money had been 
used for bribe payments abroad, totalling several millions. These pay-ments led i.a. to a 
supervisory proceeding subject to stock exchange law in the USA and to a criminal 
proceeding against the plaintiff in Germany. At home and abroad, fines running into 
billions have been imposed on the plaintiff. For the internal investigations on the system of 
black accounts, the plaintiff engaged a law firm after its discovery. Siemens justified its 
claim for compensation by stating the board (negligently) breached its duty to ensure a 
lawful behaviour of the company. The defendant as board member did not ensure that the 
company establishes an efficient compliance system with preventive effects, which is 
actually applied and controlled. The board member defended himself against the claim for 
damage i.a. on the ground that the compliance system was not part of the board 
department under his responsi-bility. He had adopted for his department corresponding 
directives to prevent dubious payments. Division managers were responsible for the 
practical implementation. The court accepted the arguments of the applicant company. The 
court sentenced the board member to pay compensation in the amount of in total EUR 15 
m. including law-yers’ fees in the amount of EUR 12.85 m. although the board member 
concerned nei-ther knew the system of black accounts nor knew the corrupt payments and 
was just one of ten board members at that time. 
115Fleischer, H. (2014). Aktienrechtliche Compliance-Pflichten im Praxistest: Das 
Siemens/Neubürger-Urteil des LG München I. Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht, 17, 321-
329. 
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dismissal or no profit-related compensation could be envisaged for the CCO 
and the compliance department in order to protect him from retaliations 
resulting into job loss or salaries discretionality116. On this note, back in 2005 
also the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision highlights that: “The 
independence of compliance function staff may also be undermined if their 
remuneration is related to the financial performance of the business line for which they 
exercise compliance responsibilities. However, remuneration related to the financial 
performance of the bank as a whole should generally be acceptable”117. 
 
Chapter 8: Management Board, Supervisory Board and the Compliance 
Department 
 
19. Besides the issue of the compliance department’s independence and its 
status vis-à-vis the management board, it is also important to examine the 
mutual interaction between the management board and the compliance 
department. In fact, despite the need to safeguard the department’s 
independence, this does not mean that it can always act without following the 
direction of the management board. This aspect is particularly clear when one 
considers the fact that at the heart of the compliance department is the need to 
retrieve and analyse information flows. Indeed, the compliance department 
must have access to the necessary information flows within the company in 
                     
116Krieger, S., & Guenther, J. (2010). Die arbeitsrechtliche Stellung des Compliance-Officers. 
NZA -Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht , 27, 367- 369.  
117http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf 
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order to perform its task in an effective way. But this does not mean that, at any 
time, it is in a position to gain access to all information or to interrogate 
employees in the company. In principle, as a staff department, the compliance 
department must follow the directions of the management board. In fact, the 
management board may give the compliance department permission to 
permanent access to particular information systems and the right to an 
anticipated interrogation of employees. Also in this case, access to information 
should be commensurate to the nature of the company. Indeed, the recently 
released ISO 19600 standard on compliance management systems118 lists several 
examples of collection methods119 and specifies that “there are many methods for 
collecting information. Each method listed below is relevant in different circumstances 
and care should be taken to select the variety of tools appropriate to the size, scale, 
nature and complexity of the organization”.  
20. Another important element necessary to examine the role of the 
compliance department in the context of corporate governance is its 
relationship with the body entrusted with supervisory activity. As recalled 
supra under par. 1, in Germany this body is the supervisory board, while in 
                     
118http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=62342 
119 Examples of information collection include: — ad hoc reports of noncompliance as they 
emerge or are identified; — information gained through hot lines, complaints and other 
feedback, including whistle blowing; — informal discussions, workshops and focus 
groups; — sampling and integrity testing, such as mystery shopping; — results of 
perception surveys; — direct observations, formal interviews, facility tours and 
inspections;— audits and reviews; — stakeholder queries, training requests and feedback 
provided during training (particularly those of employees). 
59 
 
 
Italy this role is embodied by the “Collegio Sindacale”. According to Casper120,  
three questions arise. First, in what amount of detail does the supervisory board 
have to monitor the effective establishment of a compliance department? 
Secondly, to what extent does the supervisory board have to perform 
examinations or investigations, e.g. in the form of random checks, to monitor 
the efficiency of the work of the compliance department? Lastly, do individual 
infringements of law provide a reason for investigations by the supervisory 
board itself or can it rely on the fact that the management board, through 
intermediation by the compliance department, is pursuing such infringements? 
21. If the management board has not established a compliance department 
because a decision has been made that it is unnecessary in respect of the current 
circumstances of the company, the supervisory board has to examine 
independently within the framework of a risk analysis, whether a formal 
compliance organisation is really dispensable. This is part, in fact, of the general 
duty to examine the company organisation foreseen for the supervisory board 
or its equivalent. For instance, pursuant to art. 2403 of the Italian Civil Code: “Il 
collegio sindacale vigila […]sull'adeguatezza dell'assetto organizzativo[…] adottato 
dalla società e sul suo concreto funzionamento”, i.e. the “Collegio Sindacale” 
(equivalent for many tasks to the German supervisory board) has supervisory 
duties regarding the adequacy of the company’s organization, and its actual 
functioning”. This supervisory duty does not only entail formal checks, but also 
                     
120Casper, M. (2012). Corporate Governance and Corporate Compliance. In Du Plessis, J.J., 
Großfeld, B., Luttermann, C., Saenger, I., Sandrock, O., & Casper, M. (Eds.),German 
Corporate Governance. International and European Context.Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, 359-
378.  
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reviews of the actual organization121. It is commonly maintained that the 
compliance department’s staff shall generally not be involved in the activities 
they monitor. However, a combination of the compliance function with other 
control units at the same level (such as money laundering prevention) may be 
acceptable if this does not generate conflicts of interests or compromise the 
effectiveness of the compliance function. Combining the compliance function 
with audit functions shall generally be avoided as this is likely to undermine 
the independence of the compliance function because audit is charged with the 
oversight of the compliance function. However, for practical reasons (for 
example, decision making), and in certain circumstances (for example, in 
investment services providers of only two persons), it may be more appropriate 
to have one body responsible for both functions. Whether staff from other 
control functions also performs compliance tasks, shall also be a relevant 
consideration in the determination of the relevant number of staff necessary for 
the compliance function. With this in mind, in Italy it has been pointed out that 
the fact that the Italian Collegio Sindacale can coincide with the Compliance 
Department (Organismo di Vigilanza) is legally problematic122. In fact, not only 
are the functions of the compliance department and the Collegio Sindacale 
different in their nature, but the Collegio Sindacale is regarded as a potential 
addressee of white collar crimes (such as those foreseen under Art. 2368 of the 
Italian Civil Code). Moreover, it has been pointed out earlier that the 
                     
121Montalenti, P. (2009). Organismo di vigilanza e sistema dei controlli. Giur. Comm. -
Giurisprudenza commerciale, 4, 643. 
122Tombari, U. (2013). Corporate governance e «sistema dei controlli» nella spa. Torino: 
Giappichelli Editore. 
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management board is no assistantpublic prosecutor (“Hilfsbeamter der 
Staatsanwaltschaft”), whereas in Italy the Collegio Sindacale can be123. Hence, it 
is controversial what happens in those cases in which the Compliance 
Department coincides with the Collegio Sindacale, and whether the latter loses 
its status of guarantor of enforcement or the status of guarantor is extended to 
the Compliance Department124.  
22. If a compliance department has been established by the management 
board, then the examination task of the supervisory board has several focal 
points. First, the supervisory board has to examine the mutual relation between 
the management board and the compliance department, i.e. whether the 
management board monitors the compliance department and complies with the 
guidelines which it has set up itself. For instance, the supervisory board may 
want to check that the head of the compliance department (CCO) reports at 
least monthly to the management board. Secondly, the supervisory board has to 
examine whether the compliance department adheres to the policies for its 
work set up by the management board (i.e. its actual functioning and not 
merely its formal existence). Additionally, the efficiency of the compliance 
department has to be examined125. In regard to the degree of detail of the 
                     
123Valensise, P. (2009). L'organismo di vigilanza ex d. lgs. n. 231/01: considerazioni su 
poteri, composizione e responsabilità. Analisi Giuridica dell'Economia, 8(2), 355-382. 
124D'Aponte, M. (2014). Autorità e indipendenza della commissione di garanzia nei conflitti 
sindacali. Torino: Giappichelli Editore. 
125 Casper, M. (2012). Corporate Governance and Corporate Compliance. In Du Plessis, J.J., 
Großfeld, B., Luttermann, C., Saenger, I., Sandrock, O., & Casper, M. (Eds.), German 
Corporate Governance. International and European Context.Berlin - Heidelberg: Springer, 359-
378. 
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monitoring by the supervisory board, it is guided by several factors; apart from 
the size of the company, it must consider how frequently violations of law have 
occurred in the company and which risk level is associated with the type of 
business in which the company is involved. However, as a general rule, the 
supervisory board cannot be required to investigate on a random basis whether 
violations of law have been committed within the company126. Such random 
investigations would jeopardise the trusting cooperation between the 
management board and the supervisory board. The report of the management 
board is the sole source of information for the supervisory board which, again 
as a general rule, may rely on its accuracy, as the management board is 
obligated to utmost honesty in their relationship with the supervisory board. 
Some commentators argue in favour of an extensive right of the supervisory 
board to gather information127, particularly a right to interrogate employees in 
the absence of the management board, although this may negatively affect the 
working atmosphere and the trusting cooperation between the management 
board and the supervisory board.A direct line of authority from the supervisory 
board towards either the compliance department or employees of the company 
can only be justified if actual suspicious circumstances exist, and the 
management board or the compliance department are not trying to clarify the 
situation. It is, however, recommended, as an initial step, that the supervisory 
board has to ask the management board first to invite the head of the 
                     
126Fleischer, H. (2008). Corporate Compliance im aktienrechtlichen Unternehmensverbund. 
CCZ - Corporate Compliance Zeitschrift, 1(1), 1-6. 
127 Nonnenmacher, R., Pohle, K.,& von Werder, A. (2007). Aktuelle Anforderungen an 
Pruefungsausschuesse – Leitfaden fuer Pruefungsausschuesse (Audit Committees) unter 
Beruecksichtigung der 8. EU-Richtlinie, DB- Der Betrieb, 60, 2412 – 2415. 
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compliance department to a meeting of the supervisory board in order to 
receive a direct report from the compliance officer regarding compliance 
activities within the company. However, a duty of the compliance officer to 
report to the supervisory board does not exist in principle. The only exception 
to this would be if the management board as a whole was involved in breaches 
relating to compliance issues. Whereas the supervisory board may normally be 
satisfied with receiving periodic reports from the management board, the 
supervisory board may initiate further investigations if there are discrepancies 
in the reports, or if the reports contain details about an accumulation of 
incidents relevant to compliance. More stringent standards for the examination 
may be applied to such members of the supervisory board who have previously 
held a mandate within the management board and as a result of that have 
special knowledge128.  
23. Whose is the responsibility to monitor the compliance department? The 
answer to this question is a tricky one, as each jurisdiction varies – sometimes 
significantly. In Italy, for instance, the compliance department’s functions can 
be attributed to the “Collegio Sindacale”, and indeed this is a frequent practice 
for small companies. The Collegio Sindacale shall be appointed by the Board of 
Directors (Consiglio di Amministrazione), as a collegiate body (i.e. not just one 
or some of its members), and this appointment is not considered an element 
that undermines the “Collegio Sindacale”’s own independence. Moreover, the 
                     
128Winter, M., (2010). Die Verantwortlichkeit des Aufsichtsrats fur “Corporate 
Compliance”. In Kindler, P., Koch, J., Ulmer, P., & Winter M. (Eds.), Festschrift fuer Uwe 
Hueffer zum 70. Geburtstag.München: CH Beck Verlag, 1103 – 1123. 
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very fact that the Collegio Sindacale carries out the activites of a compliance 
department excludes that it can monitor it. In German literature, it is asked for 
example whether the monitoring of the compliance department can be 
delegated to the Audit Committee, a committee whose establishment is not 
mandatory, but permitted - and even recommend. The duties of the Audit 
Committee include, inter alia, questions of compliance. If the supervisory board 
delegates questions of compliance to the Audit Committee, the duties explained 
above are transferred to that committee. In such a case, the members of the 
supervisory board as a whole, who are not part of the Audit Committee, are 
freed from these duties as they have no duty to act. According to Section 107(3) 
No 4 of the AktG, the duty of the remaining members of the supervisory board 
in that situation is limited to monitoring within the framework of the frequent 
reports of the committee to the plenum as a whole. Corporate responsibility for 
the task of control rests with the supervisory board as a collegiate body129. 
 
Chapter 9: Compliance Officers and Liability 
 
24. Having analysed the contours of the compliance department’s duties and 
its status relative to other bodies within the company, also the liability of the 
compliance officers should be considered. As a preliminary remark, there is no 
                     
129Casper, M. (2012). Corporate Governance and Corporate Compliance. In Du Plessis, J.J., 
Großfeld, B., Luttermann, C., Saenger, I., Sandrock, O., & Casper, M. (Eds.),  German 
Corporate Governance. International and European Context.Berlin - Heidelberg: Springer, 359-
397. 
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standard description as responsibilities will depend on the context and the 
needs of the company. In many cases, the role of compliance officers within 
organisations is still being defined130. The position of the compliance officer 
could involve policy owning responsibilities, such as ensuring that controls are 
in place, managed appropriately and complied with, or the compliance officer 
may be a voluntary, supportive part- time role with the employee simply acting 
as a local point of contact. Many factors influence an compliance officer’s 
exposure to personal liability. While all employees have a responsibility to 
abide by the law and the terms and conditions of their employment contract 
(whether that be written or not), it is not always the case that employees 
understand their responsibilities (documented or assumed), nor their potential 
exposure to personal risk and liability. Furthermore, the spectrum of employees 
carrying out the compliance officer role is likely to include those with specified 
professional duties, e.g. accountants and lawyers, and/or varying seniority. The 
obligations imposed by their professional body or their “officer status” in the 
company will influence the liability context within which these individuals 
work. Also, some job titles are significant. For example, ombudsman and 
auditor can be defined in some jurisdictions as technically and legally specific 
roles and this will determine their legal responsibilities and privileges 
etc.Finally, liability can be prescribed because of particular duties assigned 
specifically to the compliance department officer role. For example, in the US, 
                     
130Schneider, H., & Gottschaldt, P. (2011). Offene Grundsatzfragen der strafrechtlichen 
Verantwortlichkeit von Compliance-Beauftragten in Unternehmen. ZIS- Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik. Available at: http://www.zis-
online.com/dat/artikel/2011_7_593.pdf. 
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compliance officers in the securities industry are more exposed to the risk of 
personal liability if they have supervisory duties rather than solely a 
monitoring role. In some jurisdictions, legal liability may be formally 
“delegated” to senior employees in their employment contract. In practice 
employment contracts are not always updated to reflect a new role or evolving 
responsibilities and the accompanying changes in liabilities. In some 
jurisdictions (for example France and Germany), the Board or a senior officer of 
the company may, in a separate written document, formally set out a senior 
employee’s delegated duties and authorities with accompanying legal and 
criminal liabilities. The delegee can further delegate his/her powers, but not the 
associated liabilities. Where delegations of authority and duties have been 
formally made, and an employee is acting within the scope of their duties, the 
employer would generally be expected to be vicariously liable for a 
wrongdoing, together with the employee. 
25. In 2008, the Head of Internal Audit and Legal at a public cleaning service 
company, “BerlinerStadtreinigung131” (owned by the State of Berlin), was 
convicted for failing to act on evidence of customerovercharging. When he 
became aware of the systematic overcharging, in the region of some €23 
million,he informed a member of the company’s board, who instructed him not 
to correct the error. The GermanBundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court) 
convicted and imprisoned the Head of Internal Audit and Legalon the basis 
that he had assisted fraud by failing to act, i.e. to take his concerns to a higher 
                     
131 BGH 5 StR 394/08. 
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level.In another case in November 2011, the UK’s Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) imposed a fine of £14,000on a compliance officer at a hedge fund 
management company (Dynamic Decisions Capital Management).She had 
failed “to challenge a colleague, [and] investigate and act on the information 
she received”following concerns raised by investors around the sale of a bond. 
The FSA concluded that she “did notengage with her responsibilities...and 
therefore failed to act with due skill and care” and neglected “tounderstand the 
importance of her role and the wider regulatory obligations it brings”. 
26. With a view to the case recalled in the previous paragraph, the German 
Bundesgerichtshof (Federal High Court of Justice) expressly stated that a  
compliance officer (not at board level) is obliged to avert criminal acts 
committed by employees of the organisation to the detriment of third parties132. 
In fact it is not the compliance officer's primary duty to protect the company 
from attacks and damages, as is the case, for example, with auditing 
(preventing breach of trust and embezzlement at the company's expense) and 
measures for the protection of security of the works (preventing unauthorized 
persons from entering). Rather, compliance's duty – and, therefore, the 
employees' duty who work in that area – is the prevention of illegal acts having 
effect within the company (e.g. violation of regulations for the protection of 
employees) and outside of the company (e.g. cartel agreements or the use of 
company computers to exchange child pornography). The compliance officer 
                     
132 The court stated that “the duty of a Compliance Officer is to prevent infringements of the law, 
especially crimes, which are conducted out of the company. Such Officers regularly have a duty to 
act according to sec. 13 Penal Code”.  
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can also take on additional tasks, such as a data security, money laundering or 
an export control officer133. By accepting these duties compliance officers 
assume a special legal position, which distinguishes them from the other 
employees within the company. In the United States, the specific monitoring or 
supervisory duties of non-board member compliance officers actually varies by 
industry. Presently, compliance officers in the securities industry are the most 
heavily regulated134. They make up a very unique subset of the compliance 
activity in the US, so it is difficult to say whether the guidelines provide an 
indication of where the law of personal liability for other compliance officers 
might head, but following them may minimise their risk of personal liability 
under US law. Then again, securities firms are required by law to have chief 
compliance officers with primary responsibility for administering those policies 
and procedures designed to prevent violations of the applicable securities laws 
and regulations. The SEC is authorised to sanction securities firms and their 
officers for failing to reasonably supervise another person who is subject to 
their supervision. However, two things are worth noting. Firstly, in order to 
address concerns about the scope of personal liability, having the title of chief 
compliance officer does not, in and of itself, carry supervisory 
responsibilities135. They have to be formally assigned. Secondly, even where 
compliance officers are deemed to be “supervisors”, US regulation states that 
                     
133Goldschmid, H. J. (1997).Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officer Paradoxes, 
Problems, and Proposed Reforms.J. Corp. L. - Journal of Corporation Law, 23, 631. 
134Talukdar, A. S. (2005). The Voice of Reason: The Corporate Compliance Officer and the 
Regulated Corporate Environment. UC Davis - Business Law Journal, 6, 45-183. 
135Oesterle, D. A. (1983). Limits on a Corporation's Protection of its Directors and Officers 
from Personal Liability. Wis. L. Rev. - Wisconsin Law Review, 513. 
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they will not be deemed to have failed to reasonably supervise another person 
if they had reasonably discharged their supervisory responsibilities in 
accordance with the correct procedures136. The SEC’s stated intent is that the 
monitoring role of a chief compliance officer does not itself subject the officer to 
liability. 
 
Chapter 10: Compliance and Whistle-blowing 
 
27. When investigating the scope of activity of a compliance department, it is 
important to examine whistle-blowing, arguably a key component of 
compliance systems. The starting point of any argument on the interplay of 
compliance and whistle-blowing is the importance of information within the 
company (and the group). Access to information is explicitly mentioned by art. 
6, par. 3 of Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 
2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council: “as regards 
organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined 
terms for the purposes of that Directive in order to enable the compliance function to 
discharge its responsibilities properly and independently, Member States shall require 
investment firms to ensure that the following conditions are satisfied: (a) the compliance 
function must have the necessary authority, resources, expertise and access to all 
relevant information […]”. Moreover,  according to the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, “The compliance function should have the right on its 
own initiative to communicate with any staff member and obtain access to any 
                     
136Murphy, D. E. (2001). Federal sentencing guidelines for organizations: a decade of 
promoting compliance and ethics. Iowa L. Rev. - Iowa Law Review, 87, 697. 
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records or files necessary to enable it to carry out its responsibilities. […]The 
compliance function should be able to carry out its responsibilities on its own 
initiative in all departments of the bank in which compliance risk exists. It 
should have the right to conduct investigations of possible breaches of the 
compliance policy […]The compliance function should be free to report to 
senior management on any irregularities or possible breaches disclosed by its 
investigations, without fear of retaliation or disfavour from management or 
other staff members. Although its normal reporting line should be to senior 
management, the compliance function should also have the right of direct 
access to the board of directors or to a committee of the board, bypassing 
normal reporting lines, when this appears necessary.”137 Gathering information, 
thus, is the first element of any compliance department’s activity, and this is 
where whistle-blowing fits into compliance. Through whistle-blowing, 
informants may report (putative) violations of law, usually anonymously. The 
advantage of an anonymous whistle-blowing-system is the greater willingness 
of the law abiding employee to reveal violations of law, as he or she does not 
have to fear retaliations by superiors or by colleagues on whom he or she has 
been “dobbed in”138. On the other hand, the disadvantages are palpable: an 
anonymous system carries an inherent danger of denunciation as a 
phenomenon, with an increase in reputation risk for corporate players. Two 
formats of whistle can be distinguished. In external whistle-blowing systems 
                     
137http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf 
138Schneider, U. H., & Nowak, C. (2010),  Sind die Einrichtung einer Whistleblowing-Stelle 
und der Schutz des Whistleblowers Teil guter Corporate Compliance. In 
Hönn/Oetker/Raab,Festschrift für Peter Kreutz, S, 855-865. 
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theinformant may reveal himself to an authority that is outside the company 
and usually public. For this purpose, examples from the USA include: the False 
Claims Act 1863 (also indicated as Lincoln Law), Section 802 in conjunction 
with Section 301 of the Sarbanes–Oxley-Act of 2002139in connection with 
violations of the accounting principles or more recently the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010 with its reward for whistle-blowers, if, due to the information, a fine is 
successfully imposed. Internal whistle-blowing systems essentially allow 
employees to report violations of law by colleagues or superiors to a central 
body within the company without disclosing the identity of the informant to 
the suspect. Thus, on the one hand, there are systems in which the informant 
remains completely anonymous while on the other hand there are those in 
which he or she has to identify him- or herself to the whistle-blowing body, 
which treats the personal details of the informant as confidential and, in 
particular, does not disclose them to the suspected persons.  
28. In this respect, one cannot help noting that the US approach is 
significantly different from most European solutions developed so far. The 
definition of “whistleblower” outside of the United States is itself a subject of 
debate.For the past two decades, the US has attached whistleblower protection 
provisions to most law bills in which federal dollars is spent, or which are 
intended to protect the public from financial loss, nuclear radiation, aviation 
                     
139Section 301 of SOX requires audit committees of companies listed on  a stock exchange to 
establish “procedures for the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints received by the issuer 
regarding accounting, internal accounting  controls or auditing matters, and the confidential, 
anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or 
auditing matters”.  
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disasters, unsafe trucks on the road, and a wide variety of other harms. For 
most of the federal whistleblower statutes, the U.S. Department of Labor is 
assigned to investigate and make findings, and thereafter either the 
whistleblower or the employer may appeal the decision administratively, and 
more often, judicially. Instead of this type of US comprehensive whistleblower 
protection approach, most European Union nations have only a patchwork of 
whistleblower protections found in employment, criminal, media, and anti -
corruption laws, and whistleblowing is mostly permitted but not compulsory. 
Moreover, adopting a whistleblowing policy may require prior approvals140, 
and sor far the hypothesis has not been rightly posited that a whistle-blowing 
system is a necessary part of a compliance system.  
 
Chapter 11: Whistle-blowing and conflict with other legal obligations 
 
29. An interesting aspect of whistle-blowing as a possible part of compliance 
is the fact that it can entail conflicts with other obligations, both general ones 
and substantive ones. As far as general obligations are concerned, it should be 
asked for instance whether adopting a whistle-blowing policy could ultimately 
result into a violation of the general obligation for corporate directors to protect 
                     
140Rauhofer, J. (2007). Blowing the whistle on Sarbanes-Oxley: Anonymous hotlines and the 
historical stigma of denunciation in modern Germany. International Review of Law Computers 
and Technology, 21(3), 363-376. 
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the company’s reputation from potential damage141. In this respect, an external 
whistle-blowing system is usually accompanied by damage to the reputation of 
the company with potential investors, potential employees and rating agencies. 
It is the obligation of the management board to prevent such damage within the 
framework of its general management task. In Germany there would only be an 
obligation, based on Section 93 of the AktG, if the advantages of anonymous 
whistle-blowing exceeded the detriments.  
30. As far as conflict of whistle-blowing with substantive obligations is 
entailed, data protection law is perhaps the most challenging area. Conflicts can 
arise in a single jurisdiction, where compliance obligations faces limits imposed 
by the same country’s data protection laws, but even more at cross-border level, 
where compliance-related information flows collide with one or more data 
protection regulations142. Unsurprisingly, some of the most interesting case-law 
originated from US compliance-related information gathering schemes and 
their conflict with the data protection laws of the host country of an affiliated 
company of US corporate group. More in-depth analysis will be provided in 
Part II (Chapter 6, par. 30) of this research, covering corporate groups. 
 
 
                     
141Pittroff, E. (2013). Whistle-Blowing Systems and Legitimacy Theory: A Study of the 
Motivation to Implement Whistle-Blowing Systems in German Organizations. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 1-14. 
142Gunasekara, G. (2007). The ‘final’privacy frontier? Regulating trans-border data flows. 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 15(3), 362-393. 
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Chapter 12: Compliance and MiFID 
 
31. So far, this research has dealt with the compliance obligations embedded 
in general law prescriptions, i.e. with the “if” question: is there such a thing as a 
compliance duty and, if so, what are its contents? Earlier in this research, it has 
been demonstrated that a duty of compliance does indeed exists for 
boardrooms, although usually some degree of discretion is granted to 
boardrooms as to how match this duty – the “how” question. Along with 
compliance duties deriving from general obligations, specific compliance duties 
for particular industries can derive from substantive laws, which also provide 
detailed prescriptions as to how compliance should be implemented. 
32. Implementation of the MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments) 
Directive143 follows the “progressive levels” approach provided by the 
Lamfalussy procedure. The first level of the Lamfalussy process was reached 
with the approval of the 2004/39/CE Directive on markets in financial 
                     
143 Council Directive 2004 /39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 21 April 
2004 on markets in financial instruments, which amends Directives 85 /611/EEC and 93 
/6/EEC of the Council and the Council Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and repeals Council Directive 93 /22/EEC of the Council, and see the 
Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006 laying down detailed rules of implementation of 
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the 
requirements of organization and the activity terms for investment companies and the 
definitions of certain terms for the purposes of this Directive and Regulation (EC) No 
1287/2006 of the Commission, 10 August 2006, laying down detailed rules of 
implementation of Directive 2004 /39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
with regard to the obligations of investment firms to register, report the operations, work 
in a transparent market, use financial instruments during negotiations and define certain 
terms for the purpose of this Directive.   
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instruments (Level 1). This was completed with the enactment by the European 
Commission of the second level directive 2006/73/CE and EC regulation 
1287/2006 (Level 2), both containing the detailed rules for the implementation 
of the first level directive: Directive 2006/73/CE, which refers to the 
requirements of the organization and the terms of use of the activity of 
investment companies. Following the creation of this regulation, and before 
January 2011, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) began 
the process of drawing up and disseminating interpretations, positioning and 
guidelines, and promotes the comparison between regulators, operators and 
relevant associations (Level 3). After January 2011, ESMA (European Securities 
and Market Authority) the new independent European authority continues the 
CESR plans. 
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Compliance in a cross-border corporate group 
 
““Whoever operates in Italy—individual or corporate entity—has to 
respect Italian law. Here an administrative offense is imputed to a 
foreign corporation connected to a crime made in Italy. The jurisdiction 
is Italian, even if the corporation adopted a compliance program in a 
foreign context. If a corporation does not adopt a compliance program, 
it is not per se illegal. Its relevance is on the corporation’s culpability.”. 
 
Judge Mannocci, Siemens case144 
 
* * * 
 
Chapter 1: Group Compliance in the pre-“Compliance Era” Case Law 
 
0. As a preliminary remark, as acknowledged among others by a long 
scholarly debate, a corporate group as a conjunction of a number of companies 
does not have a legal status but only represent an economic unit, so the 
addressees of statutory provisions to be complied with are the individual 
companies as separate legal persons145. This, however, does not mean that a 
parent company has no duties vis-à-vis the rest of the group146 as explained 
                     
144Trib. Milano, sez. XI Giud. Riesame, Pres. Rel. Mannocci, ord. 10-28-2004, Siemens, AG, 
as quoted in Bevilacqua, F.C. (November/December 2006). Corporate Compliance 
Programs Under Italian Law, Ethikos and Corporate Conduct Quarterly, , vol. 20 no. 3, 1. 
145Dewey, J. (1926). The historic background of corporate legal personality. Yale Law Journal, 
655-673. 
146Grantham, R., & Rickett, C. E. (1998). Corporate personality in the 20th Century. Oxford: 
Hart Publishing. 
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more in-depth infra. With this in mind, the famous Supergun landmark case of 
1996 can perhaphs be mentioned as a lead case about compliance and cross-
border corporate groups147. Back in 1996, the Swiss criminal court condemned 
board members of a Swiss parent company (group holding) in a case where its 
subsidiaries violated arms control norms148. Interestingly, the key argument 
upheld by the court was not that the board members of the parent company 
were culpable of illegal arms export, nor that they showed some sort of 
complicity with the group subsidiaries149. Rather, the court held the parent 
company board responsible for not having put in place a group-wide 
reporting and control system that would have allowed the parent company’s 
board to detect suspect behaviour at the level of subsidiaries. With a view to the 
above, the Supergun case can arguably be further un-packed into four key 
questions: 
 
i. Does the status of controlling/parent company within a corporate 
group entail specific compliance obligations for its board? 
ii. What are the contents and the scope of such obligations? 
iii. How are the obligations implemented group-wide? 
                     
147Williamson Jr, R. L. (2003). Hard law, Soft law, and Non-Law in multilateral arms 
control: some compliance hypotheses. Chi. J. Int'l L. - Chicago Journal of International Law,4, 
59. 
148Scott, R. (1996). Report of the Inquiry Into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-use 
Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions: Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of 
Commons Dated 15th February 1996. House of Commons – Stationery Office, 5 Volumes and 
Index, Vol. 1. 
149Cassani, U. (2014). Corporate Responsibility and Compliance Programs in Switzerland. 
In Manacorda, S., Centonze, F., & Forti, G. (Eds.), Preventing Corporate Corruption. Anti 
bribery compliance model.Springer International Publishing,491-503. 
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iv. What are the limits imposed on group-wide compliance duties by 
legal obligations stemming from other law provisions affecting 
individual companies which are part of a group? If there are 
situations of two obligations imposed simultaneously, which 
obligation would rank senior?  
 
Chapter 2: Cross-border complexity (Introductory Remarks) 
 
1. As illustrated earlier in Part I of this research, compliance indisputably 
already poses critical challenges for single, stand-alone companies operating 
just in their home jurisdictions. The famous French statesman Charles De 
Gaulle famously asked “How can you govern a country which has 246 varieties of 
cheese?”. This witty sentence maintains much of its validity also in fields other 
than cheese: legal diversity – and complexity – are an inherent element of the 
global landscape, and pose great challenges to international corporate 
players.In a globalized corporate landscape, where suppliers and clients are all 
across the globe, the complexity – and the costs - of compliance challenges 
increases immensely. The expansion of the EU, the exponential growth of 
digital services, the rise of new market economies following the collapse of 
Soviet communism, and the opening up of China to foreign investment are just 
some of the better-known phenomena that have been experienced in recent 
years. How and to what extent do cross-border operations affect corporate 
compliance? Cross-border business, no doubt, increases the challenges of 
corporate compliance. Today, many of the markets targeted by “global” 
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corporate players are outside their “home” jurisdiction. A 2006 survey150 by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit revealed that over one-third of survey respondents 
say they answer to ten or more regulators, and over three-quarters report to 
four or more. Siemens is a good example of this complexity: a global 
powerhouse with activities in nearly 190 regions, it has 336,000 employees 
working at 1,640 locations around the globe. A bank like Deutsche Bank151, 
operating in 74 countries, faces more than 350 regulatory exams a 
year.Moreover,today’s world is populated by corporate groups, rather than 
isolated business ventures. Management, too, is increasingly responsible for 
activities on an international basis. Its horizons are no longer limited by 
national or local considerations, but by “transnational” ones. With a view to 
corporate compliance, arguably one of the key challenges for compliance 
officers of internationally active companies is whether regulatory convergence 
will prevail, or divergence. In a November 2013 speech, Andrew Ceresney, Co-
Director of the US SEC Division of Enforcement, noted that in 2013, the SEC, the 
US Department of Justice, and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation hosted a 
first of its kind Foreign Bribery and Corruption Training Conference152. 
Representatives from over 50 law enforcement and regulatory agencies from 30 
different countries attended the conference during which the attendees shared 
                     
150The Economist Intelligence Unit (June 2006).Controlling risk and improving effectiveness; 
Gladstein, D.L., & Reilly, N.P. (1985). Group decision-making under threat: the tycoon 
game. Academy of Management Journal, 23, 613–27. 
151Bueschgen, H. E. (1995). Deutsche Bank from 1957 to the Present: The Emergence of an 
International Financial Conglomerate. In Gall,L. (Ed.), The Deutsche Bank 1870-1995. 
London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. 
152The opening speech of the conference is available online at: 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171492212#.VKgVK3te-6s 
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information on enforcement and investigatory techniques, all with the goal of 
enhancing the enforcement of the (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and 
other international anti-corruption laws. Moreover, enforcement agencies share 
their findings more often with their foreign peers, although substantial 
differences in approach still exist. Indeed, while it is commonly acknowledged 
that initiatives to foster greater cooperation among states are more common 
today than in the past, it is also true that the never-stopping production of new 
laws by different state actors inevitably results in greater complexity153.  
 
2. The concept of a company carrying on business in several countries is far 
from new. After all, the Dutch East India Company (the “Verenigde Oost-
indische Compagnie”), founded in 1602, is often considered as the first true 
multinational corporation. From the 17th to the 18th century trading companies 
such as the Dutch East India Company (and its British counterpart, the East 
India Trading Company) acted on behalf of European governments in Asia. By 
1750, the Dutch East India Company employed around 25,000 people and was 
doing business in 10 Asian countries154.  
 
3. Internazionalization has increased enormously in developing and 
transition economies in recent years. Current statistics convey an impressive 
message: according to the United Nation's World Investment Report of 
                     
153According to a presentation by law firm Norton Rose, over the past two years the 
following states enacted new anti-corruption laws: Canada, Messico, Brazil, India, Ireland, 
Spain, India and Russia. 
154Wills, J.E. (1974).Pepper, Guns, and Parleys: The Dutch East India Company and 
China.Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1622-1681. 
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2010:“[…] the global crisis has not halted the growing internationalization of 
production. The reduction in sales and in the value-added of foreign affiliates of 
transnational corporations in 2008 and 2009 was more limited than the 
contraction of the world economy. As a result, foreign affiliates’ share in global 
gross domestic product (GDP) reached an historic high of 11 per cent. 
Transnational corporations’ foreign employment increased slightly in 2009, to 
80 million workers. The rise of developing and transition economies is apparent 
in international production patterns. These economies now host the majority of 
foreign affiliates’ labour force. In addition, they accounted for 28 per cent of the 
82,000 transnational corporations worldwide in 2008, two percentage points 
higher than in 2006. This compares to a share of less than 10 per cent in 1992, 
and reflects their growing importance as home countries as well155”.  
 
4. Moreover, companies operating trans-nationally are often part of 
a corporate group or conglomerate156, where they act either as parent/holding 
company or as subsidiaries157. More specifically, “national” multinationals 
usually have a single parent company of a particular nationality, whilst 
“international” multinationals have two or more controlling parents of different 
                     
155http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2010_en.pdf 
156Siedel, G. J. (2001).  Legal complexity in cross-border subsidiary management. Tex. Int'l 
LJ - Texas International Law Journal, 36, 611. 
157Dunning, J. H. (1999). Trade, location of economic activity and the multinational 
enterprise: a search for an eclectic approach. In Buckley P.J.,& Ghauri, P.(Eds.), The 
internationalization of the firm. London: Thomson,  61-79. 
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nationalities158, but this description relates only to the legal structure and does 
not describe either the commercial activity of a group or the underlying 
decision-making structures159. Arguably, limited liability is a crucial driver of 
corporate group architectures, because it becomes a matter of strategic policy 
how the firm is to be structured in a legal way. Incorporation does not only 
offer dispersed shareholders limited liability, but the regime is also available to 
a parent corporation that is sole shareholder in its incorporated subsidiaries – 
although as discussed infra this principle finds several exceptions. Limited 
liability provides the possibility to structure a firm as a corporate group160. 
Groups are ubiquitous in the corporate landscape, as they provide two 
corporate architectural benefits to parents: first, with the decision of the parent 
company to incorporate each risky business161 in a separate corporation, it 
compartmentalizes the risks of each individual business into a subsidiary 
corporation162. With this, the individual subsidiary corporations could be 
shielded from damage claims that may arise from the activities of any of the 
other subsidiaries163. Second, as a shareholder, the parent company needs not to 
                     
158Bucley, P.J., & Casson, M.C. (1985). The Economic Theory of the Multinational Enterprise. 
London: Macmillan; Buckley, P.J., & Casson, M.C. (1976). The Future of the Multinational 
Enterprise. London: Macmillan. 
159Elango, B. (2004). Geographic Scope of Operations by Multinational Companies: An 
Exploratory Study of Regional and Global Strategies. European Management Journal, 22.4, 
431-441. 
160McGee, J.,& Thomas, H. (1986). Strategic groups: theory, research and taxonomy.Strategic 
Management Journal, 7.2, 141-160. 
161Khanna, T., & Yafeh, Y. (2005). Business Groups and Risk Sharing around the World.  The 
Journal of Business, 78.1, 301-340. 
162 Sykes, A.O. (1984). The Economics of Vicarious Liability. Yale Law Journal, 93,1231. 
163Faccio, M., Lang, L., & Young, L. (2009). Pyramiding vs leverage in corporate groups: 
International evidence.Journal of International Business Studies, 41.1, 88-104. 
84 
 
provide additional capital in the case that one of its subsidiaries is confronted 
with a damage claim that more than erases all of the equity of the 
subsidiary.Given the fact that limited liability compartmentalizes subsidiary 
risk and protects the parent, it affects the way in which the parent chooses to 
control her subsidiaries. Compartmentalization makes it less necessary to 
control risks on the parent level as it will be in the case of one corporation. It is 
even the other way around: risky activities will be stimulated, because limited 
liability insulates the other subsidiaries and the parent164165. In a corporate 
group the result is a higher level of investment in risky activities in subsidiary 
corporations than in the unincorporated group166.Limited liability affects the 
allocation of decision rights between parent and subsidiary167. If the parent 
compartmentalizes business risks in corporate subsidiaries, it will not matter to 
her from a liability perspective whether decision rights stay at the level of the 
subsidiary board or will be brought to lower levels within the subsidiary 
corporations. To the parent it will not matter at what level in the subsidiary 
corporation a tortuous act is committed. In the absence of strong compliance 
prescriptions, although liability may flow upwards via a vicarious liability rule, 
it would halt at the level of the board of the subsidiary.As a matter of fact, 
corporate groups have the possibility to deploy different economic functions in 
                     
164Easterbrook, F.H., & Fischel, D.R. (1985). Limited liability and the corporation. U. Chi. L. 
Rev. - University of Chicago Law Review, 52, 89. 
165Blumberg, P. (1993). The multinational challenge to corporation law: the search for a new 
corporate personality. New York: Oxford University Press. 
166 Glynn, T.P. (2004). Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability 
for Corporate Officers. Vanderbilt Law Review, 57,329. 
167 Brooks, R. R.W. (2002). Liability and Organizational Choice. Journal of Law and Economics, 
45,91. 
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a variety of jurisdictions. Cash management functions can be concentrated in 
one specific country, whereas intellectual property assets (patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, etc…) in another one, and so on. The services rendered by these 
“specialized” companies to the group are rolled over to other group companies 
through ad hoc service agreements. Furthermore, several group companies may 
be located in parts of the world where the potential size of the market may not 
even be matched by well-developed legal infrastructure.  
 
5. The use of group structures and cross-border activity amplify the level of 
complexity of the global corporate landscape, as different countries very often 
have their own different rules, sophistication levels or pace of reform168.Thus, 
the question arises whether the set of legal duties imposed in a specific 
jurisdiction is limited only to the relevant company or should be observed 
group-wide169. In Germany, for instance, there have recently been two antitrust 
law cases, in which it has been discussed whether a foreign parent company is 
subject to a duty to install organisational measures within the German 
subsidiary companies170. 
 
                     
168Chandler, A.D., & Mazlish, B.(2005). Leviathans: Multinational corporations and the new 
global history.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
169Teubner, G., & Sugarman, D. (1990). Unitas Multiplex: Corporate Governance in Group 
Enterprises. In Teubner, G.,& Sugarman, D. (Eds.).Regulating Corporate Groups in 
Europe.Baden Baden: Nomos. 
170Bundeskartellamt, Az. B1-200/06 from 9 February 2009; ECJ, 10 September 2009 – C-
97/08P ¼ (2009) 9 WM 2048 et seq with an annotation by Schneider, U.H. (December 8, 
2009). Compliance im Konzern. NZG - Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht, 34, 1321 and 
foll.. 
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Chapter 3: Group-wide compliance as part of a group-wide management 
duty? 
 
6. In this chapter, the issue will be examined whether there is such as a 
thing as a group-wide duty of compliance, and, if so whether this duty is part of 
a group management duty. In fact, earlier in this research, we have ascertained 
for the stand-alone that the duty of compliance is part of a duty imposed on the 
board.  Now, as we do not deal with a stand-alone company but with corporate 
groups, we set out to examine whether an analogy is possible. First, it should be 
defined what the management duty (in Germany this would be the 
“Leitungsplicht”, in Italy it would be the “principio di corretta amministrazione” 
enshrined in the Italian Civil Code) looks like. Although the group 
management duty171 is not defined explicitly, the tendency to infer the existence 
of a group-wide management duty from the peculiar nature of the group 
holding/parent company arguably represents a key element in the whole 
discussion about compliance within corporate groups.  
 
7. First, it should be noted that the parent company – especially if its sole or 
predominant business is to manage its subsidiaries - carries out its business 
through the affiliated companies, and therefore in the German scholarly debate 
its board’s management duty can be deemed to include affiliated companies as 
well172. However, as we will point out more-in-depth infra, extrapolating the 
                     
171Kropff, B. (1984). Zur Konzernleitungspflicht. Zeitschrift für Unternehmens-und 
Gesellschaftsrecht, 13(1), 112-133. 
172Schneider, U.H., & Schneider, S.H. (2007). Konzern-Compliance als Aufgabe der 
Konzernleitung. ZIP - Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 44, 2063. 
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existence of a group management duty from the fact that a parent company acts 
through its affiliated company is not always accepted as a valid reasoning, and 
the Italian Supreme Court requires further elements to hold the parent 
company liable for the group.  
 
8. Second, depending on the actual relationship between the parent 
company and its subsidiaries, further elements can be put forward to 
demonstrate the existence of a management duty of the former vis-à-vis the 
latter companies. For instance, to the extent a parent company does not just set 
high-level guidelines and does not leave the management of the subsidiaries to 
the subsidiaries’ board and management, the parent company can be 
considered a “de facto director”173. Pursuant to Italian criminal case law, the de 
facto director is equivalent to the rightful director and therefore is fully subject 
to the prohibitions and penalties provided by criminal law for the acts 
committed by both. Not applying these prohibitions would lead to a legal 
asymmetry, i.e. to considering that the criminally illicit activity by the de facto 
director is not an offence due to the absence of in-vestiture in the position, 
unlike that existing in the rightful director and therefore the former would be 
unjustly exonerated of any criminal liability. The dominant Italian case law 
subjects the de factor director to criminal law in its substantial content and 
correctly deems that in criminal law, the liability is based on the effective 
management of the company which prevails over the formal one of taking on 
                     
173Sgubbi, F. (2006). Gruppo societario e responsabilità delle persone giuridiche ai sensi del 
D. Lgs. n. 231/2001. Rivista 231, 1,7. 
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the office174. The individual model fact situations of offences are configured by 
criminal law, regardless of the formal title, under which the activity of director 
is exercised but according to the factual observation that the activity is 
concretely exercised. Following this line of reasoning: because compliance duty 
is a duty ultimately imposed on the board, as discussed earlier in this research, 
then the compliance duty also applies to the parent company. Resorting to de 
facto directorship as a means to project a management duty (that includes a 
compliance duty) onto the whole group, may however prove difficult.  In fact, 
in Italy, using a “de facto director” legal characterization can mean that a whole 
company (the parent company) is treated like a board director, i.e. that it is 
regarded as an individual regardless of its status of legal person. This shift of 
legal personality is not accepted in several legal traditions such as the English, 
as it entails substantial inroads into the long established principle that 
“although a company is an artificial entity and can only act through natural 
                     
174Court of Criminal Cassation, 14th May 1993, defendant Delle Fave; Court of Criminal 
Cassation December 29th,  1972, defendant Zito in Giust. pen., 1973. II, 591; Court of 
Criminal Cassation December 5th, 1966, defendant Savoldo in Dir. fall., 1967, II, 974; 
Criminal Cassation May 8th, 1964, defendant Esposito in Rep. Foro it., 1965, entry Societa` 
no. 220, 223, Criminal Cassation July 1st, 1963, defendant De Angelis in Rep. Foro it., 1954, 
246. In legal literature: Antolisei, F. (1959). Manuale di diritto penale. Leggi complementari. 
I reati fallimentari. Milano: Giuffrè Editore, 109; Zuccalà, G. (1954). Il delitto di false 
comunicazioni sociali. Padova: CEDAM, 53; Conti, L., & Bruti Liberati, E. (1971). Esercizio di 
fatto dei poteri di amministrazione e responsabilità penali nell’ambito delle società irregolari.Il 
diritto penale nelle società commerciali. Milano: Giuffrè Editore, 110 and foll.; Monelli, F. 
(1984). La responsabilità dell’amministratore di fatto. Giurisprudenza commerciale, 107; 
Abriani, N. (1988). Gli amministratori di fatto delle società di capitali. Milano: Giuffrè Editore, 
200 and foll.. 
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persons, it is to be treated as a legal personality separate and distinct from its 
directors and members”175.  
 
9. It may also be possible toargue that a group management duty exists if 
the holding company and its subsidiaries have the same board members (so 
called “interlocking directorates”). If, for instance, a subsidiary conducts a 
different business than the parent company but has the same board members of 
the parent, then it is safe to assume that there is an actual flow of information 
and directives between the parent company and the subsidiary. The existence of 
similar/identical corporate governance bodies, as well as the constant flow of 
information represent robust arguments to state the existence of management 
duties that extend well beyond the parent company and include the subsidiary. 
Paradoxically, also the choice as to how to organize and staff the compliance 
function group-wide can affect the qualification of a group wide management 
duty. In the Italian scholarly debate, most guidelines emphasize that the 
compliance function of group subsidiaries should avoid duplications with the 
parent’s compliance function, because in a litigation scenario the absence of 
duplications would make it more difficult to blame mis-compliance cases onto 
the whole group176.       
 
                     
175UK Supreme Court judgment in Holland v Revenue and Customs (HMRC) [2010] . 
176Opinion no. 1250 of the Italian Banking Association of April 19, 2011, available on-line: 
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/pdf2010/SoleOnLine5/_Oggetti_Correlati/Documenti/Nor
me%20e%20Tributi/2011/10/guida-reati-ambientali/Parere-ABI-OdV.pdf. 
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10. With a view to the question raised in the previous paragraph, one should 
recall at the outset that, although the corporate group is an economic unit, this 
does not mean that each company shares the same interest. This may, for 
instance, have to do with the fact that each group company is tasked with a 
different business and thus has different goals and priorities.  Moreover, the 
self-interest of the parent company can be quite different from the 
subsidiaries’ interest177. This is for instance quite evident in taxation matters, as 
the use of cross-border group structuresoften magnifies the potential to 
“optimize” revenue flows within the group, and achieve substantial tax savings 
by allocating higher portions of group revenue to group companies that are 
incorporated in jurisdictions with a limited tax burden. Many legislators are 
aware of different interests coexisting in the same group, and have thus 
foreseen a duty for the parent company to prevent damage to subsidiaries (or, if 
damage occurs, to restore it or compensate the damaged company). For 
instance, art. 2497 of the Italian Civil Code recognizes the legitimacy of 
management and coordination as well as the "physiological" interference of the 
holding company (parent) in the management of the companies belonging to its 
group.The obligation of proper management is binding for each company or 
entity exercising management and coordination, including not only the 
directors of the holding and the controlled company, but also the holding 
company itself. As a consequence, in case of damage, such entities will be 
deemed liable as well as, more generally, any person having taken part in the 
                     
177Montalenti, P. (1995). Conflitto di interesse nei gruppi di società e teoria dei vantaggi 
compensativi. Rivista delle Società. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi, 16-17. 
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harmful act.Any damage is to be evaluated in the context of the economic and 
business interests of the group as a whole, and taking into account the overall 
results of the management and coordination acts on the basis of an after-the-fact 
inquiry, including both the damages and benefits affecting the company subject 
to management and coordination178. 
 
11. The duty of the parent company to prevent damage strongly commends 
the establishment of a compliance system across the group, which is 
organisationally embodied within the parent company. In fact, in the previous 
paragraphs, we have examined a variety of elements that are used in the 
scholarly debate and legal discourse to argue in favour of or against the 
existence of a group-wide compliance duty. These elements are mostly centered 
around the peculiar nature of the parent company: the holding (and 
management) of the subsidiaries, the potential re-charachterization of the 
holding as de facto director, the one-enterprise approach used in some 
jurisdictions (such as the Swiss) and specific legal branches (e.g. EU competition 
law). In addition to these elements, one can also recall the almost universal 
principle of organizational appropriateness, i.e. the idea that compliance is a 
commensurate duty. While there is no doubt that there is such as thing a 
compliance obligation and that this obligation lies with the top management of 
a firm, it is also true that the extent to which this obligation has to be satisfied 
depends on the complexity and nature of the firm itself. For instance, in the 
                     
178Roth, K., & O'Donnell, S. (1996). Foreign subsidiary compensation strategy: An agency 
theory perspective. Academy of management Journal, 39(3), 678-703. 
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words of the ISO 19600 standard on compliance systems management (par. 4.6): 
“The organization should document its compliance obligations in a manner that is 
appropriate to its size, complexity, structure and operations” and “the extent and level 
of detail of the compliance risk assessment are dependent on the risk situation, context, 
size and objectives of the organization and can vary for specific sub-areas (e.g. 
environment, financial, social)”. Also in the recent Neubuerger judgement by the 
Munich Regional Court, the court acknowledged that:  
 
i. a board member fulfills its organizational duty in case of a 
corresponding potential threat only if he/she establishes a compliance 
system aimed at risk control and damage prevention;  
ii. the company’s type, size and organization, the provisions to be complied 
with, the geographical presence as well as suspected cases in the past are 
crucial for the extent of the compliance system in detail. 
 
Hence, if one accepts that corporate groups often entail greater complexity, then 
it should be possible to maintain that there is such a thing as a group 
management duty, and that this duty is commensurate to the greater 
complexity of group architectures.   
 
12. In this paragraph, the different types of linkages between the parent 
company and its subsidiaries will be examined for the purpose of compliance. 
In fact, the argument that each company should be considered singularly (the 
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“archipelago solution” or “Inselloesung”179) when analysing organizational 
duties is a simplistic argument, and partly fails to recognize the findings of 
criminal law debate. For instance, in cases of bribery at the controlled company 
level, it is always necessary to look at the possibility of the controlling company 
being (concurrently) liable. There are various forms of establishing this liability. 
For the sake of this research, we will mention three basic paradigms: direct 
liability, agent liability and one-enterprise liability. Under the “Direct liability” 
paradigm, where the controlling company participated directly in the bribery of 
the controlled company. For example, by either instigating the misconduct or 
by approving payments to a third-party used as a bribe. In the Italian criminal 
law debate, it is commonly held that it is important to verify whether the 
individual who actually commits a crime has an executive status or a non-
executive status in both the parent company and the subsidiary. If the author of 
the crime holds positions in both companies, it should be assessed in what 
capacity he acted when committing the crime. This distinction is however 
impossible if the author of the crime is an executive with executive powers in 
the power as well as in the subsidiary, because this would entail a functional 
link between the individual who commits the crime and the company for both 
companies. In the “direct liability” cases, the controlling company will be 
directly liable either for the acts of its senior management, its employees - or for 
a lack of supervision. Pursuant to a landmark judgement by the Italian Supreme 
Criminal Court (Corte di Cassazione - sezione penale) of January 29 2013, no. 
                     
179Schneider, U.H., & Schneider, S.H. (2007). Konzern-Compliance als Aufgabe der 
Konzernleitung.ZIP - Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 44, 2063. 
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4324, the parent company can be held liable if the individual who violated the 
law did so also by also pursuing an interest of the parent company – regardless 
of formal agreements with the subsidiary. If “Agent liability” is involved, the 
controlling company is responsible for acts of the controlled company as its 
agent. Lastly, under the “one enterprise liability” concept, the owner of several 
legal persons is regarded itself as one enterprise encompassing and making use 
of all legal persons. Thus, any bribery within this one enterprise renders it liable 
either by imputation or by lack of supervision as if the bribery happened not in 
a separate legal person but within one enterprise. In the Swiss Criminal Code 
for example, the offence “is attributed to the undertaking” (a synonym for 
“enterprise”)180. If several companies are combined under a holding company, 
the holding company can be viewed as one single enterprise comprising all 
companies. In such case, an offence taking place in one of the companies can be 
viewed as having taken place in the one enterprise: the holding company. 
Under Italian law, pursuant to art. 5 of legislative decree no. 231/2001, in order 
to detect which company within a corporate group shall be held accountable for 
miscompliance, the specific interest or benefit of an entity has to be ascertained 
first. The interest can be: a) the interest of both the parent company and the 
subsidiary, b) the sole interest of the parent company, c) a more comprehensive 
and collective type of interest – a group interest. More specifically, in its 
judgement no. 9/2011, the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) stated 
that, in order to hold a parent company or another group company liable, it is 
                     
180Swiss Legislation “SR 311.0”, as of January 1st, 2013, available on-line at: 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/311_0/a102.html. 
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necessary that an individual who acts on behalf of the parent company or 
another group company concurs to the the crime. This linkage means that the 
liability of a group company does not automatically and per se result in an 
extension of the liability to other group companies, unless executives or 
employees concurred to the crime. This echoes a landmark opinion by the 
Italian State Council181, according to which “because the corporate liability is 
correlated to a deficiency of the organizational and oversight systems used by the 
specific company whose executives or employees committed the crime, i.e. to objective 
elements of a company, it should be excluded that, in the case of crimes committed at the 
level of a group company, the sanctions […] can be extented to all the group 
companies”. This is very important, because it suggests that in Italy the “one-
enterprise liability” theory cannot be used automatically, but that the existence 
of a “group-wide liability” shall be proved on a case-by-case basis182. More 
specifically, according to the Italian Supreme Court, the will to commit a crime 
by the holding company must be proved, and the benefits (i.e. the enrichment) 
of the holding company must be proved, too. Therefore, in principle, the parent 
company can be held liable only when it does more than merely engage in 
holding stakes, and actively engages in business conduct, also via the 
interposition of other persons. At EU level,competition authorits do not allow 
for any defence in the form of proof that appropriate antitrust compliance 
                     
181Italian State Council, section III, January 11th, 2005. 
182See also Italian Supreme Criminal Court judgment no. 24583 of June 20th, 2011. 
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programmes had been implemented.183 Instead, the Commission concludes 
from the fact that an infringement of competition law took place that there must 
be a guilty party. Given that the individual involved in the cartel cannot be held 
liable for lack of a legal basis in EU antitrust law, the responsibility is, by 
default, attributed exclusively to the relevant undertaking. This logic as applied 
by the Commission can be clearly seen from, e.g., the following statement: “In 
general, while the Commission welcomes measures taken by undertakings to avoid 
cartel infringements, such measures cannot changethe reality that infringements did 
take place and the need to sanction them in this Decision”184.  Based on the argument 
that the existence of a compliance programme did not prevent the infringement 
from taking place, the Commission also refuses to take such programmes into 
account as a mitigating factor. In the “British Sugar” case185, the Commission 
even regarded the existence of a compliance programme as an aggravating 
circumstance186. 
 
12. In a group it is commonly accepted that the dominance of one entity can 
result into a damage inflicted by the dominant entity to the other group entities, 
but this damage has to be compensated. Moreover, attention should be paid to 
the design of the group. The most obvious example is the parent-subsidiary 
relationship. Other forms include one company controlling another one 
                     
183Hofstetter, K., & Ludescher, M. (2010). Fines Against Parent Companies in EU Antitrust 
Law-Setting Incentives for 'Best Practice Compliance. World Competition: Law and Economics 
Review, 33 (1). 
184Commission, 21.2.2007, PO/Elevators and Escalators, E-1/38.823, margin no. 631. 
185Commission, 14.10.1998, British Sugar Plc, OJ of March 22, 1999, L 76/1, margin no. 208 
186Stephan, A. (2009). Hear no evil, see no evil: why antitrust compliance programmes may 
be ineffective at preventing cartels. CCP Working Paper, 09-9. 
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through formal agreements on control or on transfer of loss and profits. Control 
can also take place as a de facto contro if both companies are managed by the 
same persons, or if one company is economically fully dependent on the other. 
In Germany, there are formal agreements on control or on transfer of loss and 
profits are explicitly foreseen by the law (Beherrschungsvertrag). In Italy it is 
debated whether the Beherrschungsvertrag is admitted in other jurisdictions, and 
Italian doctrine seems to agree that only the “light” Beherrschungsvertrag is 
legally admitted in Italy, but no such an agreement that empties the 
controlled/affiliated company of its legal prerogatives187. Further on this note, it 
is important to note that several comments in the Italian doctrine suggest that a 
different kind of infra-group agreement should in any case be explicitly 
stipulated also to regulate group-wide compliance. More specifically, it is 
suggested that the parent company submits to all of its subsidiary a contract in 
which the guiding principles for compliance are provided – often in the form of 
a group-wide code of ethics188. In Germany, characterising for a group 
governed by contract is that the parent company legitimates their domination 
(or control) of the affiliated companies by one of the company contracts, 
mentioned in Sections 291 et seq of the AktG, which also contain defence 
instruments for the controlled company. As a consequence, in the group by 
                     
187Picione, A. D. L. (2008).Operazioni finanziarie nell'attività di direzione e coordinamento. 
Milano: Giuffrè Editore, Vol. 321. 
188Previtali, P. (2009). Modelli organizzativi e compliance aziendale. L'applicazione del D. Lgs. 
231/2001 nelle imprese italiane.Milano: Giuffrè Editore, Vol. 57; Lancellotti, G., & Lancellotti, 
F. (2011). Il modello di organizzazione, gestione e controllo ex D. lgs. 8 giugno 2001, n. 231. Uno 
scudo processuale per le società e gli enti.Torino: Giappichelli Editore. 
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contract, economically unfavourable instructions are allowed189, as they have to 
be automatically compensated by the parent company by the end of a year190. 
However, the instructions have to be given to the respective management board 
of the affiliate and not directly to the individual employees of the affiliate. An 
exception is only possible if the supervisory board of the affiliated company has 
delegated its own authority to instruct to the parent’s compliance department 
of the group191. 
 
13. Groups can also exist as “de facto” groups. In this particular design, 
because a contract, legitimating the domination, is absent, the detection of the 
group can sometimes be complex. Economically unfavourable instructions are 
only allowed, if the disadvantage will be compensated in each particular case192. 
Thus, the focus shifts to the question under what circumstances an instruction is 
detrimental (unfavourable). If the example above is considered again, in which 
the dominant company instructs the dominated company to end potentially 
illegal conduct, which has an economically profitable effect for the affiliate, the 
question arises, whether the disadvantage has to be determined solely under 
economic or also under other considerations. Under Italian law (art. 2497 and 
                     
189Hofstetter, K. (1990). Parent Responsibility for Subsidiary Corporations: Evaluating 
European Trends. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 39(03), 580. 
190Casper, M. (2012). Corporate Governance and Corporate Compliance. In Du Plessis, J.J., 
Großfeld, B., Luttermann, C., Saenger, I., Sandrock, O., &Casper, M. (Eds.),German 
Corporate Governance. International and European Context.Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, 388.  
191Fleischer, H. (2008). Corporate Compliance im aktienrechtlichen Unternehmensverbund. 
CCZ - Corporate Compliance Zeitschrift, 1, 6. 
192Fasciani, P. (2007). Groups of companies: the Italian approach. European Company and 
Financial Law Review, 4(2), 220. 
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seq. of the Italian Civil Code), the existence of a detriment shall be assessed not 
only based on a mere economic/accounting criterion, but on a normative 
concept as well.  
 
14. In the context of globally active corporate groups it is also important to 
underline that many day-by-day functions can be outsourced, i.e. transferred to 
external entities which are not part of the corporate group.According to the 
newly released ISO 19600 stantard (par. 3, “Outsourced processes”) “the 
organization should ensure that outsourced processes are controlled and monitored. 
Outsourcing of an organization’s operations usually does not relieve the organization of 
its legal responsibilities or compliance obligations. If there is any outsourcing of the 
organization’s activities, the organization needs to undertake effective due diligence to 
ensure that its standards and commitment to compliance will not be lowered. Controls 
over contractors should also be in place to ensure that the contract is complied with 
effectively (e.g. third-party performance appraisals). The organization should consider 
compliance risks related to other third-party-related processes, such as supply of goods 
and services and distribution of products, and put controls in place, as necessary (e.g. 
compliance obligations in contractual clauses)”. Indeed, it is possible to argue that 
private-to-private (P2P) compliance may create additional compexity for 
companies. Program elements and ethical policies become contractual 
obligations, vulnerable to such contractual remedies as indemnities, damages, 
audits, default declarations, loan acceleration and termination. P2P compliance 
is reshaping the compliance task portfolio and raising new questions about who 
is answerable to whom, both internally and across company boundaries. 
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Private compliance pressures may originate from any point in the value chain: 
suppliers, customers, capital markets, insurers193.  
 
15. As discussed earlier in this research, there is a tendency in legislation not 
to specify too much how the compliance obligation should be fulfilled. On the 
one hand, this certainly reflects the virtually limitless spectrum of solutions and 
combinations offered by corporate law and operational needs, and respects the 
discretion of the group management about the allocation of roles and functions 
within the group companies194.  On the other hand, this is also a reminder that 
compliance duty is inherently an internal obligation, i.e. an obligation that 
cannot be upheld by third parties against a company or a group. In this respect, 
The German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) recently dealt in a competition law 
matter with the reach of the organizational duties of a managing director of a 
German limited liability company with respect to external third parties195. In the 
case at stake, the plaintiff had filed an action against both a German limited 
liability company and its managing director because in its opinion the 
managing director was also personally liable to it in addition to the company. 
The German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) clarified that the organizational 
duties of a managing director only exist in principle with respect to the 
company, but not with respect to external third parties. According to the court, 
                     
193Killingsworth, S. (2014). The Privatization of Compliance. RAND Center for Corporate 
Ethics and Governance Symposium White Paper Series, Symposium on "Transforming Compliance: 
Emerging Paradigms for Boards, Management, Compliance Officers, and Government". 
194Daccò, A., & Portale, G. B. (2006). Accentramento di funzioni e di servizi nel gruppo e 
ruolo dell'assemblea della società controllata. Rivista di diritto privato, 11(3), 463-483. 
195Judgement of 18.06.2014, file no. I ZR 242/12 
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a personal liability with respect to third parties due to a breach of 
organizational duties only comes in consideration in exceptional cases196. This 
could, for example, be the case if the managing director ignores breaches of 
which he is aware or prevents himself from obtaining knowledge of such. The 
same applies if the managing director has himself established a business model 
aiming at the infringement of rights. However,if managers culpably breach 
their organizational duties to the company, they may be liable to pay damages 
to the company. Moreover, the creditors of the company in each case may then 
be able to enforce a claim against the managing director by if they prove that an 
asset of the company has been damaged. Under Italian law, pursuant to art. 
2403 of the Italian Civil Code, the director has to ensure that the company has 
an appropriate organization. Failure to do so is generally regarded as an 
important element that creditors can use to hold the director accountable in case 
of a damage to the company’s wealth. Moreover, in 2007 art. 2428 of the Italian 
Civil Code – the article that defines the mandatory contents of the financial 
statement’s management explanatory notes (“Relazione sulla gestione”) was 
amended to include a list of potential risk areas197. Hence creditors shall back 
up potential lawsuits against corporate directors or statutory auditors not 
                     
196Grüninger, S., Jantz, M., Schweikert, C., & Steinmeyer, R. (2012). Organisationspflichten-
eine Synopse zum Begriffsverständnis und den daraus abzuleitenden Anforderungen an 
Aufsichts-und Sorgfaltspflichten aus juristischer und betriebswirtschaftlicher 
Perspektive.Studie 2 im Forschungsprojekt “Leitlinien für das Management von 
Organisations-und Aufsichtspflichten”.KICG-Konstanz Institut Für Corporate Governance 
Forschungspapiere, No. 4. 
197Ginesti, G. (2014). La relazione degli amministratori nella comunicazione economico-finanziaria 
d'impresa: Profili teorici e prassi internazionale. Torino: Giappichelli Editore. 
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merely with allegations about a lack of organization, but also with allegations 
about a lack of risk disclosure198.  
 
Chapter 4: Group-wide compliance organization within the group 
 
15. As pointed out earlier,when examining compliance, the main focus of 
scholarly research is the “if” question, i.e. whether a duty of compliance exists 
and whether it contains a specific obligation. However, when it comes to the 
“how” question – how should compliance be organized? How should a 
compliance department be set up? – there are few specific indications provided 
by the law.In Germany, also the GCGC (Article 4.1.3) does not provide any 
specific guidance as to how the compliance system should be organized within a 
group, i.e. whether it is only required at the level of the parent company or 
whether a more granular group-wide organization is necessary. In fact, Art. 
4.1.3 goes as follows: “The Management Board ensures that all provisions of law and 
the enterprise’s internal policies are abided by and works to achieve their compliance by 
group companies (compliance).” Thus, in this statement, a clear gradation is 
expressed: the management board faces a strong duty vis-à-vis the parent 
company, and a loose obligation vis-à-vis the rest of the group. In fact, while the 
management board has to take over the responsibility for the compliance with 
the statutory provisions within the parent company, it only has to work 
towards it in the affiliate companies. This means, at least indirectly, that the 
                     
198Beretta, S., Bozzolan, S., & Michelon, G. (2011). La disclosure sul sistema di controllo 
interno come meccanismo di monitoraggio: evidenze empiriche da differenti contesti 
istituzionali.Management Control, 1, 125-150. 
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duty and the responsibility ultimately lie with the managing body of the 
affiliate companies. 
 
16. In German doctrine, it is asked whether there are arguments under 
company law to assume a duty to establish a compliance department across the 
group, based on the duty to prevent damage. As in the single, stand-alone 
enterprise, the legal basis would the general public duty of care of the 
managing directors towards their own company, pursuantto Section 130 OWiG 
according to which the owner of a company acts contrary topublic policy if he 
or she omits to implement the necessary control measures required to prevent 
breaches of duty by the company, which are punishable by means of a fine or a 
sentence. However, Section 130 only applies to the “owner of a company”, and 
it is questionable whether the relationship among the parent/dominating 
company in a corporate group is the same as the relationship among the owner 
and the owned company. In fact, according to a December 1, 1981 BGH 
sentence199, the legal personality of the affiliated company could not allow to 
consider the dominating company as the “owner” of the company. According 
to Casper, a general duty of the management board of the controlling company 
to ensure lawful conduct of the affiliated companies in the sense of a duty of 
group management cannot be acknowledged200201. On the one hand, it is 
                     
199Quoted by Schneider, U.H. (December 8th, 2009). Compliance im Konzern. NZG - Neue 
Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht, 34, 1324.  
200 Casper, M. (2012). Corporate Governance and Corporate Compliance. In Du Plessis, J.J., 
Großfeld, B., Luttermann, C., Saenger, I., Sandrock, O., & Casper, M. (Eds.),German 
Corporate Governance. International and European Context.Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, 387. 
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possible to maintain that the duty of group management cannot be derived 
from the status of the parent company as shareholder. In fact, the point of 
departure is the basic principle of corporate law that shareholders are not liable 
for the obligations of the corporation in which they hold ownership. This 
principle of the limited liability of corporations is, as such, to be honoured in 
any area of the law. In a corporate group, the responsibility of the various legal 
entities must therefore be clarified individually202. On the other hand, it is also 
true that the parent company carries out its business also through affiliated 
companies, and therefore its own duty of management also represents a duty of 
group management203 based on the active management of the subsidiaries’ 
business and not on the status of shareholder of the parent company.  
 
17. The establishment of a compliance system seems to be in line with the US 
landmark case law on  the duty of care, and, in particular with the Caremark 
case (see infra, Part I, Chapter 2, par. 10), as well as with general obligations 
such as to Section 130 OWiG according to which the owner of a company acts 
contrary topublic policy if he or she omits to implement the necessary control 
measures required to prevent breaches of duty by the company, which are 
punishable by means of a fine or a sentence. 
                                                            
201Verse, D. A. (2011). Compliance im Konzern, Zur Legalitätskontrollpflicht der 
Geschäftsleiter einer Konzernobergesellschaft. ZHR - Zeitschrift für das gesamte handelsrecht 
und wirtschaftsrecht, 175(2), 401-424. 
202Hofstetter, K. (1995). Sachgerechte Haftungsregeln für Multinationale Konzerne: Zur 
zivilrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit von Muttergesellschaften im Kontext internationaler Märkte. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 77. 
203Schneider, U.H. (December 8th, 2009). Compliance im Konzern.NZG - Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht,34, 1326.  
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18. Even if it is not necessarily possible to invoke a general obligation to 
monitor for corporate groups such as the one stipulated under Section 130 
OWiG, it is nevertheless increasingly evident that international case law 
recognizes the duty for the dominating/parent company in a group to set up a 
group-wide compliance organization. We have already recalled the 1996 Swiss 
Supergun case, where the parent company’s board were indicted not because 
they committed a crime, but because they did not set up a group-wide  
compliance organization204. Moreover, with the Akzo205 ECJ Judgement, the 
European Court of Justice has confirmed that parent companies are presumed 
to be liable for cartel infringements committed by a wholly owned subsidiary. 
The presumption is rebuttable, but parent companies are very unlikely to 
escape cartel fines by claiming their subsidiaries operate independently. In the 
Etex Case on February 9 2009 the Federal Antitrust Authority held that under 
Section 130 of the Administrative Offence Act a parent company can be fined if 
it omits to take appropriate measures to prevent its subsidiaries from forming a 
cartel with competitors206. The authority fined several producers of clay bricks 
that had agreed on a price increase, including two German subsidiaries of the 
Belgian ETEX group. An additional fine of more than €10 million was imposed 
on the German parent company, ETEX Holding GmbH, as it had not taken 
reasonable measures to prevent the participation of its subsidiaries in the cartel. 
                     
204Reich-Graefe, R. (2004). Changing Paradigms: The Liability of Corporate Groups in 
Germany. Conn. L. Rev. - Connecticut Law Review, 37, 785. 
205Case C-550/07 P. Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission. 
206Tschierschke, A. (2013). Die Sanktionierung des Unternehmensverbundes: Bestandsaufnahme, 
Perspektiven und Europaeisierung.Baden - Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
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According to this ruling even foreign parent companies may be held liable for 
the defective compliance organization of their German subsidiaries. 
 
19. With a view to the organization of a compliance organization across the 
group, a broad discretionary power exists207. In particular, the management 
board of the parent company is entrusted with the organisational discretion. 
More specifically and it may meet its duty either with a strong, central 
compliance department or by means of many decentralised compliance 
departments208 in each affiliate company209, which are interlinked with each 
other. In the case of decentralized compliance, intermediate layers can be found 
as well, such as for example “regional” compliance functions, such as Europe, 
Middle-East and Asia (so called EMEA), whose purpose it is to act as 
organizational filters for the compliance processes managed by individual 
companies operating within a given region. Both solutions – centralized 
compliance management and decentralized management - are widely adopted. 
As an example of decentralized compliance management, the Italian state-
owned defence and technology group Finmeccanica provides the following 
layout210 of its group compliance structure: 
                     
207Pohland, S. (2000). Globale Unternehmensarchitekturen. Methode zur Verteilung von 
Informationssystemen. Berlin: Weißensee-Verlag. 
208Gupta, A. K., & Govindarajan, V. (1991). Knowledge flows and the structure of control 
within multinational corporations. Academy of management review, 16(4), 768-792. 
209Kleindiek, D. (2003). Konzernstrukturen und Corporate Governance: Leitung und 
Überwachung im dezentral organisierten Unternehmensverbund. In Hommellhoff, P. 
Hopt, K., v. Werder, A., Leitung und Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der Rechts-
und Wirtschaftspraxis, 787. 
210www.finmeccanicagroup.com 
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An example of a centralized compliance model is the following layout by 
Japanese videogame leader CapCom211:  
                     
211http://www.capcom.co.jp/ir/english/president/governance.html 
108 
 
 
 
Therefore, the main overarching requirement is that responsibility for 
compliance within the group as a whole is established, whichever method is 
selected212. Additionally, compulsory guidelines across the group have to be 
defined. Moreover, a reporting system on possible breaches, including the 
monitoring of this reporting system, has to be established and the management 
board has to be enforced within the whole group213. However, with regard to 
the actual particularities of the systems, generalising statements cannot be 
made, as the circumstances of the individual case in the respective group must 
be taken into account. In many cases, it can prove quite problematic – especially 
for small and medium sized corporate groups – to devise a compliance 
                     
212Montalenti, P. (2009). Organismo di vigilanza 231 e gruppi di società. Analisi Giuridica 
dell'Economia, 8(2), 383-396. 
213Hauschka, C. E.  (2006). Von Compliance zu Best Practice. Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik, 39, 
258-261. 
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management system that matches the compliance duty but represents no 
excessive burden for the group. In this respect, ISO 19600 can prove itself as a 
valuable tool. In fact the ISO 19600 standard is designed as a flexible guideline 
without any normative references. It provides recommendations based on the 
principles of good governance, flexibility, proportionality, transparency, and 
sustainability. It is open for all kind of organizations. Especially small and 
medium-sized companies benefit from this approach, as they can implement 
the guideline recommendations according to the size and maturity of their 
company214. It is this kind of flexibility that gives small and medium-sized 
companies the incentive to deal with compliance on their own terms. Because 
the guideline is based upon the principle of continual improvement, 
organizations can expand their compliance management systems as their needs 
increase215. Should the management board decide in favour of a strong, central 
compliance department at the level of the parent company, the management of 
the subsidiary companies is nevertheless not released from establishing its own 
compliance system if necessary. Moreover, other issues can arise. For instance, 
in the Italian scholarly debate about the status of the parent company’s 
compliance function’s team members216217, it is generally maintained that: a) 
                     
214Bleker, S., & Hortensius, D. (2014). ISO 19600: The development of a global standard on 
compliance management. Journal of Business Compliance, 3(2), 48-59. 
215Almy, A. (2014). Why certify? The value of anticorruption compliance program 
certification. Journal of Business Compliance, 3(3), 43-51. 
216See the Confindustria (the Italian industrialists’ umbrella organization) guidelines 
available online at: www.confindustria.it; alternatively, in German language, see: 
Kuhlmann, P. (2014). Verbandssanktionierung in Italien: Das decreto legislativo 8 giugno 2001 n. 
231 im Vergleich mit europäischen Vorgaben und dem deutschen Recht. Munchen: Herbert Utz 
Verlag (Vol. 795). 
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when working on other group companies other than the parent company, the 
parent company’s compliance function members should be regarded as external 
service providers/consultants rendering services to the subsidiaries, b) in this 
consultant status, the confidentiality obligations routinely applicable to 
professionals apply. This is especially important if one bears in mind that a 
number of legal concepts protect communications between a client and his or 
her attorney and keeps those communications confidential. In the U.S., for 
example, the attorney–client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges 
for confidential communications, and that the U.S. Supreme Court has stated 
that by assuring confidentiality, the privilege encourages clients to make full 
and frank disclosures to their attorneys, who are then better able to provide 
candid advice and effective representation218. Should this be the case, situations 
can take place in which there is a conflict for the parent company’s compliance 
function members. More precisely: to what extent is it possible to reconcile 
these members’ obligation vis-à-vis the parent company and the confidentiality 
obligations stemming from the “consultant status” vis-à-vis the group 
subsidiaries? Further operational complexity can be envisaged for those cases in 
which compliance functions are not assigned to a department of the parent 
                                                            
217Mazzacuva, F. (2014). L'ente collettivo come soggetto nell'ambito del diritto punitivo: modelli di 
responsabilità e nuovi strumenti sanzionatori. Analisi comparata con i sistemi di common law. 
Doctoral dissertation. Milano: Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca. 
218Nelson, C. E. (2014). Corporate Compliance Monitors Are Not Superheroes with 
Unrestrained Power: A Call for Increased Oversight and Ethical Reform. Geo. J. Legal Ethics 
-Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 27, 723-1021.  
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company, but to an “insourced”219 group company whose sole/primary 
purpose is to provide compliance management services to the whole group220.      
 
20. Having said this, it is also very important to understand who is actually 
in charge of compliance. Assigning responsibility for compliance within an 
organization is a particularly important part of the ISO 19600 standard. More 
specifically, pursuant to par. 5.3.2 (“Assigning responsibility for compliance in the 
organization”), “the active involvement of, and supervision by, governing body and top 
management is an integral part of an effective compliance management system. This 
helps ensure that employees fully understand the organization’s policy and operational 
procedures and how these apply to their jobs, and that they carry out compliance 
obligations effectively. For a compliance management system to be effective the 
governing body and top management need to lead by example, by adhering to and 
actively supporting compliance and the compliance management system. Many 
organizations have a dedicated person (e.g. a compliance officer) responsible for day-to-
day compliance management, and some have a cross-functional compliance committee 
to coordinate compliance across the organization. Some organizations – depending on 
their size –also have someone who has overall responsibility for compliance 
management, although this may be in addition to other roles or functions, including 
existing committees, organizational unit(s), or outsource elements to compliance 
experts. This should not be seen as absolving other levels of management of their 
                     
219Mauermair, J. (2013). Compliance and Supply Chain Safety. Supply Chain Safety Management. 
Berlin – Heidelberg: Springer, 299-308. 
220Schniederjans, M. J., & Zuckweiler, K. M. (2004). A quantitative approach to the 
outsourcing-insourcing decision in an international context.Management Decision, 42(8), 
974-986. 
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compliance responsibilities, as all managers have a role to play with respect to the 
compliance management system. It is therefore important that their respective 
responsibilities are clearly set out and included in their job descriptions. Compliance 
responsibilities of managers will, by necessity, vary according to levels of authority, 
influence and other factors, such as the nature and size of the organization. However, 
some responsibilities are likely to be common across a variety of organizations”. In this 
respect, in the recent Neubuerger judgement by the Regional Court of 
Munich221, Mr. Neubuerger, a former Siemens board member, defended himself 
against the claim for damage inter alia on the ground that the compliance 
system was not part of the board department under his responsibility. He had 
adopted for his department corresponding directives to prevent dubious 
payments. Division managers were responsible for the practical 
implementation. According to the Court, however, depending on the 
company’s type and risk situation the board is obligated to create a clear 
responsibility for compliance within the board. The departmental responsibility 
of one board member does not, however, release the (remaining) board 
members of their overall responsibility to ensure the observance of the 
principles of legality. All board members are obligated to clarify reported 
infringements, to keep themselves informed about occurrences, to verify the 
existing compliance system and to establish a corresponding efficient structure. 
Moreover, according to the Regional Court of Munich, the board may not 
delegate the implementation of the compliance system in detail to a lower level 
(“division managers”). The board must check out for itself whether and how 
                     
221Regional Court of Munich, decision of December 10th,  2013, file no. 5 HK O 1387/10, 
“Siemens” – case / decision published end of March 2014. 
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the compliance system is implemented and whether it is appropriate and 
functional. In this respect the Regional Court of Munich states that the 
delegation of this central task of the corporation’s statutory organ “board” to 
employees on a lower level constitutes a breach of duty. In the context of its 
monitoring duty it is the responsibility of each board member to ensure that a 
functioning compliance system is resolved by the board. Furthermore, a board 
member may not absolve her/ himself from his/ her responsibility by using the 
excuse that the remaining board did not follow her/ his ideas for the 
implementation of a compliance system in accordance to the applicable 
legislation. Indeed, an outvoted board member must participate in good faith in 
implementing the board’s resolutions222. This does however not apply if the 
resolutions do not comply with legal requirements. If the board members’ 
proposals for improvement of the compliance system have not been taken into 
account by his board colleagues, the board member has to submit an 
appropriate counter response to its colleagues and, if necessary, to inform the 
supervisory board. 
 
21. Having regard to the duty of compliance within a group, the question 
should asked whether the discretion of the parent or dominating company is 
limitless or not. Reference here is not made to the set-up of the compliance 
organization (e.g. centralized compliance vs distributed compliance), but to 
specific actions undertaken by the compliance function. In particular, it should 
                     
222Fleischer, H. (2014). Aktienrechtliche Compliance-Pflichten im Praxistest: Das 
Siemens/Neubürger-Urteil des LG München I. Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht, 17, 321-
329. 
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be examined to what extent the discretion goes as far as general duties to 
prevent damage are involved, and insofar as specific obligations exist at group 
level, such as data protection laws. 
 
22. As far as general damage pre-emption duties are involved, it has already 
been pointed out that most group legislations recognize that a group structure 
often entails a dominant role by a parent company vis-à-vis the other group 
entities223.  One must thus distinguish between the duties of the 
dominant/parent company vis-à-vis the parent company itself on one hand, 
and the duties of the dominant/parent company vis-à-vis the 
subsidiaries/dominated companies224.  
 
23. When considering the duties of the dominant/parent company vis-à-vis 
the parent company itself, the board of the parent company must in any case 
behave in accordance with the law. This extends to all its activities, and hence 
also to the the direction of the group. Moreover, the board of the parent 
company has to ensure an adequate group-wide organization225, and it makes 
no difference whether the group is organized centrally or decentrally: what 
                     
223Hofstetter, K. (1990). Parent Responsibility for Subsidiary Corporations: Evaluating 
European Trends.International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 39(03), 576-598. 
224Nygh, P. (2002). The Liability of Multi-national Corporations for the Torts of Their 
Subsidiaries. European Business Organization Law Review, 3(01), 51-81. 
225Schneider, T. (2009). Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Umsetzung der gesellschaftsrechtlichen 
und bankenaufsichtsrechtlichen Anforderungen an Risikomanagement auf Gruppenebene. Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot. 
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matters is that the parent company avoids damage (also reputational) at the 
level of its affiliated companies226.  
 
24. As for the compliance duties of the parent company vis-à-vis its 
subsidiaries, arguably the parent company’s board can exert some discretion. In 
fact, based on the group’s organization, it can choose how to set up its control 
organization. More specifically, if the group has a centralized model, then the 
parent company board will accordingly intrude deep into its affiliated 
companies’ activity227. It will do so by requesting information on a regular 
basis, monitoring and controlling their tasks and duties, and, when necessary 
sanctioning mis-compliance by the affiliated companies. On the contrary, if the 
group is decentralized and the parent company’s role is only limited to, say, 
human resources and group financing, then the degree of “intrusion” by the 
parent company will be very limited, and reliance will be made on the boards 
of the affiliated companies. In this case, according to Schneider, the parent 
company will only have to make sure that the affiliated companies establish a 
compliance department228, but the affiliated companies still retain discretionary 
power as to how structure the department. Yet, one should also bear in mind 
that while parent companies often exert influence over subsidiaries by merely 
determining their strategy and finances (in the form of, e.g., targets for results, 
                     
226Miller, S. K. (1998). Piercing the corporate veil among affiliated companies in the 
European community and in the US. American Business Law Journal, 36(1), 73-149. 
227Zoppini, A. (2002). I diritti della personalità delle persone giuridiche (e dei gruppi 
organizzati). Rivista di diritto civile, 48(6), 851-894. 
228Schneider, U.H. (December 8, 2009). Compliance im Konzern.NZG - Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht, 34, 1326. 
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turnover, investments etc.), it is not always clear whether such intervention 
alone triggers a duty on the part of the parent to supervise the subsidiary’s 
compliance. Strategic and financial targets do not directly relate to the 
operational business. However, the risk that the competitive behaviour of the 
subsidiary may be decisively influenced by them, should not be dismissed out 
of hand. For example, executive bodies or employees of subsidiaries could be 
tempted to commit infringements if they were put under pressure to meet 
ambitious strategic or financial targets set by the group. The parent company 
must therefore make it cristal clear that such targets are only to be achieved 
within the limits of the law and it must furthermore monitor compliance with 
these principles as part of its strategic and financial control. This requires that 
the parent company implement or mandate adequate compliance systems at the 
subsidiary. In fact, if the exertion of influence is restricted to laying down 
strategic plans and financial targets, the connection to an infringement of 
competition law is not strong enough to presume that the parent acted 
negligently.  
 
25. In its 2005 paper “Compliance and the compliance function in banks“, 
dedicated to compliance and banks, also the Bank of International Settlements 
allows for a certain degree of discretion, while underlining that compliance 
principles apply both to individual banks and to the banking group as a whole: 
“regardless of how the compliance function is organised within a bank, it should be 
independent and sufficiently resourced, its responsibilities should be clearly specified, 
and its activities should be subject to periodic and independent review by the internal 
audit function. […] The principles should be applicable to all banks, although it is for 
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individual banks to determine how best they should be implemented. A bank may be able 
to follow practices other than those set out in this paper which are also sound and 
which, taken together, demonstrate that its compliance function is effective. The way in 
which the principles are implemented will depend on factors such as the bank’s size, the 
nature, complexity and geographical extent of its business, and the legal and regulatory 
framework within which it operates“. Multinational banking groups have to 
respect the rules of conduct in force in all countries in which they carry out their 
activities. However, in Europe, following the Second EU Banking Directive 
(Directive 89/646/CEE), they answer in precedence to the supervisory 
regulations of the country of origin (home country control principle). In these 
cases, banks must identify the most appropriate organizational solutions to 
ensure the correct risk management which results from the need to respect all 
the provisions applicable in relation to the various areas of operation. Similarly, 
it is also appropriate that companies controlled by European banks operating 
abroad take care to conform to the holding company, even in cases where the 
rules of the countries in which the subsidiary is established do not have similar 
levels of awareness. The model of compliance must therefore be structured to 
allow the systematic exchange of directives and information, both top-down 
and bottom-up. 
 
Chapter 5: Compliance and financial services (elements) 
 
26. We have pointed out earlier in this research that MiFID provides a 
substantive regulatory framework for establishing a compliance function in 
entities active in investments services. MiFID requires investment services 
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providers to establish, implement and maintain adequate policies and 
procedures designed to detect any risk of failure by the investment services 
provider to comply with its obligations under MiFID. As part of this, the 
compliance function shall identify the level of compliance risk the investment 
services provider faces, taking into account the investment services and 
ancillary services provided by the investment services provider, as well as the 
types of financial instruments traded and distributed. The compliance risk 
assessment shall take into account the applicable obligations under MiFID, 
national implementing regulation and the policies, procedures, systems and 
controls implemented within the investment services provider in the area of 
investment services. The assessment shall also take into account the results of 
any monitoring activities and of any relevant internal or external audit findings. 
The compliance function’s objectives and work programme shall be developed 
and set up on the basis of this compliance risk assessment. The identified risks 
shall be reviewed on a regular basis as well as adhoc when necessary to ensure 
that any emerging risks are taken into consideration (for example, resulting 
from new business fields or other changes in the investment services provider’s 
structure).In particular, the monitoring programme foreseen under MiFID aims 
to evaluate whether the investment services provider’s business is conducted in 
compliance with its obligations under MiFID and whether its internal 
guidelines, organisation and control measures remain effective and 
appropriate. Where an investment services provider is part of a group, 
responsibility for the compliance function rests with each investment services 
provider in that group. An investment services provider shall therefore ensure 
that its compliance function remains responsible for monitoring its own 
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compliance risk. This includes where an investment services provider 
outsources compliance tasks to another investment services provider within the 
group. The compliance function within each investment services provider shall, 
however, take into account the group of which it is a part - for example, by 
working closely with audit, legal, regulatory and compliance staff in other parts 
of the group. The risk-based approach to compliance shall form the basis for 
determining the appropriate tools and methodologies used by the compliance 
function, as well as the extent of the monitoring programme and the frequency 
of monitoring activities performed by the compliance function (which may be 
recurring, adhoc and/or continuous). The compliance function shall also ensure 
that its monitoring activities are not only desk-based, but that it also verifies 
how policies and procedures are implemented in practice, for example through 
on-site inspections at the operative business units. The compliance function 
shall also consider the scope of reviews to be performed. 
 
Chapter 6: Cross-border groups and compliance duties 
 
27. In practice, the necessity to establish compliance systems in 
multinational groups is becoming more and more apparent. The difficulties 
described above are increased as different legal systems apply, with 
jurisdictions crossing over to apply in others229. From a general perspective, it is 
perhaps advisable to compare the case in which the parent company is based in 
                     
229 Schneider, U.H. (2007). Corporate Manslaughter und Corporate Compliance. EuZW - 
Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 18/2007, 553.  
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the home state with the case in which affiliated companies are based in such 
jurisdiction (i.e. the state is merely a host state). In the former case, the dominant 
view is that organizational duties apply to the parent company, and, given the 
functional link to its affiliated companies, to the whole group. The question 
then can be raised, to what extent this duty can stretch into foreign jurisdictions. 
For instance, can the board of an Italian parent company be held liable for not 
establishing a compliance structure to avoid crimes by foreign affiliated 
companies? In the latter case, what duties are imposed on the Italian affiliated 
companies of a corporate group headquartered abroad? This question can be 
further elaborated by examining the case in which a foreign parent has no 
subsidiary nor branch in a given jurisdiction, but in any case conducts business 
in it.  
 
28. The case in which the parent company is based in the home country shall 
be considered first. According to German doctrine, if the group management is 
based in Germany, it makes no difference whether risks and damage for the 
parent company result from the misconduct of a foreign or a domestic affiliate 
company230, insofar as the breach of statutory regulations abroad by the affiliate 
is concurrently resulting in a damage for the parent company. If the parent 
company establishes a multinational compliance department across the group, 
the limits under the law applicable to company groups depend on the 
respective statute of the affiliate company. In Italy, the question of how 
                     
230 Casper, M. (2012). Corporate Governance and Corporate Compliance. In du Plessis, J.J., 
Großfeld, B., Luttermann, C., Saenger, I., Sandrock, O., & Casper, M. (Eds.), German 
Corporate Governance. International and European Context.Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, 389. 
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organizational duties shall be implemented group-wide is left unadressed in 
civil law. Hence, guidance can be sought in Legislative Decree no. 231/2001, the 
Italian discipline on corporate criminal liability that also lays down specific 
exemptions for entities which choose to establish compliance departments and 
programs, and run them effectively. In Italian doctrine, the extent to which the 
corporate liability regime foreseen under Legislative Decree no. 231/2001 can 
be applied to crimes committed abroad is largely debated231. Pursuant to art. 4 
of Legislative Decree no. 231/2001 the entities having their main seat in Italy 
are held liable also for crimes committed abroad, unless these crimes are 
already pursued in the countries where they have been committed. In other 
words, it is not sufficient that a senior group manager is involved in a crime 
abroad to trigger the corporate liability regime foreseen under Legislative 
Decree no. 231/2001, but other specific conditions must apply as well232.  
 
29. The case in which a controlled company is domiciled in a country but its 
parent company is based abroad shall be considered now. This case is debated 
quite widely by scholarly authors, as it often entails a situation in which the 
affiliated companies are already embedded in a cross-border compliance 
system, and would therefore be subject to a double duty of compliance: one 
deriving from the local laws, and one deriving from group-wide compliance 
                     
231Razzano, F. C., & Nelson, T. P. (2008). The Expanding Criminalization of Transnational 
Bribery: Global Prosecution Necessitates Global Compliance. The International Lawyer, 1259-
1286. 
232Fusco, E. (2007). Applicabilità del d. lgs. 231/2001 alle banche estere. Responsabilità 
amministrativa delle società e degli enti, (4), 179. 
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guidelines233. A position expressed by Italian prosecutors and judges to make 
the case that host state organizational duties apply is that insofar as foreign 
entities operate in Italy, even temporarily, they shall comply with Italian laws, 
regardless of the fact that the host State has similar/identical laws governing 
the same matter. In the Siemens case234, for instance, the analogy with the road 
traffic laws was made, suggesting that even if Germany had no prescription to 
use safety belts in Germany, this would not exempt German drivers to use them 
when in Italy. Also the re-examination of the Siemens decision (Giud. 
Mannocci) concluded: “Whoever operates in Italy—individual or corporate entity—
has to respect Italian law. Here an administrative offense is imputed to a foreign 
corporation connected to a crime made in Italy. The jurisdiction is Italian, even if the 
corporation adopted a compliance program in a foreign context. If a corporation does not 
adopt a compliance program, it is not per se illegal. Its relevance is on the corporation’s 
culpability.” With this argument, Siemens was subjected to a specific sanctions 
regime foreseen under Art. 9, par. 2, lett. c) of Legislative Decree no. 231/2001 
even if the German section 30 of the OWiG did not entail the obligation to adopt 
specific organization models235.  
 
                     
233Baritti, S. (2006).  L'applicazione del d. lgs. n. 231 del 2001 a societa estere operanti in 
Italia: il caso degli istituti di credito e degli intermediari finanziari (Tribunale di Milano, 
ord. 27 aprile 2004--Tribunale di Milano, ord. 28 ottobre 2004). Diritto del Commercio 
Internazionale, 20(3), 805. 
234Trib. Milano, sez. XI Giud. Riesame, Pres. Rel. Mannocci, ord. 10-28-2004, Siemens, AG. 
235Martín, A. N., & de Morales, M. M. (2014). Compliance Programs and Criminal Law 
Responses: A Comparative Analysis. Preventing Corporate Corruption. Berlin: Springer 
International Publishing, 333-362. 
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30. Triangular situations can also easily take place. For instance, a parent 
company based in country A, and its subsidiary based in country B could find 
themselves jointly bidding for a tender in a third country. Alternatively, two 
companies of the same group but based in different countries may participate in 
a project that is wholly or partly funded with EU funds.  
 
31. In 2015, the likelihood that a group subsidiary operates in a host country 
without its group having a compliance program whatsoever is fairly low. In 
fact, as has been discussed earlier in this research, pressure is mounting also 
from the private business world through “P2P (private-to-private) compliance” 
to embed compliance in everyday business activities. A pressing legal question, 
on the contrary, is what the legal value of a compliance program will be outside 
its home jurisdiction. So far, little elements can be found in Italian caselaw to 
assess this: it is still unclear how a foreign compliance model would be 
regarded in Italy under Legislative Decree no. 231/2001. More specifically, 
while it is clear that Italian laws – i.e. corporate criminal liability - would be 
applied regardless whether the parent in the home country has adopted a 
group-wide compliance department, it is unclear whether a foreign model 
would be seen as equivalent to the model foreseen under artt. 6 and 7 of 
Legislative Decree no. 231/2001. On one hand, it is argued that the model 
foreseen under artt. 6 and 7 of Legislative Decree no. 231/2001 is the only one 
admitted in order to benefit from the corporate liability regime exemption. On 
the other hand, it is noted that even more important than the existence of the 
model foreseen under artt. 6 and 7 of Legislative Decree no. 231/2001 is the 
effective implementation of measures designed to avoid crimes. Therefore, a 
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case-by-case analysis seems to be the most appropriate solution in order to 
assess the specific situation of subsidiaries with a foreign parent company. 
Another extremely interesting aspect is whether in the future it will be possible 
to have some sort of “organizational equivalence” in the compliance field. 
While assessing equivalence of organizations across different jurisdictions has 
long been a Sisyphean task, standardization of processes could help overcome 
many difficulties in this field. For instance, if a compliance organization were to 
be designed according to the newly developed ISO 19600 standard, this would 
certainly contribute to greater comparability of compliance organizations. This 
idea is clearly a driving element of the ISO 19600 standard, and its introduction 
states the following: “in a number of jurisdictions, the courts have considered an 
organization’s commitment to compliance through its compliance management system 
when determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed for contraventions of relevant 
laws. Therefore, regulatory and judicial bodies can also benefit from this International 
Standard as a benchmark”. The flexible approach of ISO 19600 is noteworthy. In 
fact, every organization can decide independently to what extent the 
implementation is still deemed proportional (with regard to the involved costs 
and benefits). The structure combined with the overlying principle of continual 
improvement enables organizations to act in accordance with ISO 19600 in 
every stage of their compliance management system development and to 
improve upon it. Morever, a global standard will add comparability between 
compliance systems in different jurisdictions and industries. The guideline can 
be used globally due to its broad scope and its character as a recommendation-
only standard. In addition, the guideline brings with it no risk of a conflict with 
any national law. However, it should also be noted out that it is still unclear 
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how organizations are supposed to prove their implementation of the ISO 
recommendations to others. Currently, there is no certification according to ISO 
19600, and ISO standards can overlap with existing domestic standards236. 
Therefore, it can occur that a compliance officer is confronted with conflicting 
provisions, especially since the definitions are inconsistent. This is not harmful 
per se, since ISO 19600 is compatible with other compliance measures, but it still 
counteracts the aspired global standardization. It is discussed whether a true 
global standard is needed. Since there is no majority to be found amongst the 
ISO members for establishing a certification according to ISO 19600, at least the 
national standardization institutes should coordinate and adapt their respective 
national standards structurally and conceptually to ISO 19600. However, the 
ISO's approach could change. In case the ISO members find a majority a 
certification (or at least an affirmation to comply with the guideline) according 
to ISO 19600 might be possible in future.  
 
32. So far, only cases with a corporate presence have been considered 
(parent or subsidiaries). While corporate presence represent a significant 
portion of cross-border compliance analysis, there also cases in which there are 
compliance issues despite the absence of a corporate presence in a given 
country. As a 2005 Financial Times article reported, “You can be doing business 
outside the US and find you have got a problem with US sanctions for example, which 
                     
236Paulitsch, H. (2014). Austria: ISO 19600: Compliance Management Systems – Guidelines, 
available online at:http://www.schoenherr.eu/knowledge/knowledge-detail/austria-iso-
19600-compliance-management-systems-guidelines. 
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in certain circumstances is just not obvious”237. In many jurisdictions public 
prosecutors as well as private parties are proving capable of using local 
legislations to pursue players whose links with the country of the suing party 
are not immediately evident. An example of this state of facts is the recurring 
use, in the United States, of the Alien Tort Claims Act, a U.S. statute relating to 
“piracy on the high seas” and dating back to 1789, that today is used to pursue 
multinational companies through the U.S. courts for human rights abuses 
committed abroad by foreign governments with which they have been 
operating jointly. Moreover, as international commerce expands and the speed 
of cross-border transactions increases, companies doing business overseas face 
a daunting challenge – compliance with the anti-bribery provisions of the U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and similar laws imposed by other 
countries238. The stakes are high, as evidenced by the trend of FCPA 
investigations and prosecutions by US and foreign regulators over the past five 
years: since 2003, the number of FCPA enforcement actions brought by the US 
Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
increased from an average of two or three cases per year to 38 enforcement 
actions in 2007239. These cases have resulted in record fines and penalties as well 
as disgorgement of profits for violations of the Act. As worldwide initiative to 
stop bribery gain momentum, companies face not only FCPA enforcement 
                     
237Financial Times(April 14th, 2005).New strategic role of legal risk. 
238Kaikati, J. G., et al., (2000). The price of international business morality: Twenty years 
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Journal of Business Ethics 26.3, 213-222. 
239Salbu, S.R. (1997). Bribery in the global market: A critical analysis of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act.  Wash. & Lee L. Rev. - Washington and Lee Law Review,54, 229. 
127 
 
 
actions in the United States but also the possibility of independent or 
concurrent enforcement actions in other jurisdictions240.  
 
33. Moreover, as discussed earlier in this research, back in 2004 an Italian 
court held a German company not resident in Italy and operating in Italy only 
through a temporary company grouping (s.c. “associazione temporanea 
d’impresa”) accountable for criminal offences (namely: bribery) committed in 
Italy241. More specifically, the Italian Supreme Criminal Court stated that Italian 
criminal laws are applicable to a criminal offence committed abroad if there is 
any connection with Italy, even if the connection is not per se a criminal breach, 
the rationale being that the connection “has to be regarded as a fragment of larger 
criminal sequence that should not be taken singularly”242. Moreover, section 4 or 
Law no. 231/2001 foresees the application of Italian criminal laws – and 
sanctions - to entities which have their main seat in Italy and commit violations 
abroad.  
 
                     
240Earle, B. (1995). United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the Money Argument.Dick. J. 
Int'l L. - Dickinson Journal of International Law, 14, 207. 
241In the Siemens Case, the Court of Milan, in its verdict of October 28th, 2004, stated that it 
is almost self-evident that foreigners (both individuals and legal entities), when acting in 
Italy, shall comply with Italian legislation, regardless of the fact that similar rules exist in 
their country of origin. 
242 Italian Criminal Court, Sentence no. 4284/2000. 
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34. On a somewhat similar note, the UK Bribery Act 2010 came into force on 
1 July 2011243. The Act – designed to counter the corruption of public officials - 
will also have extra-territorial application. Namely, the offences may be 
prosecuted if done by a British national or corporate or by a person who is 
ordinarily resident in the UK regardless of whether the act or omission which 
forms part of the offence took place outside the UK, and/or if any act or 
omission which forms part of the offence occurs within the UK.In addition, 
corporate criminal offences will apply to commercial organizations which have 
a business presence in the UK (regardless of where the bribe is paid or whether 
the procedures are controlled from the UK); this extends the reach of the 
legislation well beyond the current regime. 
 
35. With a view to the previous paragraphs, it has been illustrated that cross-
border groups face a considerable complexity, which, in turn, can result into 
burdensome compliance. Unsuprisingly, the combination of national laws and 
extraterritorial reach of many provisions suggest to implement group-wide 
compliance departments. This is also the view of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, whose position expressed in 2005 in respect of banking 
group compliance was the following one: “[…]Banks may conduct business 
                     
243Introduced to Parliament in the Queen's Speech in 2009 after several decades of reports 
and draft bills, the Act received the Royal Assent on April 8th, 2010 following cross-party 
support. Initially scheduled to enter into force in April 2010, this was changed to July 1st,  
2011. The Act repeals all previous statutory and common law provisions in relation to 
bribery, instead replacing them with the crimes of bribery, being bribed, the bribery of 
foreign public officials, and the failure of a commercial organization to prevent bribery on 
its behalf. The Act’s official full text version can be found on-line at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/pdfs/ukpga_20100023_en.pdf. 
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internationally through local subsidiaries or branches,  or in other jurisdictions where 
they do not have a physical presence. Legal or regulatory requirements may differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and may also differ depending on the type of business 
conducted by the bank or the form of its presence in the jurisdiction. […] Banks that 
choose to conduct business in a particular jurisdiction should comply with local laws 
and regulations. For example, banks operating in subsidiary form must satisfy the legal 
and regulatory requirements of the host jurisdiction. Certain jurisdictions may also 
have special requirements in the case of foreign bank branches. It is for local businesses 
to ensure that compliance responsibilities specific to each jurisdiction are carried out by 
individuals with the appropriate local knowledge and expertise, with oversight from the 
head of compliance in co-operation with the bank’s other risk management functions. 
[…] The Committee recognises that a bank may choose to carry on business in various 
jurisdictions for a variety of legitimate reasons. Nevertheless, procedures should be in 
place to identify and assess the possible increased reputational risk to the bank if it offers 
products or carries out activities in certain jurisdictions that would not be permitted in 
its home jurisdiction”.  
 
Chapter 7: Whistle-blowing and corporate groups 
 
36. Earlier in this research (Part I) we have pointed out that whistle-blowing 
schemes are a key element of many compliance schemes set up by companies 
and corporate groups, as compliance is essentially based on information flow. 
We have also pointed out that information flow itself faces some significant 
limitation posed by data protection laws, and that the limits are typically 
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strongest in cross- border groups244.On 14 November 2005, the Düsseldorf 
Regional Labour Court (“Landesarbeitsgericht Düsseldorf”) ruled that Wal-Mart’s 
whistle-blowing Policy breaches German labour law. The decision confirmed 
the Wuppertal Labour Court’s (“Arbeitsgericht Wuppertal”) previous decision of 
15 June 2005 which held that the policy was unlawful. Interestingly, the courts 
left open the question of what requirements should be imposed in order for a 
whistle-blowing policy to comply with data protection law.The decision has 
drawn public attention to this very specific legal question. Companies, in 
particular US stock listed companies, are in a dilemma. On the one hand, US 
law obliges them to implement corporate governance listing standards for 
companies, including the implementation of procedures encouraging 
employees to report misconduct. On the other hand, European law (in 
particular data protection law) imposes mandatory restrictions on such whistle-
blowing. Although expressly addressing only labour law issues, it held that an 
employer may request that his employees report misconduct. However, the 
precise scope of such a legal whistle-blowing obligation is still open. In the 
absence of relevant case law or administrative guidance, general data protection 
law provisions have to be applied. In the private sector, these provide for a 
balance of interests according to Section 28 Federal Data Protection Act 
(“Bundesdatenschutzgesetz”). The whole principle of balance of interests means it 
is not possible to make a general assessment of whistle-blowing policies; 
instead, policy provisions must be reviewed in each individual case. The 
                     
244  Schneider, U.H. (2010). Sind die Einrichtung einer Whistleblowing -Stelle und der Schutz des 
Whistleblowers Teil guter Corporate Compliance?. Festschrift für Peter Kreutz, Köln, S. 855. 
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balance of interests must consider, among other things, the severity of the 
alleged misconduct on the one hand; and on the other hand, the alleged 
infringer’s interest in not becoming the subject of an unfounded investigation. 
In addition, the reporting employee’s privacy interests must be taken into 
account. 
37. A decision of the German Federal Court of Justice (“Bundesgerichtshof”)245 
indicates that German data protection law generally accepts whistle-blowing to 
a certain extent. Where can the line be drawn? According to Schneider, data 
protection and compliance are two duties which do not per se exclude each 
other246. Rather, on one hand compliance posits the respect, among other things, 
of data protection. On the other hand, the scope of compliance is restricted by 
data protection law and data protection criminal law. The interplay between 
compliance and data protection is not an easy one, as the collection, elaboration 
and use of personal data is only allowed insofar as specific, factual and 
thoroughly documented elements exist which underpin the suspect that a legal 
violation has occurred. With this in mind, pre-emptive data collection is in all 
likelihood not possible, nor are wide, unspecific investigations.  
38. Germany is hardly the only country in which whistle-blowing schemes 
can entail a conflict with data protection regulations. France, for instance, is also 
a country with a consistent track record of verdict an official positions in which 
local regulators deemed whistle-blowing policies in breach of data protection 
                     
245BGH DB 1989, 1464. 
246Schneider, U.H.,& Schneider, S.H. (2007). Konzern-Compliance als Aufgabe der 
Konzernleitung. ZIP - Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 44, 2061-2065. 
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laws247. As a backgrounder, when whistle-blowing schemes schemes rely on the 
processing of personal data, i.e. on the collection, the registration, the storage 
and the disclosure of data related to an identified or identifiable person, they 
are subject to the provisions of the French Data Act. When such systems are 
carried out in an automated form, they are subject to a requirement of prior 
authorization by the French data protection authority “Commission Nationale 
de 1’Informatique et des Libertés” (CNIL) pursuant the French Data Protection 
Act, due to their qualification as processing operations that may exclude 
individuals from the benefit of a right or of their employment contract in the 
absence of any specific legal provision. In two decisions issued in May 2005, the 
CNIL refused to approve two ethical hotlines set up by US companies to 
comply with SOX requirements on corporate governance248. In order to comply 
with SOX requirements, two French subsidiaries of American companies, 
McDonald’s France and CEAC, sought permission to establish anonymous 
employee whistleblower hotlines and asked the CNIL to register the systems 
for use in France249. The system set up by MacDonald’s France which resulted 
from the code of Ethics of the international McDonald’s group, allowed the staff 
of the French subsidiary to report to the American parent company 
(McDonald’s Corporation) either by mail or by fax, on the behaviour of their 
                     
247Baumgartner, F. (2007). Whistleblower Procedures and Personal Data Protection in 
France. Corporate Governance Law Review, 3, 206. 
248Dowling Jr, D. C. (2008). Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Hotlines Across Europe: 
Directions Through the Maze. Int'l Law. - International Lawyer, 42, 1. 
249Marchini, R. (2006). Conflict of Laws: Anonymous Whistleblowing Hotlines Under 
Sarbanes-Oxley and European Data Protection Laws. Privacy & Data Security Law Journal, 
575. 
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colleagues “deemed contrary to the French legal rules as well of the Code of 
Ethics”. The system set up by CEAC (Compagnie européenne 
d’accumulateurs), established by the parent company, Exide Technologies, 
permitted all the employees of the group to “communicate with the 
Surveillance Accounting Committee of the Board of Directors of Exide on issues 
such as accounting inaccuracies or irregularities which could occur”. The 
hotline also permitted employees to report to the management of the group on 
possible violations of company principles (rules of ethical or commercial 
conduct) or of laws currently in force. According to the French CNIL, the 
schemes at stake were at risk of compressing the liberty of employees, and 
represented a disproportionate response. In fact, the CNIL first considered that 
the employees subject to a denunciation would not be immediately informed of 
the collection of data questioning their professional or personal integrity and 
would not be in a position to oppose such collection, which would infringe the 
French Data Protection Act. Second, the CNIL pointed out that these systems 
were disproportionate to the aim they seek to achieve regarding the risks of 
slanderous denunciations and he stigmatization of employees having been 
subjects of an ethics alert250. The CNIL noted in this respect that other legal 
means251 existed in order to ensure compliance with legal provisions and 
company rules (e.g. trainings, audits and alerts by the statutory auditors for 
financial and accounting issues). 
                     
250Lanois, P. (2007). Sarbanes-Oxley, Whistleblowing, And European Union Data Protection 
Laws. Practical lawyer Philadelphia, 53(4), 59. 
251Katz, G., & Lenglet, M. (2010). Whistleblowing in French Corporations.Philosophy of 
Management, 9(1), 103-122. 
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Chapter 8: Why the group compliance officer’s powers (and responsibilities) 
are not unrestrained. 
 
39. With a view to the paragraphs above, it is increasingly clear that the job 
of group compliance officer is a Sisyphean task, as foreign laws and/or 
courtrooms could extend its responsibility to all of the group in spite of the 
existence of compliance officers at the level of group subsidiaries. Earlier in this 
research, we have recalled that the duty of compliance officer entails specific 
responsibilities. In order to understand these responsibilities, a famous German 
Federal Court sentence was mentioned. In the Court’s words “the duty of a 
Compliance Officer is to prevent infringements of the law, especially crimes, which are 
conducted out of the company. Such Officers regularly have a duty to act according to 
sec. 13 Penal Code.” The approach of the court was not only a reference to the 
increased importance of compliance, but also raised interesting questions 
regarding the liability of a compliance officer. The task of many compliance 
officers is the prevention of crime, but the Court has not dealt with any of these 
problems. It is therefore not clear whether the court wants to constitute a new 
kind of responsibility for compliance officers and the management. Limitations, 
however, should arguably apply for the group compliance officer, and his duty 
should be examined relative to a number of elements. Firstly, in many 
jurisdictions and legal disciplines, the corporate group is no legal persona an 
sich, so reference shall be made only to individual companies, whose boards can 
be held liable for wrongdoings and crimes. The extension of compliance duty to 
the whole group – and hence to the parent company – is only possible if specific 
reasons are provided to demonstrate an active involvement of the parent 
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company. Secondly, one of the overarching guiding principles of compliance 
management is that it should be commensurate to the complexity of the 
business and to its architecture. Recently issued standards such as the ISO 
19600 standard dedicated to compliance management system can prove useful, 
but in the absence of a certification system it is quite difficult for a company – 
not to speak of an entire group - to prove the implementation of the ISO 
recommendations to others, so comparability of compliance undertakings will 
remain hard to achieve. However, in many cases compliance officers are merely 
obligated to report to the chief executive officer. If they fulfill this obligation, 
there is no room for a liability based on omission252. Thirdly, as recalled earlier, 
in the scholarly debate there are already comments which characterize the 
parent company’s compliance officer advising group subsidiaries as an 
“external consultant” and believe that in such capacity he is bound by 
confidentiality and attorney privileges. Therefore conflicts can in particular 
arise when the group compliance officer is a lawyer and deals with group 
subsidiaries253. Fourth, the compliance officer may face limitations in his day-
by-day job which are themselves the outcome of legal compliance. As pointed 
                     
252 Engelhart, M. (2010). Die neuen Compliance-Anforderungen der BaFin (MaComp).ZIP - 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 1832 - 1838; Lösler, T. (2008). Zur Rolle und Stellung des 
Compliance-Beauftragten. WM - WertpapierMitteilungen, 1098 - 1102; Rönnau, T.,& 
Schneider, F. (2010). Der Compliance-Beauftragte als strafrechtlicher Garant, ZIP - 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 60.   
253Spaulding, N. W. (2013).  Compliance, Creative Deviance, and Resistance to Law: A 
Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege. J. Prof. Law – Journal of the professional lawyer, 135; 
McNeece IV,  J. B. (2012). Ethical Conflicts of the Hybrid General Counsel and Chief 
Compliance Officer. Geo. J. Legal Ethics - Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 25, 677; Hackett, 
S. (2012). Corporate Counsel and the Evolution of Practical Ethical Navigation: An 
Overview of the Changing Dynamics of Professional Responsibility in in-House Practice. 
Geo. J. Legal Ethics - Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics,25, 317. 
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out in this research, the access to information and data can sometimes generate 
conflict with data protection laws which exist in several foreign jurisdictions, 
and neither a board nor a compliance officer have legal powers to either 
override or disregard these laws – in fact in many jurisdictions these are no 
assistant public prosecutors (“Hilfsbeamte del Staatsanwaltschaft”).   
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Compliance as new international policy pattern 
 
“On many issues most states have lost control over 
some of the functions of authority and are either sharing them 
with other states or with other (non-state) authorities..“ 
 
Susan Strange254 
 
* * * 
 
Chapter 1: Compliance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
0. At the onset of this research, we have clarified that compliance is 
different from corporate social responsibility, but both elements are generally 
seen as each other’s complement. What seems undeniable, indeed, is that the 
ultimate goal of compliance – the creation of a compliance department, crafting 
of guidelines and their implementation, etc.. – is not limited to ensuring 
adherence to the law, but entails a broader set of elements, and compliance and 
corporate social responsibility often time converge towards a single 
goal.Bayer’s compliance policy, for instance, mentions that “Bayer is conscious of 
its responsibility to protect health and the environment and ensure people’s safety” or 
                     
254Strange, S. (2007). The Retreat of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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that “All employees are expected to behave in a friendly, objective, fair and respectful 
manner toward colleagues and third parties. Discrimination or harassment of any kind 
will not be tolerated”255. Compliance is not just about adherence with the law 
but also about containing reputation damage. Rules and their overall 
acceptance stem from the global Zeitgeist, and the current Zeitgeist attaches 
great importance to corporate behavior. The context of today’s global landscape 
should thus be examined in order to have a better understanding of the 
systemic forces that drive the debate around compliance and make it a key 
issue of our time. Access to information and media enables the public across the 
globe to be more informed and to easily monitor corporate activities, with a 
better understanding of the differences between technical compliance 
(adherence to the letter of the law) and actual compliance (adherence to the 
spirit of the law)256.   
 
1. Based on the elements described in Part I and Part II of this research, it is 
clear that on one hand compliance duties derive from – general or substantive – 
legal obligations, on the other hand that compliance is a tool to avoid damage. 
With respect to corporate social responsibility, it may not be immediately clear 
whether the purpose of corporate social responsibility initiatives is a similar 
one. In particular, conventional wisdom that starts out from the actor-centered 
assumption that the prime function of business actors is, and has to be, profit 
                     
255Available on-line at: http://www.bayer.com/en/corporate-compliance-policy.aspx 
256Gabel, J.T.A, Mansfield, N.,& Houghton, S. (2006).Letter vs. spirit: The evolution of 
compliance into ethics. American Business Law Journal, 46.3, 453-486. 
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maximization is contradicted. In Milton Friedman’s view257, no code of conduct 
would ultimately be capable of setting market demands by force. However, this 
assumption and the consequences derived from it are often an 
oversimplification, as it neglects the fact that the market place is not the only 
environment that makes demands on business. Rational business actors have to 
take into account the challenges posed by globalized markets and those 
emanating from the state and from transnational civil society.258 The interaction 
of the three worlds of market, state and civil society259 provide for a 
normatively enriched environment, to the extent that the very word “market” 
may acquire a different meaning under these altering context conditions.  
2. In the face of public pressure or the threat of state regulation, “doing 
good”260 – and, accordingly, be proactively compliant with rules and norms - 
may be the most rational strategy for business to evade  the risks associated 
with adverse campaigning or public regulation. In fact, one the ironies or the 
recent era of deregulation business (in terms of state control) has been the 
                     
257 Friedman, M. (1995). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. In 
Hoffman, W.M., & Frederick, R.E. (Eds.),Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate 
Morality. New York: McGraw Hill, 137–141. 
258 McCormick R. (2009). Legal risk in the Financial Markets following the Global Financial Crisis. 
Available at https://community.oecd.org/community/gcls/blog/2009/07/15/legal-risk-
in-the-financial-markets-following-the-global-financial-crisis-a-uk-perspective; Strange, S. 
(1988). States and Markets. London: Pinter Publisher. 
259 Anheier, H., & Themudo, N. (2002). Organisational forms of global civil society: 
implications of going global. In Glasius, M., Kaldor, M.,& Anheier, H.K. (Eds.), Global Civil 
Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 191-216. 
260 Collins, J.C. (2001). Good to Great.New York: Harper Business. 
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simultaneous expansion of constraints imposed by civil society261. Non-
governmental activity on a global scale has now become a key part of the 
discourse of globalization262 and is routinely identified as one of the key drivers 
of  the contemporary emphasis on corporate accountability263. It comes as no 
coincidence, for instance, that the European Union constantly acknowledges the 
importance of social and market pressures264, noting that civil society must be 
recognized as playing a significant role in this new business governance265.  In 
fact, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s Global Compact is what economists 
call a social-norming proposition266. By signing on to it, corporations agree to 
                     
261Cashore, B., Auld, G.,& Newsom, D. (2004). Governing Through Markets: Forest 
Certification and the Emergence of Non-State Authority. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press; Cashore, B.,  Auld G., Bernstein, S., & McDermott, C. (2007). Can non-state 
governance “ratchet up” global environmental standards? Lessons from the forest sector. 
RECIEL – Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 16 (2), 158–72; 
Clapp, J. (1998). The privatization of global environmental governance: ISO 14000 and the 
developing world. Global Governance, Vol. 4, No 3, 295–316. 
262 Aman, A. (1998). The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the 
Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law, 769–870. 
263 Hester, J.M. (1975). Social responsibility of organisations in a free society. In Backman, J. 
(Ed.), Social Responsibility and Accountability. New York: New York University Press; 
Spitzer, E. (May 1st, 2002). The crisis of accountability. Full text at 
www.oag.state.ny.us/press/statements; Reich, R.B. (1998). The new meaning of corporate 
social responsibility. California Management Review, 40/2, 8–17. 
264Simmons, B. A. (2008). The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy.Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
265 COM (2002) 347: Communication from the Commission concerning Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A business contribution to  sustainable Development, available on-line at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/employment_ri
ghts_and_work_organisation/n26034_en.htm. 
266Cetindamar, D., & Husoy, K. (2007). Corporate social responsibility practices and 
environmentally responsible behaviour: the case of the United Nations Global Compact. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 76, 163–76. 
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uphold certain broad values such as environmental standards267268 and human 
rights269, which of course include rights as workers, as consumers, as voters, as 
children, and as women. The very act of signing on to such a compact focuses 
the signatory corporations, as well as potential critics, on what they do and plan 
to do to achieve progress toward the objectives. These consist of widely shared 
and internationally affirmed social values broadly stated (such as removal of 
gender discrimination and child labor). Given the broad general nature of the 
compact’s objectives, however, the specific steps they take are best left to the 
corporations, working with the democratic countries in which they operate.270 
For instance, signatory companies operating in Germany can be expected to 
follow national legislation and act within their national rights. They would, for 
example, exercise their right to hire replacement workers freely, even though 
that helps cripple the right to strike. But they would be expected to reduce wage 
                     
267Christmann, P.,& Taylor G. (2003).Environmental self-regulation in the global economy: 
the role of firm capabilities. In S. Lundan (Ed.), Multinationals, Environment and Global 
Competition.Amsterdam: Elsevier/JAI, 119–46. 
268Cashore, B., Auld G.,&Newsom D. (2004). Governing Through Markets: Forest Certification 
and the Emergence of Non-State Authority. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
269Addo, M. K. (1999). Human rights and Transnational Corporations – An Introduction.Human 
Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations. London - Boston:Kluwer 
Law International, 3-37. 
270 Nongnooch, K., & Sherer, M. (2004). Corporate social accounting disclosure in Thailand.  
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 17 Iss: 4, 629 – 660; Amba-Rao, S.C. (1993). 
Multinational corporate social responsibility, ethics, interactions and Third World 
governments.Journal of Business Ethics, 12, 553-572; Stuckelberger, C. (2002). Global Trade 
Ethics. An Overview.Geneva: WCC - World Council of Churches Publications. 
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discrimination against women because Germany accepts that objective 
explicitly and enforces it.271 
 
Chapter 2: Compliance as an evolutionary path from rules-based corporate 
behaviour to values-based behaviour 
 
3. With a view to the above paragraphs, “doing good” and “behaving 
properly” clearly are part of a strategy to avoid reputational risks, and so is the 
production of private norms and the stiff increase of compliance that originates 
from this phenomenon.272In many presentations compliance is generally 
described as an evolutionary path from rules-based to values-based 
compliance273. 
 
                     
271Chen, S., & Bouvain, P. (2009). Is Corporate Responsability Converging? A Comparison 
of Corporate Responsibility Reporting in the USA, UK, Australia, and Germany. Journal of 
Business Ethics Volume 87, Supplement 1 (2009), 299-317. 
272 Richman, B.D. (2004). Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive 
Theory of Private Ordering. Columbia Law Review, 104,2328. 
273 The graph above is freely adapted from the UK 2010 Bribery Act’s official presentation, 
available online at: http://www.ukbriberyact2010.co.uk/images/stories/bribery-act8.png. 
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In order to minimize reputational risk, private self-regulation must prove 
successful if it really wants to prevent legally binding regulation (state, ”hard 
law” regulation) being imposed. However, this embedding in pending public 
regulation could have yet another impact on private efforts trying to anticipate 
and prevent state intervention: even if public regulation follows at a later stage, 
its substance would be pre-shaped by the norms and rules of private self-
regulation. These expectations of the potential impact of the fear of forced 
compliance go along with the suspicion that in the absence of this threat the 
reliability of voluntary self-commitments would suffer.  
 
4. Consumers and investors are demonstrating increased interest274 in 
supporting responsible business practices and are demanding more information 
                     
274Brown, G.R. (1971). Corporate Counsel's Responsibility in the Age of Consumerism. Food 
Drug Cosm. LJ – Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal, 26, 154. 
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as to how companies address risks and opportunities275. In a 2006 McKinsey 
survey of business executives, only 8% of the interviewed people thought 
companies were motivated to champion social or environmental causes and 
work hardly on their disclosure policies out of genuine concern. One of the 
leaders in the adoption of explicit accountability policies, codes and reports was 
Shell, its “transformation” having become a classic business school case study, 
and it was very much responding major reputation crises resulting from both 
environmental and human rights issues, particularly in Western Africa. The 
company’s operation in a state run by a military dictatorship accused of major 
and frequent human right abuses, the impact of oil extraction on indigenous 
population, and the campaigns of human rights organizations pointing the 
finger not just at the Nigerian dictatorship but at Shell itself amounted to a 
public relations disaster. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) played a 
major part in the publicity and pressure that prompted Shell’s 
“transformation”, not only Greenpeace on the environmental side, but Amnesty 
International, Pax Christi and others on the human rights front, and the 
advancement of corporate accountability has to be seen in the context of the 
growth of a highly active a highly active and activist society, which has put 
significant pressure on business via campaigns, publicity, boycotts and 
pressures both for more transparency and for more socially responsible policies 
and practices.  
 
                     
275Whitehouse, L. (2003). Corporate social responsibility as citizenship and compliance: 
initiatives on the domestic. European and global level, Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 11, 85–
98. 
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5. Central to the public debate on corporate behavior is the perceived 
deficiency of national and international law remedies regarding corporate 
accountability, and in particular the ability of available regulation to 
successfully govern a corporation’s conduct, or even the conduct of a 
corporation’s partners (most typically suppliers) in jurisdictions outside the 
corporation’s home state276277. As a general consideration,  the traditional 
boundaries of moral278 and legal accountability have already been breached and 
companies are now exposed to environmental and social failings well beyond 
their direct operations and into the supply chain. In the Unocal ATCA case279, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the company could be challenged in court simply for 
knowingly assisting human rights violations in the supply chain regardless of 
                     
276 See, e.g., Leeuwarder Courant December 7th , 2007; AD/Groene Hart, December 5th, 2007. 
The case can be summarized as follows:  in December 2007 a labour conflict in India turned 
into a diplomatic incident when a Indian court issued international arrest warrants against 
several Dutch fair trade activists. These activists, involved in the struggle for fair labor 
conditions and freedom of trade union activities, were accused of libeling an Indian 
clothing factory. The alleged libel consisted of the fact that the Dutch organizations had 
accused the Indian company (Fibres and Fabrics International, FFI) of not providing 
adequate labor conditions to its workers, suppressing the freedom of speech and not 
respecting the freedom of organization of its workers. The Indian company produced jeans 
for several Western clothing brands amongst which the Dutch G-Star. G-Star said it had 
found no evidence of the stated abuses with regard to the labor conditions but terminated 
its relationship with FFI anyhow, under pressure of the continuing bad publicity.  
277McBarnet, D. (2003). When compliance is not the solution but the problem: from changes 
in law to changes in attitude. In Braithwaite, V. (Ed.),Taxing Democracy. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
278Carroll, A.B. (1991). The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: toward the moral 
management of organizational stakeholders. Business Horizons, 34/4, 39–48. Carroll, A.B., 
(2001). The moral leader: essential for successful corporate citizenship. In Andriof, 
J.,&McIntosh M. (Eds.),Perspectives on Corporate Citizenship.Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing, 
139–151. 
279 Rosencranz, A., Louk D., Doe V. (2005). Unocal: Holding Corporations Liable for 
Human Rights Abuses on their Watch. 2005 Chapman Law Review, available on-line at: 
http://lrights.igc.org/press/Unocal/chapmanlawreview_spring05.htm#FN2. 
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whether they wanted or requested them. When Ford became embroiled in the 
Firestone tire crisis, their initial defense was that they were not responsible, yet 
alone liable, for the failings of the tires which were warranted by the tire 
manufacturer. The hostile public reaction and barrage of legal actions rapidly 
caused them to accept responsibility for tires specified by them as part of the 
vehicle they had made and sold. Indeed, it was Ford and not Firestone who 
initiated a second major tire recall. In this and in many other cases, the 
distinction between moral and legal liability is being constantly tested, but 
companies are now having to weigh both aspects in deciding how they should 
respond to crises where responsibility could traditionally have been deferred to 
other parties in the supply chain. 
 
Chapter 3: Compliance as a tool to mitigate “civil society litigation risk” 
 
6. A corporate social responsibility-oriented compliance is also a means to 
minimize the risk of litigation risk coming from civil society. In fact, civil society 
has also played a very direct role in bringing law into play, often in innovative 
and even surprising ways, to enforce corporate responsibility, and increasingly 
to make it a legal obligation. Instead of just seeking to influence state or 
international legislation – i.e. public law – they have turned to the tools offered 
by private law, essentially tort and contract. One of the most creative examples 
is the use, in the United States, of the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), a U.S. 
statute relating to “piracy on the high seas” and dating back to 1789, rarely used 
for two centuries. It is, nonetheless, currently proving the bane of multinational 
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corporations who are being pursued, via ATCA, through the U.S. courts280. The 
goal is to have them pay out compensation – and be seen to take responsibility 
– for human rights abuses committed abroad by foreign governments with 
which they have been operating jointly.  
 
7. The use of ATCA is an example of highly creative legal enforcement by 
non-governmental organization concerned with human right abuses. It should 
also be recalled that new legal developments are directly and indirectly 
fostering voluntary corporate social responsibility281 and market pressures, 
while new legal tools are being evolved, and old ones creatively used, to make 
what businesses had previously perceived as voluntary, or beyond the law, in 
fact legally enforceable. This is not, on the whole, new state regulation, nor 
international law, but other facets of law – often private law – being used by 
private parties, non-governmental organizations, business itself, and indeed 
governments under a different hat. All of this certainly raises interesting angles 
on the real nature of compliance, and on law’s capacity to escalate. It also shows 
how social and market forces increasingly interplay with law, with more 
complex forms of governance emerging. Legal doctrines and processes are 
being used by non-governmental organizations as part of their overall strategy, 
                     
280Shamir, R. (2004). Between self-regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: on the 
contested concept of corporate social responsibility. Law & Society Review, 38 (4), 635-663. 
281Becheur, A.,& Bensebaa, F. (2004). Responsabilite sociale des entreprises: acceptabilite, 
credibilite et legitimite des pratiques, paper presented at the 13th AIMS Conference, 
Normandie – Vallee de Seine; Capelle-Blancard, G., & Giamporcaro-Sauniere S. (2006). 
L’investissement socialement responsable, nouveaux acteurs, nouveaux enjeux. Cahiers 
Français, 331, 70–77; Capron, M., & Quairel-Lanoizelee, F. (2004). Mythes et réalités de 
l’entreprise responsible. Paris: Editions La Decouverte. 
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and market forces are being stimulated and facilitated by legal measures. 
Activist players282, have for example used company law to gain legal status and 
a legal voice within companies, making themselves not just external pressures 
on companies but internal pressures. They have done this through the simple 
expedient of buying shares, making themselves shareholders and exercising 
shareholder rights to bring about resolutions to annual general meetings. Such 
actions have provided a new means for their conventional role of awareness-
raising, with significant publicity raised through reporting of their actions at 
annual general meetings.  More than publicity has resulted, with changes in 
corporate policy also being accomplished. In California in 2004, the Interfaith 
Center on Corporate Responsibility283, an umbrella organization filing for a 
group of shareholding non-governmental organizations, withdrew a resolution 
destined for Occidental’s annual general meeting only when the company 
agreed to adopt a human rights policy. Non-governmental organizations have 
thus used the opportunities available in law to move from the role of advocates 
outside the corporation to the role of legal actors within it. The shareholder 
resolution brought by the Ecumenical Council for Corporate Responsibility to 
Shell’s 2006 annual general meeting284 was introduced as being proposed 
because of concerns about the “loss of production, environmental costs and 
reputational risk faced by our company”. Amnesty International USA has also 
                     
282Schurr, S. (January 11th, 2006). Fruitless? Activist Shareholders Could Be Losing Their Ability 
to Shake Managements.Financial Times. 
283http://www.iccr.org/issues/. 
284Ecumenical Council for Corporate Responsibility (ECCR) official website, May 2nd, 2006, 
ECCR urges Shell shareholders to vote yes to responsible resolution, full text available on-line at: 
http://www.eccr.org.uk/dcs/NewsRelease_Shell_02May06.pdf. 
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extended the tactic into a base for more conventional campaigning by asking 
ordinary Americans to voice their concerns and priorities to institutional 
investors holding shares in their names, asking them to support shareholder 
resolutions addressing human rights. For instance, two resolutions pressed in 
2006 were first, in relation to Dow Chemicals, seeking more helo for the 
remaining 100,000 and more victims of Bhopal285, and, second, in relation to 
Chevron, regarding health and environmental issues in the Ecuadorian 
Amazon which Amnesty alleged were caused by the operations of Chevron’s 
subsidiary Texaco286. This “Share Power” campaign, and the general exercise of 
shareholder rights to promote corporate responsibility, confronts and exploits 
the narrow legal interpretation of corporate responsibility as primarily to 
further shareholders’ interests by making shareholders advocates of corporate 
responsibility.  
 
Chapter 4: Contractual control and compliance 
 
8.  Besides court litigation, contractual control is another mechanism 
frequently used by businesses themselves to transform legal commitments into 
legal obligations, and to impose these obligations on other businesses. In fact, 
there is a growing trend for major companies to include compliance 
commitments in the terms and conditions they set out for their contracts with 
their own suppliers. While the market power of large companies vis-à-vis 
                     
285http://www.amnesty.org/en/appeals-for-action/call-chemical-company-address-
legacy-bhopal. 
286http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/americas/ecuador. 
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suppliers is clearly an important factor in any influence accomplished, it is 
becoming regarded in business as best practice to formalize this as a legal 
obligation. The adoption of this controlling role by big business over its 
suppliers may be less surprising and less altruistic than it seems. Some of the 
companies whose reputations have been hardest hit by the human rights 
movement have found themselves pilloried for the practices of external 
suppliers which were not their legal responsibility, but for whose actions they 
were nonetheless held accountable287. Nike’s experience vis-à-vis the child 
labour practices of its south-east Asian suppliers epitomizes this288. It may be no 
wonder then that companies increasingly require their external suppliers, as 
well as their own companies, to adopt corporate social responsibility codes of 
conduct, and are using the legal mechanism of contract to do so. So the 
pressures of market and civil society have had the knock-on effect of business 
exercising legal control over business. It might also be noted that the production 
of contracts is itself facilitated by companies’ ability simply to incorporate 
standards already set by non-governmental organizations such the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). Nor is it just businesses that are using 
contract as a means of promoting corporate responsibility. National, local, and 
indeed supranational governments are not only using conventional regulatory 
law to foster corporate responsibility, but are also using their market power 
                     
287 Heydenreich, C. (2003).Zulieferbeziehungen aus Sicht der OECD-Leitsatze – Anspruch 
und Erfahrungen aus Perspektive von NGOs. In Germanwatch (Ed.), Wie weit reicht die 
Verantwortung von Unternehmen. Handels- und Zuliefererbeziehungen von multinationalen 
Unternehmen, Leverkusen: Moosdruck, 22–6. 
288Liubicic, R. (1998). Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labelling: the Limits and 
Possibilities of Promoting International Labour Rights Through Private Initiatives. Law and 
policy in international business, vol. I, 112-42. 
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coupled with private law. They do so, for instance, by including corporate 
responsibility in their own procurement contracts289. The Italian government, 
for instance, has required specified “green” standards for the companies whose 
goods and services it purchases, covering energy efficiency, greenhouse gas 
emissions, the efficient use of natural resources and raw materials, transport, 
pollution controls and appropriate sourcing of environmentally sensitive goods 
such as timber290. Californian and Massachusetts state procurement 
policies291are well known for their policy-driven stance, while a number of 
European states and the European Union have also included “sustainable” 
procurement in its official positions. One could question the fact that 
compliance is undertaken and virtuous behavior is incentivized within 
corporate groups because of fear. However, even if companies proclaim 
normative self-commitments only for strategic reasons without actually being 
convinced of their appropriateness, the importance of the societal environment 
lies in securing rule-consistent behavior by helping the logic of rhetorical self-
entrapment to unfold.  
 
Chapter 5: Compliance and activist investors 
 
7.Another crucial factor that sparked attention vis-à-vis corporate engagement 
and served as a huge incentive for both corporate social responsibility and 
                     
289Carter, C.R., & Jennings, M.M. (2004). The role of purchasing in corporate social 
responsibility: a structural equation analysis. Journal of Business Logistics, 25 (1), 145–86. 
290http://www.buy-smart.info/project-en/project-participants/consip-spa/consip-spa2. 
291Swanson, M. et al., Developing priorities for greener state government purchasing: a 
California case study, Journal of Cleaner Production, 13.7 (2005), 669-677. 
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corporate compliance is the rise of pension funds and activist investors292. The 
greater integration of world capital markets - in particular in the European 
Union following the introduction of the Euro - and the growth in equity capital 
throughout the 1990s have also been a significant factor in rekindling interest in 
corporate governance issues. Increasingly fast growing corporations in Europe 
have been raising capital from different sources by cross listing on multiple 
exchanges293. In the process they have had to contend more with USA and UK 
pension funds. This has inevitably contributed to the spread of an “equity 
culture” outside the USA and UK, and to a multiplication of legal undertakings 
and requirements294.The growth in defined contribution pension plans, indeed, 
has channeled an increasing fraction of household savings through mutual and 
pension funds and has created a constituency of investors that is large and 
powerful enough to be able to influence corporate governance, as the share of 
financial assets controlled by institutional investors has steadily grown over the 
1990s in OECD countries. This also comes with disproportionately large 
institutional holdings in small countries with developed financial centers, like 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Institutional investors in the 
                     
292Clark, G. (2004). Pension Fund Corporate Engagement: The Fifth Stage of Capitalism, 
Industrial Relations, 59 (1),142–71;Clark, G. (2003). European Pensions and Global 
Finance.Oxford: Oxford University Press; Clark, R.C. (1986). Corporate Law.Boston: Little 
Brown; Brooks, S.M. (2005). Interdependent and Domestic Foundations of Policy Change: 
The Diffusion of Pension Privatization Around the World. International Studies Quarterly,49 
(2), 273–94. 
293 Kern, S.  (2008). EU-US Financial Markets Integration -  a work in progress, Deutsche 
Bank Research Paper Series, available on-line at: 
http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-
PROD/PROD0000000000225963.pdf. 
294Statman, M. (2000). Socially responsible mutual funds. Financial Analyst Journal, May–
June, 30–90. 
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USA alone command slightly more than 50% of the total assets under 
management and 59.7% of total equity investment in the OECD295. This has led 
to the emergence of a service industry that makes voting recommendations and 
exercises votes for clients. These investors are becoming more demanding and 
they are one of the forces behind the rapid transformation of several corporate 
governance systems and the rising expectations around corporate 
accountability. In the United Kingdom, FTSE (the Financial Times Stock 
Exchange Index) introduced in 2001 the FTSE4Good296 index using criteria 
based on corporate social responsibility297. Dow Jones in the US has its 
Sustainability Indexes298. There are “socially responsible”, ethical and “green” 
investment trusts. FTSE4Good’s approach is to raise the bar over time, 
“engaging” companies to meet higher standards at each review and dropping 
companies that fail to do so. In its first three years it notably dropped 87 
companies, including household names such as Goldman Sachs and Avon, 
while the introduction of more demanding human rights criteria resulted in 53 
companies developing new policies and practices to ensure continued 
inclusion. Significantly, companies included in these indices make much of it in 
                     
295 Davis, P., & Steil, B. (2001). Institutional Investors. Cambridge: MIT Press, 296.  
296http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/index.jsp. 
297Robertson, D.C., & Nicholson, N. (1996). Expressions of corporate social responsibility in 
UK firms. Journal of Business Ethics, 15/10, 1095; Ruggie J. (2006, June 14th). Remarks delivered 
at a forum on Corporate Social Responsibility Co-Sponsored by the Fair Labor Association and the 
German Network of Business Ethics. Bamburg. Text available on-line at: http://www.reports-
and-materials.org/ Ruggie-remarks-to-Fair-Labor-Association-and-German-Network-of-
Business-Ethics-14-June-2006.pdf. 
298http://www.sustainability-index.com/. 
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their sustainability reports299. Moreover, large pension funds can wield 
significant influence. CalPERS300, the Californian Public Employees Retirement 
Scheme Fund, announced in February 2002 that it was pulling out of 
investment in businesses in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines 
because they did not meet CalPERS investment criteria301. Four years later, in 
June 2006, the Norwegian government pension fund, one of the largest in the 
world, withdrew investment from Wal-Mart and Freeport McMoRan Copper 
and Gold out of concerns about human rights and environment. With such 
significant levels of business value at stake, it is not surprising that shareholders 
are increasingly informed and active on the issues. The growth in ethical 
funds302 is one clear indication, with the power of this still-niche sector to secure 
board attention to social and environmental issues disproportionate to its size. 
Mainstream investors are coming under increasing pressure and are even facing 
legislated requirements, as in the case of UK pension trustees, to disclose their 
policy on the inclusion of environmental and social issues in their investment 
                     
299 Ballou, B., Heitger, D. L.,& Landes, C. E. (2006). The future of corporate sustainability 
reporting. Journal of Accountancy, 202(6),  65-67 and 70-74. 
300Cameron, D., Jacob, R., & Wine, E. (2002, February 22nd). Calpers' Asian retreat is a victory 
for ethics: But the giant Californian pension fund's pull-back from four emerging markets goes 
against the tide.Financial Times. 
301Cameron, D., Jacob, R., & Wine, E. (2002, February 22nd). Calpers' Asian retreat is a victory 
for ethics: But the giant Californian pension fund's pull-back from four emerging markets goes 
against the tide. Financial Times. 
302Whitehouse, L. (1998). The current trend in consumerism and its impact on the rights of 
home owners. In Cowan, D. (Ed.), Housing: Participation and Exclusion. Aldershot: Ashgate; 
Whitehouse, L. (2003). Corporate Social Responsibility as Citizenship and Compliance: 
Initiatives on the Domestic,European and Global Level. Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 11, 
85–98; Whitehouse, L. (2003). Corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship and the 
global compact: a new approach to regulating corporate social power?Global Social Policy, 3,  
299–318. 
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and voting decisions.  Arguably, a new element is represented also by the 
increased activism303,304 among mainstream investors. Part of this increase 
reflects the heightened focus on corporate governance, post-Enron. The huge 
losses in shareholder value have prompted investment managers to scour their 
portfolios for hidden risk, and investors are now keenly aware of the 
importance of good governance in protecting and enhancing the value of their 
investments. Even more significantly, mainstream investors seem to be 
gradually challenging some of the moral liability of the companies in which 
they invest. Shareholder resolutions have proliferated, demanding strategic 
reviews and responses on issues from climate change305 to genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) to human and labour rights performance. Many have been 
able to achieve once unthinkable levels of support from the main body of 
shareholders. 
 
Chapter 6: Compliance and risk management 
 
8. One of the key factors contributing to compliance’s international 
relevance is the unprecedented legislative emphasis on risk management these 
days. In fact, the importance of compliance in today’s corporate debate also 
                     
303 Barlow, M., & Clark, T. (2002). Global Showdown: How the New Activists are Fighting 
Corporate Rule.Toronto: Stoddart. 
304Bielefield, S., Higginson, S., Jackson,  J.,& Ricketts, A. (2004). Directors’ duties to the 
company and minority shareholder environmental activism. C&SLJ – Company and 
Securities Law Journal, 23, 28. 
305 Aguilar, L. A. (2010). Statement at open meeting – interpretive release regarding disclosure of 
climate change matters.Speech presented at U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Washington, DC. Text available on-line at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-
9106.pdf 
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reflects an overall attitude towards risk. More specifically, it reflects the 
confidence that risk can be managed, in the sense that “adequate” organizational 
features can reduce the life-threatening impact of risks on the company. Risk 
management-related regulation comes in many shapes. For instance, laws may 
require firms to adopt specific risk management/measurement techniques; 
impose corporate governance arrangements to manage risks, such as by 
requiring companies to have a risk committee within the corporate board, the 
presence of independent directors therein, internal “status” requirements for 
chief risk officers, separation of risk management from operating management 
functions, board duties to supervise risks, etc.; validate firms’ risk management 
models as a condition to more favorable regulatory treatment; impose a generic 
requirement to adopt adequate risk management procedures; require top 
management to certify the effectiveness of risk management (internal contro) 
policies and procedures and identify material weaknesses thereof, and impose 
disclosure obligations to explain risk management governance, policies, and 
procedures to investors and the public at large306.European company law was 
long silent on risk management: if at all, it mentioned the board’s responsibility 
for internal organization. Such is the case of rules dating back as far as from the 
1930s. But even where no such explicit rules were in place, it has always been 
clear that the board of directors and/or management were responsible for the 
adequate organization of a company as much as they were responsible for 
                     
306Enriques, L., Zetzsche, D. (2013). The Risky Business of Regulating Risk Management in 
Listed Companies. European Company and Financial Law Review, 10(3), 271-303. 
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running the business307. Today, both at the European level as well as at national 
levels the board of directors is asked to pay more attention to risk management. 
Trust needs to be restored with adequate controls to mitigate the accidents that 
happened. The 2004 Transparency Directive requires that issuers’ annual and 
interim reports include “a description of the principal risks and uncertainties 
that [it] face[s]” and “The interim management report shall include at least an 
indication of important events that have occurred during the first six months of 
the financial year, and their impact on the condensed set of financial statements, 
together with a description of the principal risks and uncertainties for the 
remaining six months of the financial year”308. The requirement to disclose the 
principal risks and uncertainties obliges companies to install at least a risk and 
uncertainty identification system. In a proposal for the modernization of this 
directive ESMA is empowered to issue guidelines with respect to these 
disclosure requirements309. The identification of risks was already required in 
the prospectus to be published when the company is stock exchange listed. 
                     
307 The same can be said about the first generation of financial services directives up to the 
mid-1980s: risk management was not explicitly mentioned. See Article 3 (4) of the First 
Directive on Credit Institutions (requiring a description of the organizational structure); 
Arts 16, 17 (2) of the First Directive on Non-Life Insurance of 1973 and Arts. 19, 20 (1) and 
(2) of the First Directive on Life Insurance of 1979. In a similar vein, the UCITSD I of 1985 
contained no rules on risk management as an organizational requirement.   
308 Article 4, § 2, subpart c and article 5, § 4 Directive 2004/109/EG of the European 
Parliament and the Council of December 15, 2004 on the harmonization of transparency 
requirements with regard to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to 
trading on a regulated market, OJ L No 390 of December  31st, 2004, p. 38. 
309 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonization of transparency requirements in relation to 
information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market 
and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, COM(2011) 683 final, October 25th,2011, p. 16. 
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Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC and Commission Regulation 809/2004, which 
oblige companies to include risk factors in the prospectus. The list of risk factors 
must comprise company-specific risks and/or risks related to the securities 
issued that are material for taking investment decisions. Directive 2010/73/EU 
further clarified what information is considered “key information” in assessing 
risks related to the company and the securities:  
 
[ …] essential and appropriately structured information which is to be 
provided to investors with a view to enabling them to understand the 
nature and the risks of the issuer, guarantor and the securities that are 
being offered to them or admitted to trading on a regulated market and, 
without prejudice to Article 5(2)(b), to decide which offers of securities to 
consider further. In light of the offer and securities concerned, the key 
information shall include the following elements:  
(i) a short description of the risks associated with and essential 
characteristics of the issuer and any guarantor, including the assets, 
liabilities and financial position;  
(ii) a short description of the risk associated with and essential 
characteristics of the investment in the relevant security, including any 
rights attaching to the securities; [ …].  
 
Listed companies must also provide for an annual corporate governance 
statement according to the Directive 2006/46/EC amending the Fourth and 
Seventh Company Law Directives. This statement must contain “a description 
of the main features of the company’s internal control and risk management 
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systems in relation to the financial reporting process”. On the consolidated 
level, “a description of the main features of the group’s internal control and risk 
management systems in relation to the process for preparing consolidated 
accounts” must be provided. The statement can be integrated in the 
management report or be published as a separate report. The auditor’s opinion 
is required to cover the consistency of the main features of the company’s 
internal control and risk management systems in relation to the financial 
reporting process. The auditor’s obligations related to the internal control and 
risk management system is limited to the financial reporting process, like the 
American requirements in SOX. Many of the aforementioned malpractices were 
either directly or indirectly related to financial “tricks” for which an adequate 
internal control system, controlled by an external expert, could be seen as an 
appropriate answer. The external auditor has to control the availability in the 
corporate governance statement on the description of the main features of the 
system in relation to the financial reporting process and issue an audit opinion. 
The Directive did not provide any guidance as to the level of work required, 
nor did it oblige the auditor to start a forensic audit. Next to the disclosure 
requirements in the Transparency and Accounting Directives, the Directive 
2006/43/EC on statutory audits stipulates that public-interest entities must 
establish an audit committee (or alternative body) to monitor the financial 
reporting process and to monitor the effectiveness of the company’s internal 
control, internal audit where applicable, and risk management systems. This 
obligation goes beyond the disclosure requirements of the Transparency 
Directive and the amendments of the Accounting Directives and covers one of 
the components of an enterprise risk management system. The monitoring 
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requirement, i.e. monitoring the financial reporting process as well as the 
internal control system, significantly increases the responsibility of the audit 
committee. According to Article 41 of Directive 2006/43/EC the audit 
committee must not only monitor the effectiveness of the internal control 
system of financial reporting, but the effectiveness of all internal control, 
internal audit and risk management systems. It can be derived from this duty 
that the company must install such systems allowing the audit committee to 
monitor their effectiveness but the Directive does not provide any guidance as 
to which kind of system is appropriate. The audit committee will have to collect 
information about all the different components and procedures of the applied 
systems and assess the functioning of the systems for which criteria need to be 
developed. The criteria allows the committee to assess if the systems provide 
for reasonable assurance that the goals can be reached. In 2005 the European 
Commission issued a recommendation on independent directors and 
committees of the board which contains additional guidelines structuring the 
audit committees' work. In fact, the recommendation is broader than the scope 
of the Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits. The recommendation contains 
several principles related to the role of the audit committee. This committee 
should assist the board in its task to, e.g. :  
- review at least annually the internal control and risk management 
systems, with a view to ensuring that the main risks (including those 
related to compliance with existing legislation and regulations) are 
properly identified, managed and disclosed;  
- ensure the effectiveness of the internal audit function, in particular by 
making recommendations on the selection, appointment, reappointment 
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and removal of the head of the internal audit department and on the 
department’s budget, and by monitoring the responsiveness of 
management to its findings and recommendations. If the company does 
not have an internal audit function, the need for one should be reviewed 
at least annually;  
- review the effectiveness of the external audit process, and the 
responsiveness of management to the recommendations made in the 
external auditor’s management letter.  
Both Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits and the Recommendation focus 
on the monitoring role of the audit committee, but they assign different roles to 
the audit committee with regard to monitoring the internal control system and 
its effectiveness, respectively. According to Directive 2006/43/EC the 
committee has a duty to perform the overall monitoring of the financial 
reporting process, but only has to monitor the effectiveness of the global 
system, whilst the Recommendation stresses the committee’s duty of 
monitoring the global internal control system, but only has to assess the 
effectiveness of the internal audit function and external audit process.The 
statutory auditor must also “report to the audit committee on key matters 
arising from the statutory audit, and in particular on material weaknesses in 
internal control in relation to the financial reporting process”. The role of the 
auditor vis-à-vis the internal control process is limited. The European auditor 
must report the material weaknesses but has no monitoring duty regarding the 
effectiveness control of the audit committee. According to Directive 
2006/43/EC monitoring the effectiveness of the system in relation to financial 
reporting remains the sole duty of the audit committee. In the US, management 
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must provide an assessment of the effectiveness of internal control for financial 
reporting. In the recitals of Directive 2006/43/EC, the collective responsibility 
of the board is stressed. Article 41, paragraph 2 of Directive 2006/43/EC also 
emphasizes the responsibility of the board members. It stresses the delicate 
borderline between the audit committee’s responsibilities and the board of 
director’s responsibility. According to Directive 2006/43/EC the audit 
committee’s duties go beyond the mere advisory work to prepare the board 
meetings. The committee has four monitoring duties and one reviewing task. 
The audit committee should inform the board of directors about the work 
program allowing the board to monitor the work of the committee.  
 
Chapter 7: Risk management in courtrooms 
 
9. Many risk-management-related rules are different from outcome-
oriented or command-and-control regulations (substantive rules), as they 
provide a certain flexibility to companies to devise their own solutions to 
challenges. Risk management and compliance are examined more and more in 
case-law across the EU. In the the Netherlands’ Laurus case310, the Enterprise 
Chamber concluded that the Board of Directors takes irresponsible risks if, 
notwithstanding negative signals, it supports the continuation of the business 
plan even when it endangers the survival of the company. Closely related to 
this case is the decision of the Court of Utrecht that found both the board and 
the supervisory board liable because they have opted for a strategy without any 
                     
310Laurus, Ondernemingskamer Gerechtshof Amsterdam, October 16th, 2003, 174/2003, 
LJN:AM 1450, http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl(accessed 5 February 2013).   
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assessment of the thereto related risks311. The Court of Appeal of Mons 
(Belgium) found the board of directors liable for the bankruptcy of the company 
because there was not an appropriate risk management system in accordance 
with the size and operational activities of the company312.These cases illustrate 
that the courts will have increasing difficulties to judge without hindsight bias. 
The new legal and regulatory risk management requirements aggravate this 
hindsight bias risk. There are already some signs of increased accountability of 
directors for having business risk mitigating systems instead of risk management 
systems. In a recent Belgian case one director was convicted for the corporate 
breaching of the environmental legislation313. The company fell short of 
compliance with the environmental legislation related to water sanitation. The 
board of directors systematically underinvested in the exploitation of the plant 
and priority was given to economize instead of complying with new 
environmental laws. The individual board member should have protested 
against this underinvestment which implies that board members must ensure 
that a system that identifies and mitigates regulatory (environmental) risks is in 
place. Although it consists of a criminal case, Belgian board members must 
object against (at least certain kinds of) risky activities and make sure that risk 
management systems identify these significant risks. Generally, the new risk 
management system requirements are open standards which leave many 
options to manage the risks.Yet, this flexibility may be deceptive. In fact, risk-
                     
311Ceteco, Rechtbank Utrecht December 12th, 2007, 171413/ HA ZA 04-34, LJN: BB,9709 
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl (accessed February 5th, 2013).   
312 Court of Appeal Bergen March 3rd, 2008, RRD 2008, 295-296.  
313 Court of Appeal Gent, November 25th, 2011, TRV 2012, 711, 734, comment S. De Geyter. 
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management-related rules typically offer a set of incentives if two conditions 
are met: a compliance organization is established, and its programmes and 
guidelines are effectively implemented. While there can be wide discretion as to 
how structure the compliance organization, not much guidance is given as to 
how ensure effectiveness314. Moreover, as noted by Enriques and Zetsche, this 
kind of risk management-related regulation facilitates misperceptions about 
what risk management can and cannot do. While risk management as a 
managerial tool is inherently imperfect, the very assimilation of risk 
management into regulation315 may have negative effects in two directions. On 
the one hand, ex ante, market participants, especially outside the firm, may 
develop a sense of misplaced security over how much a firm’s management is 
in control of the outside world. The view that managing risk means having 
risks under control is obviously wrong, but it may only be natural to share it if 
risk management is legally and politically sanctioned and if firms heavily invest 
in it as a consequence. On the other hand, ex post, risk management regulation 
may well generate an opposite misconception on the part of law enforcers 
dealing with situations in which harmful events have materialized. If the law 
requires or expects adequate risk management policies and procedures, then it 
is easy to be led into thinking that, had those procedures been in place and 
complied with, no harmful event would have materialized, and hence that 
                     
314 Rordorf, R. (2002). I modelli organizzativi e gestionali idonei a prevenire i reati.Le società, 
1302. 
315Graziani, G. (2002). I modelli organizzativo–preventivi e l’esperienza dei “compliance 
programs”. Dir. prat. Soc - Diritto e pratica delle società, 28. 
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management or the board are at fault because their risk management 
procedures were below the minimal acceptable standard316. 
 
Chapter 8: Compliance and enforced self-regulation 
 
10. As we have pointed out earlier in this research, with the exceptions of 
substantive provisions for specific sectors, it is controversial whether there is 
such thing as a duty of compliance embedded in general obligations. At the 
same time, it is undeniable that many boardrooms decide to establish 
compliance department because of the kind of incentives provided by certain 
regulations. The incentives317devised by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) 
represent an example of this approach, and a blueprint for regulations such as 
the Italian D. Lgs. No. 231/2001. In fact, through its unparalleled power to 
indict corporate entities, the DOJ and US federal prosecutors have grasped the 
ability to define and assertively impose guidance on what constitutes effective 
"corporate compliance”. This constitutes a delegation of responsibility whereby 
the government commands firms ex ante to implement "effective" compliance 
programs318, but offers little guidance for determining effectiveness. Moreover, 
the DOJ's compliance regulation grants regulated entities little opportunity to 
                     
316Enriques, L., & Zetzsche, D. (2013). The Risky Business of Regulating Risk Management 
in Listed Companies. European Company and Financial Law Review, 10(3), 271-303. 
317 Hamdani, A., & Klement, A. (2008). Corporate Crime and Deterrence. Stanford Law 
Review, 61,271. 
318Goldsmith, M., & King, C. (1997). Policing Corporate Crime: The Dilemma of Internal 
Compliance Programs. Vanderbilt Law Review, 50.1. 
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engage in experimentation319. Instead, internal corporate compliance programs 
are the instrumentalities of hard law: formal regimes designed to supply 
internal monitoring and punishment320, so that the firm can then assist the 
government in fulfilling its duties of external monitoring and  punishment321322.  
 
11. Through promulgation of the prosecutorial guidelines alone, the DOJ has 
certainly encouraged the expansion of corporate compliance departments, as 
well as the purchase of compliance services, much of it in the form of legal 
advice and training, sufficient to support a burgeoning industry323. More 
specifically, by negotiating and administering deferred prosecution agreements, 
US federal prosecutors have caused324 corporations to reorganize their 
compliance departments and redesign the ways in which they monitor and 
interact with employees, fire key personnel, including high-level officers not 
formally accused of criminal wrongdoing, hire hand-picked internal monitors, 
who report to and take orders from prosecutors, and attend meetings with 
                     
319Walsh, C.J., & Pyrich, A. (1994). Corporate compliance programs as a defense to criminal 
liability: Can a corporation save its soul. Rutgers Law Review, 47, 605. 
320Alschuler, A.W. (2009). Two ways to think about the punishment of corporations. Am. 
Crim. L. Rev.– American Criminal Law Review, 46, 1359. 
321Kowal, S. M. (1998). Corporate compliance programs: A shield against criminal liability. 
Food & Drug LJ- Food & DrugLaw Journal 53, 517. 
322Weissmann, A. (2007). New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability. Am. Crim. L. Rev.– 
American Criminal Law Review, 44, 1319. 
323 Baer, M.L. (2009). Governing Corporate Compliance. B.C.L. Rev.- Boston College Law 
Review, 50, 949. Available at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol50/iss4/2. 
324Laufer, W.S. (2001). Corporate prosecution, cooperation, and the trading of favors.Iowa L. 
Rev. - Iowa Law Review, 87, 643. 
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board members regarding the company's outstanding compliance issues325. As 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements ("DPA”s) —contractual agreements whereby 
the government agreed not to prosecute the defendant corporation in return for 
the corporation agreeing to assist the government's investigations and to take 
remedial measures to improve its internal controls326 - began to proliferate327, 
the centralized policy-making arm at the DOJ headquarters exerted control over 
divergent practices that had developed throughout the individual United States 
Attorney's offices. In 1999, the Holder Memorandum, the first internal DOJ 
guideline memorializing "best practices" in corporate criminal prosecutions, 
was circulated to the individual United States Attorney's offices. The Holder 
Memorandum was intended primarily for line prosecutors and their local 
supervisors, some of whom were known to deviate from DOJ priorities when it 
suited their purposes328. By the end of 2000, following the collapse of a "dot.com 
"-inspired speculative economy, public firms issued a wave of financial 
restatements that shook investor confidence and depressed the equity market. 
In response to significant investor losses and widely reported apprehension 
about the integrity of capital markets, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, and the Bush administration promised to vigorously prosecute the 
individual officers and employees that had been responsible for promulgating 
                     
325Bucy, P. H. (2007). Trends in corporate criminal prosecutions.Am. Crim. L. Rev. – 
American Criminal Law Review 44, 1287. 
326Spivack, P., & Raman, S. (2008). Regulating the New Regulators: Current Trends in 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements. Am. Crim. L. Rev. – American Criminal Law Review 45, 
159. 
327Illovsky, E. (2006). Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements. Criminal Justice, 21, 36. 
328Baker Jr, J. S. (2003). Reforming Corporations through Threates of Federal Prosecution. 
Cornell L. Rev. -Cornell Law Review, 89, 310. 
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securities frauds. Knowing that the prosecution of such individuals would be 
nearly impossible without the help329 of the corporations in which they worked, 
the government set out to shore up its legal apparatus in order to guarantee its 
ability to prosecute individual wrongdoers.In 2001, Larry Thompson, then 
Deputy Attorney General, released a revised memorandum that, unlike the 
earlier Holder Memorandum, explicitly commanded all prosecutors to consider 
entity-wide criminal liability330 for corporations whose employees were targets 
of investigations for criminal violations331. Following the DOJ's lead, the SEC 
adopted a similar approach to judging corporate compliance and cooperation in 
its Seaboard Memorandum, which announced the release of a parent 
corporation from liability for the conduct of its subsidiary. 
 
Chapter 9: “P2P” compliance and global governance 
 
12. Thus far, we have investigated the relation between compliance and laws 
produced by a single state – or by a variety of states. Several scholars suggest 
that the unprecedented importance of compliance should also be examined 
with a view to the proliferation of private norms, which are increasingly filling 
voids in the international space. In other words companies become norm-
                     
329Izraeli, D., & Schwartz, M.S. (1998). What can we learn from the US federal sentencing 
guidelines for organizational ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 17.9-10, 1045-1055. 
330Bittle, S. (2004). Constituting the corporate criminal: corporate criminal liability in post-
Westray Canada. In Institute of Governance, Public Policy and Social Research (Ed.), 
Governing the Corporation: Mapping the Loci of Power in Corporate Governance Design, An 
International Colloquium, London: Queen’s University. 
331Wray, C. A., & Hur, R.K. (2006). Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: 
The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice. Am. Crim. L. Rev. – American Criminal Law 
Review 43, 1095. 
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entrepreneurs – i.e. produce their own norms, comply with them and persuade 
other players to do the same. According to Killingsworth, “by recasting 
compliance and ethics from a vertical, state-imposed constraint on business to an 
integral, horizontal expectation of how business is done, P2P (private-to-private) 
compliance  encourages the adoption of best practices both as a cultural norm and, 
critically, as a path to profit. Coming now from external business partners rather than 
just the internal ethics and compliance staff, this message has the potential to re-orient 
some attitudes and remove some ethical blinders. As more businesses are forced by their 
counterparties to examine their compliance processes and routinely accept business and 
legal consequences for them, we can expect increases in overall investment in 
compliance, in the scope and robustness of the average compliance program, and in 
ambient awareness of compliance issues outside the compliance, audit, and legal staffs. 
The viral nature of the process, in which each participant can exert pressure on a large 
number of direct and indirect upstream or downstream parties, while simultaneously 
fielding demands from other members of its value chain, suggests that the trend will 
continue and its influence will grow”332. Moreover, according to Killingsworth, 
private-to-private agreements“commonly contain several distinct types of 
provisions: broad human rights, labor and corporate social responsibility standards; 
ethical rules governing relationship issues such as conflicts of interest and gifts and 
entertainment; requirements to obey specific laws of concern and laws generally; and 
procedural rules such as the right to audit the partner’s records or train its personnel. 
Process and structural rules may be imposed on the partner’s compliance activities, 
                     
332Killingsworth, S. (2014). The Privatization of Compliance. RAND Center for Corporate 
Ethics and Governance Symposium White Paper Series. Symposium on "Transforming 
Compliance: Emerging Paradigms for Boards, Management, Compliance Officers, and 
Government". 
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such as requirements to establish management accountability, develop appropriate 
policies and procedures, maintain an anonymous reporting system and an anti-
retaliation policy, train employees, conduct periodic audits, risk assessments and 
remediation, and of course, sometimes to cascade these program elements to downstream 
associates”333. The likelihood of a spread of private compliance in the 
international space is strongest, because in the international space there is no 
single supranational regulator and states operate through agreements and 
cooperation treaties334. The international space, where many corporations are 
active, is exactly where government ends and “governance” begins. In fact, 
“global governance” is often defined in terms of what it is not – neither a world 
government nor the disorderly chaos and anarchy associated with a Hobbesian 
“state of war of all against all”.  
 
13. In one of the pioneering studies of global governance published in 1992, 
James Rosenau defined global governance in general terms as “an order that 
lacks a centralized authority with the capacity to enforce decisions on a global 
scale”335. This conception of global governance was that of a purposive order 
that exists for the management of interdependence in the absence of a global 
state. His definition is very broad and has relatively little to say about who or 
what makes decisions, or precisely how enforcement takes place. Governance is 
derived from the Latin word gubernator, which is described both as a person 
                     
333Killingsworth, S. , idem. 
334Flohr, A., Rieth, L., Schwindenhammer, S., & Wolf, K. (2010). The Role of Business in Global 
Governance. London: Palgrave McMillan, 41. 
335Rosenau, J. N., & Czempiel, E.O. (1992). Governance without government: order and change 
in world politics.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
172 
 
who steers, and as a “self-acting contrivance for regulating” to ensure an even 
and regular motion336. This is an important distinction, and we will return to 
these two different aspects of how governance is accomplished in the 
discussion below. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED)337 defines 
governanceas: (1) the idea of controlling, directing or regulating influence, as 
well as being subject to the control of another (a relational aspect); (2) the office, 
function, or power of governing; (3) the manner in which something is 
governed or regulated; and (4) the general conduct of life or business, 
demeanour, and “discrete or virtuous behaviour”, which adds a normative 
component to governance.  Drawing on the origin of the concept and the 
different aspects of governance identified above, it is possible to define global 
governance in general terms.  
 
14. Global governance requires first, some form of patterned regularity or 
order at the global level338. Patterned regularity is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for global governance. Second, following Rosenau339, and 
with acknowledgement of Hedley Bull’s important contribution, global 
                     
336Rosenau, J. N. (2007). Governing the ungovernable: The challenge of a global 
disaggregation of authority.Regulation & Governance, 1.1, 88-97. 
337 Oxford English Dictionary (1971). Complete Text, Volume I (A-O).Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
338Biersteker, T. (2011). Global Governance, the Sustainability of International Institutions, and 
the Potential Role of University‐based Research Institutes. Geneva: The Graduate Institute.  
Text available on-line 
at:http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/shared/Winter/2013/Academi
c/Biersteker_Glion_Volume_chapter.pdf. 
339 Rosenau, J.N. (1992). Governance, order and change in world politics. In Rosenau, J. N., 
& Czempiel, E.-O. (Eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-29. 
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governance must be purposive and/or oriented toward the achievement of 
some goal or goals340. In this sense, and integrating it with the first element, 
global governance is order, plus intentionality, at the global level. Third, 
governance connotes a system of rule, or rules. These rules can either be formal 
and embodied within formal institutions, or they can be informal and reside 
inter-subjectively among a population or a set of key institutional actors. Global 
governance entails decisions that shape and define expectations (“controlling, 
directing, or regulating influence”) at the global level. There can be different 
degrees of institutionalization associated with different forms of governance, 
and there is much debate about whether formal or informal institutions are 
necessary for governance.  Fourth, the system of rule implied by global 
governance is authoritative, in the sense that there is a social relationship 
between the governed and some governing authority. Governance requires 
acceptance by a significant portion of some relevant population and therefore is 
“as dependent on inter-subjective meanings as on formally sanctioned 
constitutions and charters”. Governments can persist without widespread 
popular support, but governance requires performance of functions necessary 
for systemic persistence. Governance should not be equated with government, 
but with the functions of government.  Fifth and finally, as indicated above, 
given that the word governance is derived from the Latin word gubernare (both 
“to steer” and “to regulate”), it connotes some agent who steers the process, 
and it also allows for self-regulation. In this sense, a market or set of market 
                     
340Bull, H. (1977). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
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mechanisms can be said to govern. Thus, global governance is an inter-
subjectively recognized, purposive order at the global level, which defines, 
constrains, and shapes actor expectations in an issue domain. It is a system of 
authoritative rule or rules (with varying degrees of institutionalization) that 
functions and operates at the global level. In order for a system of authoritative 
rules to operate at a global level, it is not required that they be universally 
practiced or universally recognized as legitimate. It merely requires that they be 
widely shared and practiced on a global scale (on multiple continents) by 
relevant and important actors.  
 
Chapter 10: Compliance and systemic risk 
 
15. This research has shown how significantly policymakers contributed to 
the rise of compliance, and is concerned with the way in which law could (and 
sometimes does) seek to hold businesses accountable for taking their 
responsibilities – or the responsibilities of their employees -seriously by using 
various  mechanisms to encourage or enforce businesses to put in place internal 
governance structures, management practices and corporate cultures aimed at 
achieving responsible outcomes. Arguably, the shift towards enforced self-
regulation reflects the idea that the kind of risks which arose these years 
requires strong engagement by the corporate community. In fact, a risk for 
private players can morph into a systemic risk341. The one industry where 
                     
341 Beisheim, M., Rudloff, B.,& Ulmer, K. (2012). Risiko-Governance: Umgang mit globalen 
und vernetzten Risiken. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Arbeitspapier FG 8, 2012/1; 
Boeckelmann, L., & Mildner, S. (2011). Unsicherheit, Ungewissheit, Risiko. SWP-Stiftung 
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private interest coincides with public interest – and where the need for good 
compliance is highest - is perhaps the financial industry342. Typically, 
entrepreneurs, as individuals, have an appetite for risk and that appetite is 
reflected in every kind of business enterprise, large or small, regardless of its 
legal form. Investors in such enterprises are expected to accept the risk that is 
inherent in the arrangement, although there are a great many laws and 
regulations to protect investors against the unscrupulous and, up to a point, the 
negligent. However, the activities of banks and other financial services 
enterprises give rise to other special considerations because they may attract 
funds not only from individuals as risk-taking investors but also from 
individuals – and others – who have either no appetite for risk (such as an 
account-holder with a major retail bank) or a much more conservative attitude 
to risk. The inter-connection of financial institutions in the wholesale financial 
markets, where they enter into transactions with each other involving 
enormous sums of money on a daily basis, also means that if one institution 
gets into financial difficulty there is a serious risk that the problem may spread 
rapidly to other financial institutions and cause serious financial instability. All 
of these special considerations require a degree of regulation and supervision – 
and, accordingly, compliance-related structures - which would not normally be 
necessary for commercial enterprises in non-financial sectors. Arguably, 
                                                            
Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2011; Mildner, S. (2011). Der Umgang mit dem 
Unbekannten. SWP-Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -Aktuell, June 2011.  
342McCormick, R. (2009, July 15th). Legal risk in the Financial Markets following the Global 
Financial Crisis: a UK perspective.Global Charter/Legal Standard. (available on-line at 
https://community.oecd.org/community/gcls/blog/2009/07/15/legal-risk-in-the-
financial-markets-following-the-global-financial-crisis-a-uk-perspective). 
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compliance often has systemic relevance, too343. In fact, as the international law 
reform organization UNIDROIT observed in 2004, there are particular features 
of legal risk that can result into a systemic reaction:  
 
“[…] legal risk may become systemic […]. Consider, 
for example, the scenario in which an entire market 
suddenly changes its behavior because the participants 
become aware of a major legal problem inherent in a 
specific kind of transaction unsuspected until then. In 
order to avoid this risk, the market participants avoid 
entering into this type of transaction as long as the 
problem remains unsolved. Such a mass reaction, if not 
properly restrained, could seriously damage the market. 
[…]”344 
In this respect, a “War Game” simulation carried out by the UK regulatory 
authorities in 2004 to simulate risks to the financial system is very intriguing. In 
fact, the trigger event in the exercise was an imaginary unfavorable decision of 
the European Court of Justice: a classic example of compliance risk. 
                     
343Morton G. (2004). Legal risk and its impact on market efficiency. Acts of the UNIDROIT 
Seminar on Harmonised Substantive Rules regarding Securities Held with an 
Intermediary, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2004/study78/s-
78-012-e.pdf. 
344 See UNIDROIT’s Explanatory Notes to the Preliminary Draft Convention on 
Harmonised Substantive Rules Regarding Securities held with an Intermediary, December 
2004 (available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2004/study78/s-78-019-
e.pdf). 
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Interestingly, according to the Financial Times345 the simulation assumed that 
the ruling of the court “created a behind-the-scenes run on banks that were heavily 
exposed to the property sector”. When debating the trade-off between the private 
interest of companies or corporate groups and the public interest, so far only 
cases of converging negative interests have been considered, i.e. cases where 
both private players and the public have an interest in avoiding compliance 
risk, as this risk could have systemic relevance. There is no scarcity of these 
cases these days, with an ongoing global financial and economic crisis. 
However, one should not be misled by the perception that the public interest 
and the private interest coincide  only in bad times. This research, for instance, 
acknowledges the shift of functions which were previously a prerogative of 
nation-States to private players. Notably, these functions include the production 
of norms, in a scenario that several scholars have labeled as “co-production of 
statehood” or “co-performance of governance”346. The powers of nation-States, 
even of powerful ones, are not sufficient to solve global problems. Among the 
numerous strategies adopted by national governments to increase their 
problem solving capability, the more direct involvement of private actors in the 
governance process is of particular interest. This step toward societal 
participation was not primarily motivated by democratic concerns but followed 
the rationale of increasing problem-solving effectiveness by utilizing the 
knowledge and other resources that only private actors could provide. Co-
opting the former addressees of state regulation as partners in decision making 
                     
345Financial Times (May 30th, 2009).Chilling plausibility of bank’s “war game”. 
346 Schuppert, G. (2008). Von Ko-Produktion von Staatlichkeit zur Co-Performance of 
Governance.SFB-Governance Working Paper, Series 12. Berlin: Freie Universitaet. 
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could also increase the support and acceptance of political decisions. The 
expectation of a cooperative response by business actors to becoming partners 
in new governance arrangements relies on different factors, such as market 
incentive for corporations to engage in norm-production and norm-
implementation, corporations’ interest in avoiding reputational costs or legally 
binding public regulation, or the exchange of information in learning processes 
designed to improve corporate capacities to enact their supposedly intrinsically 
motivated willingness to “do good”. Law is primarily a social construct: the 
extent to which it is interpreted and applied depends on the initial legislation 
and on the degree to which its provisions are accepted  by key stakeholders. The 
role of legislators and gatekeepers is  thus crucial in setting standard and rules 
and closely guard legal definitions. However, public institutions alone are not 
sufficient to grant adequate compliance347, and there is strong evidence that also 
many non-state348 and non-governmental entities are playing a crucial role in 
defining compliance’s contours and borders349. Back in 2004, the (then) 
                     
347Grabosky, P. (1995). Using non-governmental resources to foster regulatory 
compliance.Governance, 8, 527. 
348Cashore, B.,  Auld G., Bernstein S.,& McDermott C. (2007). Can non-state governance 
“ratchet up” global environmental standards? Lessons from the forest sector. RECIEL – 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 16 (2), 158–72; Cashore, 
B., Auld, G., & Newsom, D. (2004). Governing Through Markets: Forest Certification and the 
Emergence of Non-State Authority. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
349 Shonfield, A., & Royal Institute of International Affairs (1965). Modern Capitalism: The 
Changing Balance of Public and Private Power.London: Oxford University; McBarnet, D. 
(2003). When compliance is not the solution but the problem: from changes in law to 
changes in attitude. In Braithwaite, V. (Ed.).Taxing Democracy. Aldershot: Ashgate; Cashore, 
B., Auld, G., & Newsom, D. (2004). Governing Through Markets: Forest Certification and the 
Emergence of Non-State Authority. New Haven: Yale University Press; Cashore, B.,  Auld G., 
Bernstein, S., & McDermott, C. (2007).Can non-state governance “ratchet up” global 
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chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission William Donaldson made 
this aspect – the norm-setting function by corporate players and not only by the 
state - very clear as he pointedly chose a meeting of the industry-funded US 
Conference Board to launch an attack on the dangers of continued sharp 
practice. 
 
“This erosion of trust in business is a serious and 
worrying development, and there’s no guarantee the 
problem will automatically get resolved. While regulators 
such as the SEC can enact bright, red-line rules about what 
is and is not permissible behaviour, we know from the 
course of history that human nature will push aggressive 
managers and organizations to continue to test new laws. 
Some managers will pursue questionable activity right up 
to technical conformity with the letter of the law, and 
some will step over the red line either directly or with 
crafty schemes and modern financial technology that 
facilitates deception.  
 
The SEC and others like us can set the rules and 
define independence – but legal definitions can only go so 
far. And our free market, democratic system will 
                                                            
environmental standards? Lessons from the forest sector. RECIEL – Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law, 16 (2), 158–72.  
180 
 
gradually erode, and inevitably suffer grievous harm, if 
remedial efforts are not undertaken and endorsed by a 
broad cross-section of our business and financial 
communities350”. 
 
Donaldson’s speech makes it very clear that the effectiveness of public policies 
is very limited unless the business and financial communities provide an 
adequate level of commitment and endorsement351 
 
Chapter 11: Compliance and governance networks 
 
16. Policy makers clearly attempt to constitute corporate “consciences” – 
getting companies “to want to do what they should do” – not just legally 
compliant outputs or actions, and meta-regulation – the proliferation of 
different forms of regulation (whether tools of state law or non-law 
mechanisms) each regulating one another – is a key feature of  both 
contemporary corporate governance352 and global governance353. The concept of 
                     
350 The full text of the speech is available on-line 
athttp://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch101404whd.htm. 
351Post, J., & Preston, L. (2012). Private management and public policy: The principle of public 
responsibility.Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
352Cheffins, B.R. (2000). Current trends in corporate governance: going from London to 
Milan via Toronto. Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 10/5, 5–42. 
353 See G20 Declaration Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy 
(Washington, D.C.: November 15th, 2008, at 3-4; G20 Declaration on Further Steps to 
Strengthen the Financial System (London: September 4th – 5th , 2009); G-20 Toronto Summit 
Declaration (Toronto, June 26th – 27th , 2010) at 6-7; G20 Cannes Summit Final Declaration 
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meta-regulation354 can be fitted into a broader literature355 in which governance 
is seen as increasingly about “collaborations”, “partnerships”, “webs” or 
“networks” in which the state, state-promulgated law, and especially 
hierarchical command-and-control regulation, is not necessarily the dominant, 
and not the only important, mechanism of regulation. In fact, regulators are 
seeking the establishment of, and are prepared to offer significant incentives 
for, a more pro-active risk management function within companies and 
financial institutions. However good the laws and the legal system may be, if 
corporate behaviour is bad, legal risks will follow. Such a philosophy involves 
much more analysis of what companies themselves regard as significant risks 
and the appropriate measures to be taken to mitigate and manage them356, as 
recently echoed by U.S. President Barack Obama, who in a public speech on 
                                                            
(Cannes, November 4th, 2011) at 9-10; IOSCO, Final Report on the Subprime Crisis May 
2008). 
354Morgan, B. (2003). The economization of politics: Meta-regulation as a form of 
nonjudicial legality.  Social & legal studies, 12.4, 489-523. 
355 See C. Parker (2002). The Open Corporation.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; J. 
Braithwaite (2003). Meta-risk management and responsive regulation for tax system 
integrity. Law and Policy, 25; Coglianese, C., & Lazer, D. (2003). Management-based 
regulation: prescribing private management to achieve public goals. Law & Society 
Review,37, 691 (government as ‘meta-manager’); Grabosky, P. (1995). Using 
nongovernmental resources to foster regulatory compliance. Governance,8, 527 
(‘metamonitoring’). See also Baldwin, R. (2004). The new punitive regulation. Modern Law 
Review,67, 351 and 374-82; Black, J. (2005). The emergence of risk-based regulation and the 
new public risk management in the United Kingdom. Public Law:Autumn, 512 and 543-5; 
Power, M. (2004). The Risk Management of Everything: Re-thinking the Politics of 
Uncertainty.London: Demos, 21. 
356 See remarks by Governor Mark W. Olson to the Financial Services Roundtable and the 
Morin Center for Banking and Financial Services, Washington, D.C. May 16th, 2006: 
http://www.promontorycs.com/images/Federal%20Reserve%20Governor%20Mark%20
W.%20Olsen%20Remarks%2005.16.2006.pdf. 
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financial regulation357 said that governments must make sure that “markets 
foster responsibility, not recklessness”.  
 
17. States, businesses, non-governmental organisations and people operating 
even outside these three sectors may all be active in constituting various 
governance networks that steer (or attempt to steer) different aspects of social 
and economic life. States and law may be important to a greater or lesser extent 
in each of these networks, with overlapping forms of governance coming 
together in different ways to frustrate or accomplish various regulatory goals. 
 
Chapter 12: Compliance and meta-regulation 
 
18. The term “meta-regulation” itself has been used as a descriptive or 
explanatory term within the literature on the “new governance” to consider the 
way in which the state’s role in governance and regulation is changing and 
splitting. The state is regulating regulation as a consequence of policies to apply 
transparency, efficiency and market competition principles to itself (e.g., 
government units that assess the social and economic impact of regulation 
proposed by other departments before allowing new legislation to be proposed; 
regulating or auditing the quality assurance mechanisms of semi-independent 
government agencies, newly privatised or corporatized entities and 
government departments). “Meta- regulation” can also entail any form of 
                     
357 Remarks by the President on Financial Rescue and Reform, Federal Hall, New York, 
September 14 2009, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-
by-the-President-on-Financial-Rescue-and-Reform-at-Federal-Hall. 
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regulation (whether by tools of state law or other mechanisms) that regulates 
any other form of regulation. Thus it might include legal regulation of self-
regulation (e.g., putting an oversight board above a self-regulatory professional 
association), non-legal methods of “regulating” internal corporate self-
regulation or management (e.g., voluntary accreditation to codes of good 
conduct, etc.), the regulation of national law-making by transnational bodies 
(such as the EU), and so on. At a domestic level one generally finds clear 
examples of legal meta-regulation of corporate responsibility within specific 
domains of social and economic regulation of business. The most common 
method is through determinations of corporate liability, damages or penalties 
in civil or criminal law by reference to whether the corporation has 
implemented an appropriate compliance system358.  
 
19. Meta-regulating law makes it a good legal risk management practice to 
implement processes to ensure internal compliance with regulatory goals. One 
of the oldest examples is probably the duty to provide a safe system of work in 
relation to occupational health and safety liability in tort and statutory 
regulation. The most famous is the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines for 
organisations, described earlier in this research, which state that the existence of 
an effective compliance system (as defined in the Guidelines) will provide 
companies or individuals with a reduction of penalty if they are found to have 
                     
358Bartle, I., & Vass, P. (2007). Self-regulation within the regulatory state: towards a new 
regulatory paradigm. Public Administration, 85.4, 885-905. 
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breached the law359. A variety of other regulatory liability regimes in the US are 
now predicated on similar considerations. In other jurisdictions, 
implementation of a compliance system is an important aspect in determining 
liability or penalties in relation to competition and consumer protection law, 
and vicarious liability for sexual harassment and discrimination or unequal 
employment opportunity. Recent UK and Australian corporate manslaughter 
disciplines could also be seen as examples of meta-regulation through the use of 
liability360. 
 
19. The law might also seek more indirect or partial methods of meta-regulation. 
In fact, in this research’s introduction, we have clarified that today’s corporate 
compliance largely reflects a culture in which more is expected from companies, 
both in terms of regulatory complexity and in terms of controls previously 
carried out directly by the State. The age in which the State directly controlled 
compliance seems long gone. Often more indirect, less coercive361 methods of 
meta-regulation are used (or proposed) for schemes aimed more at the ethical 
and discretionary aspects of corporate responsibility362, or for schemes aimed at 
                     
359Hess, D. (2007). A business ethics perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the organizational 
sentencing guidelines. Michigan Law Review, 1781-1816. 
360Rahim, M.M. (2012). Corporate governance as social responsibility: A meta-regulation 
approach to raise social responsibility of corporate governance in a weak economy. Board 
Directors and Corporate Social Responsibility, 145-167. 
361Black, J., & Baldwin, R. (2010). Really responsive risk‐based regulation.Law & Policy, 32.2, 
181-213. 
362The World Health Organisation’s International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes 
is probably the most successful example of international regulation that applies to business 
organisations. It includes a primitive meta-regulatory aspect: ‘manufacturers and 
distributors of products within the scope of this Code should regard themselves as 
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improving corporate responsibility as a whole (rather than focused on the goals 
of a specific regulatory regime). Several laws, such as the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002), that require certain corporate employees to report suspected corporate 
fraud up to senior management and require or encourage companies to put in 
place whistleblower policies are a form of partial encouragement to internal 
corporate conscience363, since a corporate policy encouraging and protecting 
whistleblowers (generally in relation to any breach of legal or ethical 
obligations, not just financial fraud) would be one element of the sort of 
processes that companies would need to have in place to ensure their own 
responsibility. However, much more is also possible. Laws that simply protect 
whistleblowers (e.g., by providing that they should not be sacked or sued for 
their actions, and giving them the right to sue for compensation if they are 
sacked), rather than mandating implementation of policies, provide indirect 
encouragement to internal corporate conscience364. The availability of damages 
indirectly holds businesses accountable for allowing a culture or management 
system that ignores and punishes whistleblowers to go unchecked, and 
                                                            
responsible for monitoring their marketing practices according to the principles and aims 
of this Code, and for taking steps to ensure that their conduct at every level conforms to 
them’. 
363An NGO the International Baby Food Action Network has been extremely active in 
monitoring compliance with the code (including the meta-regulatory provision quoted 
above) by Nestlé and other baby food companies (as well as governments), and enforcing it 
through social and political action. See Richter, J. (2001).Holding Corporations Accountable: 
Corporate Conduct, International Codes and Citizen Action.London: Zed Books. 
364Beim, D., Hirsch, A.V., & Kastellec, J.P. (2012).  Whistleblowing and Compliance in the 
Judicial Hierarchy. Princeton: Princeton University working paper.Available at: SSRN 
2141297.  
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encourages whistleblowers to make their concerns known365. Other examples 
might include government “approved” or sponsored voluntary corporate 
responsibility management accreditation and auditing schemes, voluntary 
undertakings to implement corporate responsibility management systems given 
to government and enforceable by contract, tax incentives, and government 
procurement decisions predicated on implementation of corporate 
responsibility systems. 
 
20. Another technique of legal meta-regulation of corporate responsibility is 
when regulators “settle” potential regulatory enforcement actions with businesses 
only on condition that they implement internal changes to identify, correct and 
prevent future wrongdoing. Or, where courts make corporate “probation” orders 
that require the company to do so as part of the organisation’s sentence. The US 
Sentencing Guidelines state that organisations that do not have an effective 
compliance program should be placed on probation to implement one. 
Regulators in the UK and other Commonwealth jurisdictions have used 
discretionary powers to informally make settlements requiring compliance 
system implementation for years. Similarly, US prosecutors under a number of 
regulatory regimes consider whether a business has implemented an effective 
compliance program or not in deciding whether to prosecute or not. Another 
common method of meta-regulation is to make the implementation of internal 
corporate conscience mechanisms a condition of licenses or permissions required 
                     
365Edwards, J., & Wolfe, S. (2007). Ethical and Compliance-Competence Evaluation: a key 
element of sound corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15.2, 
359-369. 
187 
 
 
before a company can engage in a certain business, or build facilities in a certain 
location. The most common examples are the environmental management 
systems and local community consultations often required as part of the licence 
obligations for permissions required from environmental regulators for 
manufacturing facilities366. License requirements for financial services firms 
usually include broad ranging internal systems for ensuring integrity of funds 
(preventing fraud, ensuring proper investment decisions, avoiding conflicts of 
interest, etc.) and investor disclosure367 (including consumer protection 
measures such as “know your client” principles) regulation368. Then there are a 
number of more voluntary meta-regulatory initiatives that seek to encourage or 
reward “beyond compliance” internal management systems369 by granting 
extra regulatory flexibility to firms that voluntarily adopt superior internal 
systems that go “beyond compliance” – for example, by fast-tracking the 
granting of permissions or licences to such firms, scheduling inspections less 
frequently for them, or providing public recognition for them through allowing 
                     
366Gunningham, N. (2011). Enforcing environmental regulation. Journal of Environmental 
Law, 23 (2), 169-201. 
367Ford, C.L. (2008). New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities 
Regulation. American Business Law Journal, 45.1, 1-60. 
368Gunningham, N. (2009). Environment law, regulation and governance: Shifting 
architectures. Journal of Environmental Law, 21(2), 179-212. 
369One partial example of meta-regulation at the transnational level is the Basel Accord on 
Banking Regulation, a voluntary multilateral agreement by which G10 nations agree to 
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them to use a seal or logo that is publicised as a mark of superior 
performance370.  
 
 
 
 
                     
370Coglianese, C., & Mendelson, E. (2010). Meta-regulation and self-regulation. Penn Law 
School Public Law and Legal Theory, Research Paper no. 12-11.  
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Final remarks 
 
“ If you think compliance is expensive, try non-compliance”371. 
 
Former Deputy US Attorney General Paul McNulty 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
0. In a closely connected business world, few issues affect corporate leaders 
and organizations as deeply as corporate compliance. This research has first 
dealt with the evolving contents of compliance in the context of a single 
corporate entity, where a gradient of intensity can be found across available 
literature. While compliance cannot be easily decoupled from corporate social 
responsibility in the public discourse and even in legal and managerial 
scholarship, compliance is not - only - a truism (a “Binseweisheit”)best practice 
or a “soft” law, but an obligation embedded in “hard” legal prescriptions. The 
nature of this obligation can be ascribed to a company’s top management  set of 
obligations (it is a “Fuehrungsausgabe”) and to the duty of legality 
(“Legalitaetspflicht”)stemming therefrom. For organizational purposes, 
compliance can be delegated to corporate departments, but in any case the top 
                     
371Friedman, T. L. (2005). The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
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management does not free itself from the compliance duty nor loses its 
responsibility as a collegiate body. Based on a review of a vast body of 
international literature and case-law, this thesis shows that compliance is 
generally regarded as an “organizational duty”, i.e. as a duty to establish a risk 
recognition and pre-emption organization.   
 
1. The law often grants discretion to corporate boards as to how and to 
what extent actually implement the compliance-derived organisational duty, 
and the corporate governance implications of this open-ended duty have been 
examined in part I and part III of this research against the backdrop of different 
corporate governance architectures and corporate bodies.In this respect, many 
risk-management-related rules are different from outcome-oriented or 
command-and-control regulations (substantive rules), as they provide a certain 
flexibility to companies to devise their own solutions to challenges. Several 
scholars argue, however, that this kind of risk management-related regulation 
facilitates misperceptions about what risk management can and cannot do. 
While risk management as a managerial tool is inherently imperfect, the very 
assimilation of risk management into regulation may have negative effects in 
two directions. First, ex ante, market participants, especially outside a company, 
may develop a sense of misplaced security over how much a firm’s 
management is in control of the outside world. The view that managing risk 
means having risks under control is obviously wrong, but it may only be 
natural to share it if risk management is legally and politically sanctioned and if 
firms heavily invest in it as a consequence. Second, ex post, risk management 
regulation may well generate an opposite misconception on the part of law 
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enforcers dealing with situations in which harmful events have materialized. If 
the law requires or expects adequate risk management policies and procedures, 
then it is easy to be led into thinking that, had those procedures been in place 
and complied with, no harmful event would have materialized, and hence that 
management or the board are at fault because their risk management 
procedures were below the minimal acceptable standard. 
 
2. The discretion offered to boardrooms should never be interpreted too 
broadly: complying or not complying with the laws is in any case not subject to 
the discretion of the board, and cannot represent an opportunity for cost-
opportunity analysis. At the same time, setting up efficient compliance 
organization and programs can be an important opportunity – and not just a 
legal obligation – for corporate boards. In fact, managers who implement 
effective measures to detect crime and who report wrongdoing can benefit their 
companies even if prosecutors do decide to indict. For instance, under the US 
federal sentencing guidelines and the Italian D. Lgs. no. 231/2001, a convicted 
corporation faces a significantly lower criminal fine if it had an effective 
compliance program, reported wrongdoing promptly, and cooperated than if it 
did not. If a company can prove that, before the crime was committed, it 
adopted and effectively implemented a model of organisation, management 
and control it is exempt from corporate liability under Italian law. Moreover, a 
corporation whose managers follow good corporate practices in deterring crime 
may avoid intrusive corporate probation. Finally, as testified by very robust 
bulk of managerial studies, in the face of public pressure or the threat of state 
regulation, being proactively compliant with rules and norms may be the most 
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rational strategy for business to evade the risks associated with adverse 
campaigning or public regulation. In fact, as argued in part III of this research, 
one the ironies or the recent era of deregulation business (in terms of state 
control) has been the simultaneous expansion of constraints imposed by civil 
society.  
 
3. This research maintains that corporate officers who face a compliance 
duty engage in a collaborative effort with public enforcers. This is a key feature 
of so called “enforced self-regulation”, a scheme where the State provides a 
general but open-ended obligation, and leaves its implementation to the 
company’s top management and compliance officers. Based on existing case-
law a  compliance officer has a sui generis obligation. Indeed, he is obliged to 
avert criminal acts committed by employees of the organisation to the 
detriment of third parties. In fact it is not the compliance officer's primary duty 
to protect the company from attacks and damages, as is the case, for example, 
with auditing (preventing breach of trust and embezzlement at the company's 
expense) and measures for the protection of security of the works (preventing 
unauthorized persons from entering). Rather, compliance's duty – and, 
therefore, the employees' duty who work in that area – is the prevention of 
illegal acts having effect within the company (e.g. violation of regulations for 
the protection of employees) and outside of the company (e.g. cartel agreements 
or the use of company computers to exchange child pornography). The 
compliance officer can also take on additional tasks, such as a data security, 
money laundering or an export control officer. By accepting these duties 
compliance officers assume a special legal position, which distinguishes them 
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from the other employees within the company.Significant differences across 
jurisdictions have been detected as to whether the board and/or the compliance 
officer can be carachterized assistantpublic prosecutor (“Hilfsbeamter der 
Staatsanwaltschaft”). In Italy, for instance, the Collegio Sindacale can be 
considered as such, while this is not the case in Germany. Hence, it is 
controversial what happens in those cases in which the Compliance 
Department coincides with an Italian Collegio Sindacale, and whether the latter 
loses its status of guarantor of enforcement or the status of guarantor is 
extended to the compliance organization.  
 
4. The challenges posed by compliance increase substantially in the context 
of a corporate group, and exponentially so in the context of a group whose 
business is carried out in a cross-border context. This research has in particular 
tried to advance research on the duties of group compliance, against the 
backdrop of multi-country regulatory diversity, private-to-private compliance 
obligations and organizational discretion. In fact, no law obliges a group to opt 
for a centralized group compliance or for a decentralized solution. More 
specifically, the task of a group compliance officer with a group-wide 
centralized compliance is a Sisyphean task. While a group is generally not 
regarded as a legal persona – unlike individual group companies – compliance 
shall ensure an efficient risk detection and pre-emption system that duly takes 
into account each country’s specificity. Moreover, this research has found 
multiple and converging evidence that public prosecutors routinely seek to 
ascertain the role of the holding company within group architectures, and often 
hold them liable for violations taking place at the subsidiaries’ level.  
194 
 
 
5. This thesis has tried to close a gap in existing literature by pointing out 
the limitations that should be considered when examining the duties of the 
international group compliance officer.Groups need to tailor their compliance 
programs to the international laws that apply to them. More specifically, these 
programs must comply with the foreign requirements and laws of all relevant 
jurisdictions where the companies do business. At first glance, this may seem 
like a daunting task. While it acknowledges several risks and duties associated 
with the task as group compliance officer, this thesis also conveys the message 
that his/her task should relativized due to a number of factors. Firstly, the 
extension of compliance duty to the whole group, and hence to the parent 
company, is only possible if specific reasons are provided to demonstrate an 
active involvement of the parent company in the subsidiary’s actions – the mere 
status of holding company is not enough. Secondly, one of the guiding 
principles of compliance management is that it should be commensurate to the 
complexity of the business and to its architecture, and in many cases 
compliance officers are merely obligated to report to the chief executive officer, 
so if they fulfill this obligation, there is no room for a liability based on 
omission. Thirdly, according to several commentators, the parent company’s 
compliance officer advising group subsidiaries can be considered as an 
“external consultant”. In such a capacity, the compliance officer is accordingly 
bound by confidentiality and attorney privileges, so conflicts can in particular 
arise when the group compliance officer is a lawyer and deals with group 
subsidiaries.  
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6. An important element that also contributes to relativize the role of a 
group compliance officer is the existence of restraints to the flow of information 
within a corporate group. As pointed out in this research, the access to 
information and data can sometimes generate conflict with data protection laws 
which exist in several foreign jurisdictions, and neither a board nor a 
compliance officer have legal powers to either override or disregard these laws. 
 
7. Based on our research’s findings, abundant international guidance exists 
that can help companies comply with international laws, such as the OECD’s 
Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance, or the 
newly released ISO 19600 standard on compliance management systems. Yet, 
the existence of standards is not sufficient to overcome the complexity of 
regulatory diversity. In fact, a group compliance officer’s business is also 
relativized by the absence of third-party certifications which could contribute to 
increase comparability of compliance organizations and processes across cross-
border boundaries.  In the absence of third-party certifications, it is still unclear 
how group compliance officers are supposed to prove their implementation of 
global standards to others. Therefore, it can well occur that a compliance officer 
is confronted with conflicting provisions, especially since the definitions are 
inconsistent and certainly this counteracts the aspired global standardization. 
 
8. As this research is confined to the challenges of compliance in cross-
border corporate groups, the review of the literature suggests that there is a 
wide range of issues that might have some impact on this area. In particular, a 
plethora of issues such as political, legal, cultural and social issues are likely 
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exogenous factors in this space. Another limitation of this research is that, 
having elements from different legal, managerial and policy environments, it is 
often difficult to build a parsimonious theory and theoretical specification. 
Consequently, generalisability of the findings is the most difficult aspect of this 
research approach. At the same time, this research provides several elements 
for future research. In particular, insofar as a robust body of literature and case 
law about cross-border compliance develops and cross-border cooperation 
among national enforcement authorities increases, the contours and duties of 
group compliance organizations will be defined more in-depth.  
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